Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.0 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 318E0C282CB for ; Mon, 4 Feb 2019 10:44:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 04582217F9 for ; Mon, 4 Feb 2019 10:44:27 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1549277067; bh=A9fxE1x00GgycQ2AVf6PRUOepdRNBGrIgR5VXOkzLYo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:List-ID:From; b=gJpj3ESr0WMyt3PHRKt8ScssOKHBZ3wb3L5MPBAl/Xn0TuXWvrwRR+cVrnKHaMlwU l9m84l26xVWwPp1RQWvLSvnQXxE9PZV6fzxhnOn85sMxt/vCDMC8Sjog3eI1gcqcW7 3JSPBMroGJPHnXVT6+y8HdOgrzlCsJHOJcRAuQOU= Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1730501AbfBDKoZ (ORCPT ); Mon, 4 Feb 2019 05:44:25 -0500 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]:42204 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1730519AbfBDKoY (ORCPT ); Mon, 4 Feb 2019 05:44:24 -0500 Received: from localhost (5356596B.cm-6-7b.dynamic.ziggo.nl [83.86.89.107]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A5D5C2176F; Mon, 4 Feb 2019 10:44:23 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1549277064; bh=A9fxE1x00GgycQ2AVf6PRUOepdRNBGrIgR5VXOkzLYo=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Rpl3LSCPP9S48eWxsfpYq0l/ucslfajmW6cdzjJfFr2VsZu+gqowyL1CyxdC8lXdk Mqaf15ByjkhP+A1echuBQyYaCqONY+HTN8cPyT9UBglx1dRvvazUMOCQ/r8tW8+nKT 4zygLSZzmo2NQYN2Isb9eaKdWhniVTG0jUb3Op1I= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Aya Levin , Eran Ben Elisha , Saeed Mahameed Subject: [PATCH 4.14 10/46] net/mlx5e: Allow MAC invalidation while spoofchk is ON Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2019 11:36:41 +0100 Message-Id: <20190204103610.476927978@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20190204103608.651205056@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20190204103608.651205056@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.65 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org 4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Aya Levin [ Upstream commit 9d2cbdc5d334967c35b5f58c7bf3208e17325647 ] Prior to this patch the driver prohibited spoof checking on invalid MAC. Now the user can set this configuration if it wishes to. This is required since libvirt might invalidate the VF Mac by setting it to zero, while spoofcheck is ON. Fixes: 1ab2068a4c66 ("net/mlx5: Implement vports admin state backup/restore") Signed-off-by: Aya Levin Reviewed-by: Eran Ben Elisha Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch.c | 18 ++++++------------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch.c @@ -1126,13 +1126,6 @@ static int esw_vport_ingress_config(stru int err = 0; u8 *smac_v; - if (vport->info.spoofchk && !is_valid_ether_addr(vport->info.mac)) { - mlx5_core_warn(esw->dev, - "vport[%d] configure ingress rules failed, illegal mac with spoofchk\n", - vport->vport); - return -EPERM; - } - esw_vport_cleanup_ingress_rules(esw, vport); if (!vport->info.vlan && !vport->info.qos && !vport->info.spoofchk) { @@ -1734,13 +1727,10 @@ int mlx5_eswitch_set_vport_mac(struct ml mutex_lock(&esw->state_lock); evport = &esw->vports[vport]; - if (evport->info.spoofchk && !is_valid_ether_addr(mac)) { + if (evport->info.spoofchk && !is_valid_ether_addr(mac)) mlx5_core_warn(esw->dev, - "MAC invalidation is not allowed when spoofchk is on, vport(%d)\n", + "Set invalid MAC while spoofchk is on, vport(%d)\n", vport); - err = -EPERM; - goto unlock; - } err = mlx5_modify_nic_vport_mac_address(esw->dev, vport, mac); if (err) { @@ -1886,6 +1876,10 @@ int mlx5_eswitch_set_vport_spoofchk(stru evport = &esw->vports[vport]; pschk = evport->info.spoofchk; evport->info.spoofchk = spoofchk; + if (pschk && !is_valid_ether_addr(evport->info.mac)) + mlx5_core_warn(esw->dev, + "Spoofchk in set while MAC is invalid, vport(%d)\n", + evport->vport); if (evport->enabled && esw->mode == SRIOV_LEGACY) err = esw_vport_ingress_config(esw, evport); if (err)