Return-Path: Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=pass (helo) smtp.helo=mga12.intel.com (client-ip=192.55.52.136; helo=mga12.intel.com; envelope-from=vernon.mauery@linux.intel.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.intel.com Received: from mga12.intel.com (mga12.intel.com [192.55.52.136]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 43wXDq6frTzDqSx for ; Fri, 8 Feb 2019 08:55:38 +1100 (AEDT) X-Amp-Result: UNKNOWN X-Amp-Original-Verdict: FILE UNKNOWN X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga007.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.58]) by fmsmga106.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 07 Feb 2019 13:55:35 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.58,345,1544515200"; d="scan'208";a="113238805" Received: from vmauery-desk.jf.intel.com (HELO mauery.jf.intel.com) ([10.7.150.62]) by orsmga007.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 07 Feb 2019 13:55:35 -0800 Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2019 13:55:35 -0800 From: Vernon Mauery To: Brad Bishop Cc: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org Subject: Re: Secure boot for BMC Message-ID: <20190207215535.GB9159@mauery.jf.intel.com> References: <20190205141403.y2yno3nmxvwgd6ex@thinkpad> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20190205141403.y2yno3nmxvwgd6ex@thinkpad> User-Agent: Mutt/1.9.4 (2018-02-28) X-BeenThere: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Development list for OpenBMC List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 07 Feb 2019 21:55:40 -0000 On 05-Feb-2019 09:14 AM, Brad Bishop wrote: >Hi everyone > >Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to >OpenBMC in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe? Just trying to get a feel for who >all wants to collaborate on this before I submit a design template. I would like to collaborate as well. I can share the ideas that we are working on for a two-flash secure boot model. --Vernon