From: Jarkko Sakkinen Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2020 16:48:50 +0000 Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] security: keys: trusted fix tpm2 authorizations Message-Id: <20200225164850.GB15662@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable List-Id: References: <20200130101812.6271-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> <20200130101812.6271-4-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> In-Reply-To: <20200130101812.6271-4-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> To: James Bottomley Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Jan 30, 2020 at 11:18:09AM +0100, James Bottomley wrote: > In TPM 1.2 an authorization was a 20 byte number. The spec actually > recommended you to hash variable length passwords and use the sha1 > hash as the authorization. Because the spec doesn't require this > hashing, the current authorization for trusted keys is a 40 digit hex > number. For TPM 2.0 the spec allows the passing in of variable length > passwords and passphrases directly, so we should allow that in trusted > keys for ease of use. Update the 'blobauth' parameter to take this > into account, so we can now use plain text passwords for the keys. >=20 > so before >=20 > keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=F572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e9= 4f2258f" >=20 > after we will accept both the old hex sha1 form as well as a new > directly supplied password: >=20 > keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=3Dhello keyhandle=81000001" >=20 > Since a sha1 hex code must be exactly 40 bytes long and a direct > password must be 20 or less, we use the length as the discriminator > for which form is input. >=20 > Note this is both and enhancement and a potential bug fix. The TPM > 2.0 spec requires us to strip leading zeros, meaning empyty > authorization is a zero length HMAC whereas we're currently passing in > 20 bytes of zeros. A lot of TPMs simply accept this as OK, but the > Microsoft TPM emulator rejects it with TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH, so this patch > makes the Microsoft TPM emulator work with trusted keys. >=20 > Signed-off-by: James Bottomley Should have a fixes tag. > --- > include/keys/trusted-type.h | 1 + > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++----- > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 10 ++++++---- > 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) >=20 > diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h > index a94c03a61d8f..b2ed3481c6a0 100644 > --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h > +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h > @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ struct trusted_key_options { > uint16_t keytype; > uint32_t keyhandle; > unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; > + uint32_t blobauth_len; > unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; > uint32_t pcrinfo_len; > unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/tr= usted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c > index d2c5ec1e040b..3f33d3f74d3c 100644 > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c > @@ -781,12 +781,28 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_p= ayload *pay, > return -EINVAL; > break; > case Opt_blobauth: > - if (strlen(args[0].from) !=3D 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) > - return -EINVAL; > - res =3D hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, > - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); > - if (res < 0) > + /* > + * TPM 1.2 authorizations are sha1 hashes > + * passed in as hex strings. TPM 2.0 > + * authorizations are simple passwords > + * (although it can take a hash as well) Justify to the 80 character line length. > + */ > + opt->blobauth_len =3D strlen(args[0].from); > + if (opt->blobauth_len =3D 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { > + res =3D hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, > + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); > + if (res < 0) > + return -EINVAL; > + > + opt->blobauth_len =3D TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; > + } else if (tpm2 && > + opt->blobauth_len <=3D sizeof(opt->blobauth)) { > + memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, > + opt->blobauth_len); > + } else { > return -EINVAL; > + } This starts to be unnecessarily complicated. This is what I would suggest: opt->blobauth_len =3D strlen(args[0].from); if (opt->blobauth_len =3D 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { res =3D hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); if (res < 0) return -EINVAL; opt->blobauth_len =3D TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; return 0; } if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <=3D sizeof(opt->blobauth)) { memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, opt->blobauth_len); return 0; } return -EINVAL; Easier to see quickly "when happens what". /Jarkko