Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-9.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BF07BC43215 for ; Tue, 19 Nov 2019 21:46:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8CC902240E for ; Tue, 19 Nov 2019 21:46:09 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=yahoo.com header.i=@yahoo.com header.b="i400tjzB" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726911AbfKSVqJ (ORCPT ); Tue, 19 Nov 2019 16:46:09 -0500 Received: from sonic313-15.consmr.mail.ne1.yahoo.com ([66.163.185.38]:45106 "EHLO sonic313-15.consmr.mail.ne1.yahoo.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727082AbfKSVqJ (ORCPT ); Tue, 19 Nov 2019 16:46:09 -0500 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=yahoo.com; s=s2048; t=1574199966; bh=pQnVgBDQ9FVixicaxYpRVJb7Y52n1wmRYRG9yF/IRdE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From:Subject; b=i400tjzB6LJ3Q4KVR09Zuat8CaekpBG4tW3q1SrL8jyKQQsHZ5UgkcC8M6MyCby3I37kf/zuT2Z0L80xEeRqt9a4qXe5rWvTEzCZm4PuV+7p0pTi77SVj3lIJquoP7M3g+cdYpjQ2N6xWnNR37uh3sSs4dAUZBEwL9e1bY3GBBMDBGKlOE5LkpwENGyyuHvcxb+sxhS5Tr2f+2LsvrMlLE66EAq6Gqk6IansMQR/98QyGqAqUfUEWZZAZmXEBN4fFhWos89j3AfId1uXnmQRTsN5s8XA4YACXryJeLlAl7ScRUZA0wfy7vK9Z3Xx9j4fif93bG87rQAjb5Z31I7grg== X-YMail-OSG: 0nqfzzMVM1k6tEwaC.Vh02X0c0.0H3peqHOAegE3DLeEcHx_mP3fOuZg13wn2Qk ULi5f8tyUDIRdkX7d2aXmTj7272stm_ta8UJk32CccufX13TesTHZdtnSIyUO_SbW.D4NdcgSMN9 PnGmT5m5vPDM_DFSZ3jaCdHjmUJCC3tYi.RsWRJ77UxpbeNCkKLdo0qIafo7RzdWJQj0Rdrk2VSC IaFlITFHVh2z_dr0bLDunL_3AgCCJvtB6zBAmFW3TGwXOsQCGMNcrPKChwiiQK1OsQA9TwYiHUx0 _GXH7Jl5LgSAtyRUq4o56iGv3uso2OcG4d_PD3JGSi5_SVitlN1vjQJR9bi81mMxsu8KsqJrIs29 nvhXl5uQYzvVP.z71QZVVKR4HdlIZgXgHipwVFSO2pu.LNV.FyBGwEIfr6V.fD0MoFOn2glo2YJL R3L51tEsQToWjRdAje_pMmnYzEuMVTmo2YpI6bdJ4AOVo_yb5s6PWVq9RNBWzsNU9cHsLsoGK2yD A4tguHDZ4VpKcK0j4bPCgf6bVcpSNF3GugdHPaPiEvLmv7CiEF6JfvsZRcQf3s8g3AKjINMZVIEV rSe66vaqIC.fOGP9QOb2HyjOFrPZLtRZDkybzHPQDqzikeUwim62PaUXqg76y_bKh4XhPYlcCrKW B7VHPer6mqEgUVcoCJOP3uv35JcvIW_dHXie0zLFUFEuOpUixEvt.pf_fBRFy66n9fhr.RIno9oz 9VpZrq1bwjPnVFLyKIr7PBfe8PrjlcerT99eEd9ax4piFp3t6kAQO4B83o2oIFhwNIoJfYZdPDqZ zacz3vDowHJn.cvuKzZYcErlfbUhXkicPzOMaju4LWGcuGH.OhQIqfGDlMXRnHR6O3K.c3ppXMHT oG1CjB0a8MqQLFUvmKQbolFduT_qBjobjxN0RF5y3T2ES9aYqw1xvJUAtppQETsDOWSO9QEWznoJ CkP_9Q8zLyGpnT4Q8rY2RKiaPAjDoH6NZdNru1_FdyhiZwx5N1UKN6s3cnSiGbXVO4D9mYlfcjJA mKIIWlZgl_pTS4aoluwREULRQjxTjwg2AWgcOJ_wPY5J0nv9cZgQ7KGkkkC75.fyL0YlvMlwaCwa EpvyWyRmc7PgDw1OtKx530cRO2LoNh2Sm8Ee4aLFOG5iXHAkCWGiLEE0xP0NNa3KLytTFxlZKbPv paXpHxGqpjdsXeW63agN_iW4ObRh4t5qn5E4qHOkp84qkw1V5al61rHd77Rk7ljLhrzKQs6AGrJS 8poLDCbJQw0IcHsrvj6rzksywTkoiTfu8_1MnvfHbVFZBbAmajaFmGKbZgsIbTXKCUtAi0qq84vS n7s4TTyoWC.1dvDoqnjmKQhRuTIUIV5NgNjTlzGYXLaCUz_szhNh8DXFjqISkVRdncJ5nx.0Yn8i BG1FCFB9.ScHdx5zvlEL_8MnWA.4F17ePRpYoHO26UkpcfFhf Received: from sonic.gate.mail.ne1.yahoo.com by sonic313.consmr.mail.ne1.yahoo.com with HTTP; Tue, 19 Nov 2019 21:46:06 +0000 Received: by smtp406.mail.ne1.yahoo.com (Oath Hermes SMTP Server) with ESMTPA ID 44ccda8ccd0493c5e1e3acd1964ab202; Tue, 19 Nov 2019 21:46:05 +0000 (UTC) From: Casey Schaufler To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com Subject: [PATCH v11 09/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Date: Tue, 19 Nov 2019 13:45:57 -0800 Message-Id: <20191119214601.13238-3-casey@schaufler-ca.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.20.1 In-Reply-To: <20191119214601.13238-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> References: <20191119214601.13238-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Change the security_task_getsecid() interface to fill in a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid in support of LSM stacking. Audit interfaces will need to collect all possible secids for possible reporting. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Reviewed-by: John Johansen Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org --- drivers/android/binder.c | 4 +-- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++--- kernel/audit.c | 11 ++++---- kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +-- kernel/auditsc.c | 18 ++++++++----- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 5 +++- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 ++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 4 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++----------- security/security.c | 12 ++++++--- 10 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c index 5f4702b4c507..3a7fcdc8dbe2 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c @@ -3108,12 +3108,10 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, t->priority = task_nice(current); if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) { - u32 secid; struct lsmblob blob; size_t added_size; - security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &secid); - lsmblob_init(&blob, secid); + security_task_getsecid(proc->tsk, &blob); ret = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz); if (ret) { return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY; diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 9519b4fb43ae..67f95a335b5d 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid); int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p); int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p); -void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); +void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob); int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice); int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio); int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p); @@ -1099,9 +1099,10 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) return 0; } -static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +static inline void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, + struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid = 0; + lsmblob_init(blob, 0); } static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 2f8e89eaf3e5..fd29186ae977 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -2062,14 +2062,12 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) char *ctx = NULL; unsigned len; int error; - u32 sid; struct lsmblob blob; - security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); - if (!sid) + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); + if (!lsmblob_is_set(&blob)) return 0; - lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); error = security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &ctx, &len); if (error) { if (error != -EINVAL) @@ -2276,6 +2274,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) { kuid_t uid = current_uid(), auid; + struct lsmblob blob; if (auditd_test_task(t) && (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || @@ -2286,7 +2285,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) audit_sig_uid = auid; else audit_sig_uid = uid; - security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_sig_sid); + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */ + audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0]; } return audit_signal_info_syscall(t); diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c index 356db1dd276c..19cfbe716f9d 100644 --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c @@ -1324,7 +1324,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) { struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; pid_t pid; - u32 sid; struct lsmblob blob; switch (f->type) { @@ -1355,8 +1354,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: if (f->lsm_rule) { - security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); - lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); result = security_audit_rule_match( &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index ce8bf2d8f8d2..cccb681ad081 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -444,7 +444,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, { const struct cred *cred; int i, need_sid = 1; - u32 sid; struct lsmblob blob; unsigned int sessionid; @@ -641,10 +640,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, logged upon error */ if (f->lsm_rule) { if (need_sid) { - security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); + security_task_getsecid(tsk, &blob); need_sid = 0; } - lsmblob_init(&blob, sid); result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob, f->type, f->op, @@ -2382,12 +2380,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) { struct audit_context *context = audit_context(); + struct lsmblob blob; context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t); context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); context->target_uid = task_uid(t); context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid); + security_task_getsecid(t, &blob); + /* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */ + context->target_sid = blob.secid[0]; memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); } @@ -2403,6 +2404,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp; struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context(); kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t); + struct lsmblob blob; if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) return 0; @@ -2414,7 +2416,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); ctx->target_uid = t_uid; ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid); + security_task_getsecid(t, &blob); + /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */ + ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0]; memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); return 0; } @@ -2435,7 +2439,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t); axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); - security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); + security_task_getsecid(t, &blob); + /* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */ + axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0]; memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); axp->pid_count++; diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c index 0cda17cb44a0..e279b81d9545 100644 --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c @@ -1539,11 +1539,14 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void) int ret_val; struct netlbl_dom_map *entry; struct netlbl_audit audit_info; + struct lsmblob blob; /* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */ - security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info.secid); + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding until audit_info.secid is converted */ + audit_info.secid = blob.secid[0]; audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID; audit_info.sessionid = 0; diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h index 3c67afce64f1..438b5db6c714 100644 --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h @@ -34,7 +34,11 @@ static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { - security_task_getsecid(current, &audit_info->secid); + struct lsmblob blob; + + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding until secid is converted */ + audit_info->secid = blob.secid[0]; audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current); audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 136ae4e0ee92..7288a574459b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -48,11 +48,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void) int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func) { u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; if (!ima_appraise) return 0; - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); + lsmblob_secid(&blob, &secid); return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 60027c643ecd..cac654c2faaf 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -380,12 +380,13 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, */ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) { - u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) { - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, - 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */ + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], + NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); } return 0; @@ -408,10 +409,12 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { int ret; u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); - ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, - MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ + ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], + NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); if (ret) return ret; @@ -432,10 +435,11 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) */ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { - u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); } @@ -544,7 +548,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { enum ima_hooks func; - u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) { if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && @@ -566,9 +570,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, } func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size, - MAY_READ, func); + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), blob.secid[0], buf, + size, MAY_READ, func); } /** @@ -687,11 +692,13 @@ static void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size, void ima_kexec_cmdline(const void *buf, int size) { u32 secid; + struct lsmblob blob; if (buf && size != 0) { - security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); + security_task_getsecid(current, &blob); + /* scaffolding */ process_buffer_measurement(buf, size, "kexec-cmdline", - current_cred(), secid); + current_cred(), blob.secid[0]); } } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index b60c6a51f622..e1f216d453bf 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1700,10 +1700,16 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p); } -void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) +void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid = 0; - call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid); + struct security_hook_list *hp; + + lsmblob_init(blob, 0); + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid, list) { + if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) + continue; + hp->hook.task_getsecid(p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); + } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid); -- 2.20.1