Return-Path: Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=none (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=linux.intel.com (client-ip=134.134.136.31; helo=mga06.intel.com; envelope-from=vernon.mauery@linux.intel.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.intel.com Received: from mga06.intel.com (mga06.intel.com [134.134.136.31]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 46ZdRZ1pPlzF3Q8 for ; Sat, 21 Sep 2019 01:48:40 +1000 (AEST) X-Amp-Result: UNKNOWN X-Amp-Original-Verdict: FILE UNKNOWN X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga001.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.18]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 20 Sep 2019 08:48:37 -0700 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.64,529,1559545200"; d="scan'208";a="271577547" Received: from vmauery-desk.jf.intel.com (HELO mauery.jf.intel.com) ([10.7.150.62]) by orsmga001-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 20 Sep 2019 08:48:36 -0700 Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2019 08:48:35 -0700 From: Vernon Mauery To: Joseph Reynolds Cc: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org Subject: Re: Staging plans to remove network IPMI support? Message-ID: <20190920154835.GJ45301@mauery.jf.intel.com> References: <24ab3a70-2752-e2ba-5a37-41ee35f8aa92@linux.ibm.com> <9ad6bc40-8b34-1c54-c1f6-abd5d0ee1672@linux.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable In-Reply-To: <9ad6bc40-8b34-1c54-c1f6-abd5d0ee1672@linux.ibm.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.9.4 (2018-02-28) X-BeenThere: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Development list for OpenBMC List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2019 15:48:43 -0000 On 18-Sep-2019 04:34 PM, Joseph Reynolds wrote: > Re-sending to fix up formatting error: >=20 > The OpenBMC security working group discussed a desire to remove out-of-ba= nd > network IPMI support from the OpenBMC firmware stack, here: > https://lists.ozlabs.org/pipermail/openbmc/2019-September/018319.html >=20 > This would affect out-of-band (network IPMI) only, in repository > https://github.com/openbmc/phosphor-net-ipmid. The host IPMI support is > a separate topic. >=20 > The *main idea* is a staging plan to remove network IPMI support over a > period of years, like in this progression: This may be a year 3030 topic; I would not worry too much about it for=20 now. By the time RMCP+ is gone, BMCs may not even be a thing anymore :) But in all seriousness, telnet and rlogin stayed on for YEARS beyond=20 their welcome. It will be a difficult task to wean users off RMCP+. It=20 is so easy to use and we are all used to it. Redfish is so complicated=20 and we don't have the tooling to make it work as smoothly as RMCP+. Basically what I am saying is that we need buy-in from the end users. So=20 far, for all its wonder and glory, Redfish really has been a hard sell.=20 For all the warts and flaws of RMCP+ over IPMI, people *need* it. People=20 are not rational and do not make security decisions based on logic. > 1. Tell everyone the plans at each stage below. For example: emails to the > group, mention in the release notes, update > https://github.com/openbmc/phosphor-net-ipmid/blob/master/README.md and t= he > ipmitool repo. We can certainly add something to the README, but we do need to set some=20 expectations on how much people actually read documentation. Adding=20 something there will not have nearly as much effect as putting a big red=20 banner on the bmcweb console that says "IPMI over RMCP+ is enabled and=20 is insecure. You might consider disabling it and using the Redfish=20 protocol instead" OpenBMC does not own the ipmitool project (or any of the other=20 opensource utilities that speak RMCP+), so we will need to reach out. It=20 turns out that the ipmitool maintainer is a member of the OpenBMC=20 community, so we can hopefully leverage that relationship. > 2. Implement the Redfish ManagerNetworkProtocol - defined in the DMTF > Redfish Resource and Schema Guide DSP2046 https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP204= 6.=A0 > This gives the BMC admin an interface to disable out-of-band network > IPMI.That means stopping the IPMI network service and closing its port. I keep hearing stories about redfish not being united and common enough=20 to be useful. Does the spec need to grow or do we just need to make sure=20 that it is always implemented according to the spec? > 3. Change the IPMI ManagerNetworkProtocol setting to be disabled by > default.=A0 After this, BMC admins have to take an explicit action to ena= ble > IPMI access. I would hope that long before we disable netipmid by default, Redfish=20 would be the main mechanism for accessing the BMC.=20 > By this point it should be possible to learn how to migrate from > IPMI to Redfish APIs. No, people should be learning how to migrate from IPMI to Redfish right=20 now, long before we attempt to disable RMCP+/IPMI by default. > 4. Remove IPMI from the default OpenBMC configuration. This means network > IPMI is not built into the BMC firmware image. After this, project who wa= nt > to use network IPMI will have to explicitly add it to their image. This w= ill > hopefully be a wake-up call to anyone who is still using network IPMI. I think this step could be moved up. Not every OEM user of OpenBMC wants=20 to include netipmid in their builds today. Adding a package to an image=20 is just as easy as removing it. We could make it NOT part of the image=20 by default and require all OEMs that want it to add it to their image. > 5. Remove all references to network IPMI from OpenBMC. I am not sure this is ever necessary. This is not a nanny state. If=20 someone wants openBMC to have insecure packages on their builds, that is=20 up to them. We can disable the package by default, but I think that is=20 as far as we need to go. --Vernon