Return-Path: Received: from mail.linutronix.de (146.0.238.70:993) by crypto-ml.lab.linutronix.de with IMAP4-SSL for ; 05 Feb 2019 17:26:19 -0000 Received: from mga18.intel.com ([134.134.136.126]) by Galois.linutronix.de with esmtps (TLS1.2:DHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:256) (Exim 4.80) (envelope-from ) id 1gr4UC-00035S-Vi for speck@linutronix.de; Tue, 05 Feb 2019 18:26:17 +0100 Date: Tue, 5 Feb 2019 09:26:13 -0800 From: Andi Kleen Subject: [MODERATED] Re: [PATCH v1 9/9] PERFv1 3 Message-ID: <20190205172613.GK31598@tassilo.jf.intel.com> References: <20190205152804.GY17528@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> <20190205164829.GI31598@tassilo.jf.intel.com> <20190205171326.GI17550@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20190205171326.GI17550@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: speck@linutronix.de List-ID: > We should probably have a notsx boot option that completely disables the > feature including its userspace enumeration. Some security consious > folks might actually like that. TSX has been a boon to all the fault > driven exploit muck. TSX generally only messes with exploit detection approaches, which are IMHO all snake oil anyways because they can be always circumvented in other ways. If you dig into it more deeply there's no clear security case for actually disabling TSX. In some cases it can make exploit easier to write, but that alone isn't a good reason to disable it. > And userspace should be able to do this; we killed TSX on some early > models before, right? On parts of the models without many cores. The large core count parts always had it. Functionally yes, but there are workloads that rely on it for performance, which would be effectively broken too. -Andi