Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.3 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E4F88C33FE1 for ; Mon, 17 Feb 2020 13:00:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BB13124649 for ; Mon, 17 Feb 2020 13:00:02 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1728799AbgBQNAB (ORCPT ); Mon, 17 Feb 2020 08:00:01 -0500 Received: from mga06.intel.com ([134.134.136.31]:30334 "EHLO mga06.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728791AbgBQNAB (ORCPT ); Mon, 17 Feb 2020 08:00:01 -0500 X-Amp-Result: UNKNOWN X-Amp-Original-Verdict: FILE UNKNOWN X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga004.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.48]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 17 Feb 2020 05:00:00 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.70,452,1574150400"; d="scan'208";a="258260178" Received: from local-michael-cet-test.sh.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([10.239.159.128]) by fmsmga004.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 17 Feb 2020 04:59:58 -0800 Date: Mon, 17 Feb 2020 21:03:55 +0800 From: Yang Weijiang To: Xiaoyao Li Cc: Yang Weijiang , kvm@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, sean.j.christopherson@intel.com, jmattson@google.com, aaronlewis@google.com Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] KVM: CPUID: Enable supervisor XSAVE states in CPUID enumeration and XSS Message-ID: <20200217130355.GA10854@local-michael-cet-test.sh.intel.com> References: <20200211065706.3462-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.11.3 (2019-02-01) Sender: kvm-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: kvm@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Feb 17, 2020 at 12:26:51PM +0800, Xiaoyao Li wrote: > On 2/11/2020 2:57 PM, Yang Weijiang wrote: > > CPUID.(EAX=DH, ECX={i}H i>=0) enumerates XSAVE related leaves/sub-leaves, > > +extern int host_xss; > > +u64 kvm_supported_xss(void) > > +{ > > + return KVM_SUPPORTED_XSS & host_xss; > > +} > > + > > How about using a global variable, supported_xss, instead of calculating the > mask on every call. Just like what Sean posted on > https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20200201185218.24473-21-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com/ > Thanks Xiaoyao for the comments! Good suggestion, I'll change it in next version. > > #define F(x) bit(X86_FEATURE_##x) > > int kvm_update_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > > @@ -112,10 +118,17 @@ int kvm_update_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) > > vcpu->arch.guest_xstate_size = best->ebx = > > xstate_required_size(vcpu->arch.xcr0, false); > > } > > - > > best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0xD, 1); > > - if (best && (best->eax & (F(XSAVES) | F(XSAVEC)))) > > - best->ebx = xstate_required_size(vcpu->arch.xcr0, true); > > + if (best && (best->eax & (F(XSAVES) | F(XSAVEC)))) { > > + u64 xstate = vcpu->arch.xcr0 | vcpu->arch.ia32_xss; > > + > > + best->ebx = xstate_required_size(xstate, true); > > + vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xss = > > + (best->ecx | ((u64)best->edx << 32)) & > > + kvm_supported_xss(); > > + } else { > > + vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xss = 0; > > + } > > /* > > * The existing code assumes virtual address is 48-bit or 57-bit in the > > @@ -426,6 +439,56 @@ static inline void do_cpuid_7_mask(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, int index) > > } > > } > > +static inline bool do_cpuid_0xd_mask(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, int index) > > +{ > > + unsigned int f_xsaves = kvm_x86_ops->xsaves_supported() ? F(XSAVES) : 0; > > + /* cpuid 0xD.1.eax */ > > + const u32 kvm_cpuid_D_1_eax_x86_features = > > + F(XSAVEOPT) | F(XSAVEC) | F(XGETBV1) | f_xsaves; > > + u64 u_supported = kvm_supported_xcr0(); > > + u64 s_supported = kvm_supported_xss(); > > + u64 supported; > > + > > + switch (index) { > > + case 0: > > + if (!u_supported) { > > + entry->eax = 0; > > + entry->ebx = 0; > > + entry->ecx = 0; > > + entry->edx = 0; > > + return false; > > + } > > + entry->eax &= u_supported; > > + entry->ebx = xstate_required_size(u_supported, false); > > + entry->ecx = entry->ebx; > > + entry->edx &= u_supported >> 32; > > + break; > > + case 1: > > + supported = u_supported | s_supported; > > + entry->eax &= kvm_cpuid_D_1_eax_x86_features; > > + cpuid_mask(&entry->eax, CPUID_D_1_EAX); > > + entry->ebx = 0; > > + entry->edx &= s_supported >> 32; > > + entry->ecx &= s_supported; > > We'd better initialize msr_ia32_xss bitmap (entry->ecx & entry-edx) as zeros > here. Hmm, explicit setting the MSR to 0 is good in this case, but there's implied flow to ensure guest MSR_IA32_XSS will be 0 if entry->ecx and entry->edx are 0s. In above kvm_update_cpuid(), vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xss is set to 0 when they're 0s. this masks guest cannot set non-zero value to this MSR. And in kvm_vcpu_reset(), vcpu->arch.ia32_xss is initialized to 0, in kvm_load_guest_xsave_state() MSR_IA32_XSS is set to ia32_xss, therefore the MSR is kept to 0. > > > + if (entry->eax & (F(XSAVES) | F(XSAVEC))) > > + entry->ebx = xstate_required_size(supported, true); > > And setup msr_ia32_xss bitmap based on the s_supported within this condition > when F(XSAVES) is supported. IIUC, both XSAVEC and XSAVES use compacted format of the extended region, so if XSAVEC is supported while XSAVES is not, guest still can get correct size, so in existing code the two bits are ORed. > > > + break; > > + default: > > + supported = (entry->ecx & 0x1) ? s_supported : u_supported; > > + if (!(supported & (BIT_ULL(index)))) { > > + entry->eax = 0; > > + entry->ebx = 0; > > + entry->ecx = 0; > > + entry->edx = 0; > > + return false; > > + } > > + if (entry->ecx & 0x1) > > + entry->ebx = 0; > > + break; > > + } > > + return true; > > +} > > + > > static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, > > int *nent, int maxnent) > > { > > @@ -440,7 +503,6 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, > > unsigned f_lm = 0; > > #endif > > unsigned f_rdtscp = kvm_x86_ops->rdtscp_supported() ? F(RDTSCP) : 0; > > - unsigned f_xsaves = kvm_x86_ops->xsaves_supported() ? F(XSAVES) : 0; > > unsigned f_intel_pt = kvm_x86_ops->pt_supported() ? F(INTEL_PT) : 0; > > /* cpuid 1.edx */ > > @@ -495,10 +557,6 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, > > F(ACE2) | F(ACE2_EN) | F(PHE) | F(PHE_EN) | > > F(PMM) | F(PMM_EN); > > - /* cpuid 0xD.1.eax */ > > - const u32 kvm_cpuid_D_1_eax_x86_features = > > - F(XSAVEOPT) | F(XSAVEC) | F(XGETBV1) | f_xsaves; > > - > > /* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */ > > get_cpu(); > > @@ -639,38 +697,21 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, > > break; > > } > > case 0xd: { > > - int idx, i; > > - u64 supported = kvm_supported_xcr0(); > > + int i, idx; > > - entry->eax &= supported; > > - entry->ebx = xstate_required_size(supported, false); > > - entry->ecx = entry->ebx; > > - entry->edx &= supported >> 32; > > - if (!supported) > > + if (!do_cpuid_0xd_mask(&entry[0], 0)) > > break; > > - > > - for (idx = 1, i = 1; idx < 64; ++idx) { > > - u64 mask = ((u64)1 << idx); > > + for (i = 1, idx = 1; idx < 64; ++idx) { > > if (*nent >= maxnent) > > goto out; > > - > > do_host_cpuid(&entry[i], function, idx); > > - if (idx == 1) { > > - entry[i].eax &= kvm_cpuid_D_1_eax_x86_features; > > - cpuid_mask(&entry[i].eax, CPUID_D_1_EAX); > > - entry[i].ebx = 0; > > - if (entry[i].eax & (F(XSAVES)|F(XSAVEC))) > > - entry[i].ebx = > > - xstate_required_size(supported, > > - true); > > - } else { > > - if (entry[i].eax == 0 || !(supported & mask)) > > - continue; > > - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(entry[i].ecx & 1)) > > - continue; > > - } > > - entry[i].ecx = 0; > > - entry[i].edx = 0; > > + > > + if (entry[i].eax == 0 && entry[i].ebx == 0 && > > + entry[i].ecx == 0 && entry[i].edx == 0) > > + continue; > > + > > + if (!do_cpuid_0xd_mask(&entry[i], idx)) > > + continue; > > ++*nent; > > ++i; > > } >