Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.1 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 63280C43387 for ; Thu, 10 Jan 2019 17:52:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 38AA720685 for ; Thu, 10 Jan 2019 17:52:05 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linaro.org header.i=@linaro.org header.b="V7CT7YZV" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730693AbfAJRwE (ORCPT ); Thu, 10 Jan 2019 12:52:04 -0500 Received: from mail-qt1-f194.google.com ([209.85.160.194]:45718 "EHLO mail-qt1-f194.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1730549AbfAJRwE (ORCPT ); Thu, 10 Jan 2019 12:52:04 -0500 Received: by mail-qt1-f194.google.com with SMTP id e5so14249987qtr.12 for ; Thu, 10 Jan 2019 09:52:03 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linaro.org; s=google; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references; bh=GrDWcqvz4w1IZM4bLnbt43ZL+fuuyvY4dihBlBpjGL0=; b=V7CT7YZVqJwT7KawAlSte1rU4wkBeTBI45PKWaYqng+i+5CJnWwFUqTCq6Re/emZoA Hq3thIUPjwiW+cyQT+XIJ6PLVPfBJAOyWntt0ANyEkS+jm72EuGjCGySpyH5iDVsYPyJ A1kClvbOhApBH485aAhAcGJDxZeaiFIYoRHJY= X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references; bh=GrDWcqvz4w1IZM4bLnbt43ZL+fuuyvY4dihBlBpjGL0=; b=PPEsmMgcZoQgg8iJnh6Cd+mYKWrpI/nZeNwECiTPRa30a4bZ6JID0r/Pg8b6N7o5Ru UpGatNHykT6H5yj17OTuwWvEMVDLHx8cAM+HuNRzZ9JCSWu06cgn52vHhF03jlluG9fp jxRwK47oApe5RAhDhD6r48Rgpf8Q2jD30ZxGjMofOBCwKquFD+QWz7TlRJLULG866rbL seHGvJIWUUqpKNeFs0RJD/b+s4/a8obYW4dNIK7kT302PXSb4SvBQHFotHvAvEhEOAxG L3FgUtHL98HHex6mRcZaxL3hCBu0A47WiLwlz9qGNhNBnQgNxV3/G4M4bJNboKd6gtMv piXg== X-Gm-Message-State: AJcUukeytPT4IzuWaEJuI9tBS/qduZdmpZj3PqAHmYd8UFrF8NSSdSsC CCi68NKAob91CeWYJhGjwT2C8Ux95p4= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ALg8bN6+iw0fnRKxN9HLxu4TQyua5G2QNN647vrgOU7B6RWgK2LXomJOGSMRJczeD4Szvhy2O6vbIA== X-Received: by 2002:ac8:2281:: with SMTP id f1mr10541942qta.197.1547142722843; Thu, 10 Jan 2019 09:52:02 -0800 (PST) Received: from localhost.localdomain (pool-72-71-243-63.cncdnh.fast00.myfairpoint.net. [72.71.243.63]) by smtp.googlemail.com with ESMTPSA id b8sm41815904qka.79.2019.01.10.09.52.01 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Thu, 10 Jan 2019 09:52:01 -0800 (PST) From: David Long To: stable@vger.kernel.org, Russell King - ARM Linux , Florian Fainelli , Julien Thierry , Tony Lindgren , Marc Zyngier , Mark Rutland Cc: Greg KH , Mark Brown Subject: [PATCH 4.14 07/17] ARM: 8795/1: spectre-v1.1: use put_user() for __put_user() Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2019 12:51:40 -0500 Message-Id: <20190110175150.5239-8-dave.long@linaro.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20190110175150.5239-1-dave.long@linaro.org> References: <20190110175150.5239-1-dave.long@linaro.org> Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org From: Julien Thierry Commit e3aa6243434fd9a82e84bb79ab1abd14f2d9a5a7 upstream. When Spectre mitigation is required, __put_user() needs to include check_uaccess. This is already the case for put_user(), so just make __put_user() an alias of put_user(). Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry Signed-off-by: Russell King Signed-off-by: David A. Long --- arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h | 15 +++++++++------ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h index 7d19584f5c39..cf50b030c62c 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -370,6 +370,14 @@ do { \ __pu_err; \ }) +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE +/* + * When mitigating Spectre variant 1.1, all accessors need to include + * verification of the address space. + */ +#define __put_user(x, ptr) put_user(x, ptr) + +#else #define __put_user(x, ptr) \ ({ \ long __pu_err = 0; \ @@ -377,12 +385,6 @@ do { \ __pu_err; \ }) -#define __put_user_error(x, ptr, err) \ -({ \ - __put_user_switch((x), (ptr), (err), __put_user_nocheck); \ - (void) 0; \ -}) - #define __put_user_nocheck(x, __pu_ptr, __err, __size) \ do { \ unsigned long __pu_addr = (unsigned long)__pu_ptr; \ @@ -462,6 +464,7 @@ do { \ : "r" (x), "i" (-EFAULT) \ : "cc") +#endif /* !CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE */ #ifdef CONFIG_MMU extern unsigned long __must_check -- 2.17.1