From: Dan Carpenter Date: Thu, 04 Apr 2019 15:12:17 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] xen: Prevent buffer overflow in privcmd ioctl Message-Id: <20190404151217.GA22334@kadam> List-Id: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: Boris Ostrovsky Cc: Juergen Gross , Stefano Stabellini , x86@kernel.org, kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , "H. Peter Anvin" , xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Thomas Gleixner The "call" variable comes from the user in privcmd_ioctl_hypercall(). It's an offset into the hypercall_page[] which has (PAGE_SIZE / 32) elements. We need to put an upper bound on it to prevent an out of bounds access. Fixes: 1246ae0bb992 ("xen: add variable hypercall caller") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter --- arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h index de6f0d59a24f..2863c2026655 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/xen/hypercall.h @@ -206,6 +206,9 @@ xen_single_call(unsigned int call, __HYPERCALL_DECLS; __HYPERCALL_5ARG(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5); + if (call >= PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(hypercall_page[0])) + return -EINVAL; + asm volatile(CALL_NOSPEC : __HYPERCALL_5PARAM : [thunk_target] "a" (&hypercall_page[call]) -- 2.17.1