From: Jarkko Sakkinen Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2020 15:15:12 +0000 Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 3/6] security: keys: trusted fix tpm2 authorizations Message-Id: <20200226151512.GF3407@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable List-Id: References: <20200130101812.6271-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> <20200130101812.6271-4-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> <20200225164850.GB15662@linux.intel.com> In-Reply-To: <20200225164850.GB15662@linux.intel.com> To: James Bottomley Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Feb 25, 2020 at 06:48:50PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Thu, Jan 30, 2020 at 11:18:09AM +0100, James Bottomley wrote: > > In TPM 1.2 an authorization was a 20 byte number. The spec actually > > recommended you to hash variable length passwords and use the sha1 > > hash as the authorization. Because the spec doesn't require this > > hashing, the current authorization for trusted keys is a 40 digit hex > > number. For TPM 2.0 the spec allows the passing in of variable length > > passwords and passphrases directly, so we should allow that in trusted > > keys for ease of use. Update the 'blobauth' parameter to take this > > into account, so we can now use plain text passwords for the keys. > >=20 > > so before > >=20 > > keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=F572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72= e94f2258f" > >=20 > > after we will accept both the old hex sha1 form as well as a new > > directly supplied password: > >=20 > > keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=3Dhello keyhandle=81000001" > >=20 > > Since a sha1 hex code must be exactly 40 bytes long and a direct > > password must be 20 or less, we use the length as the discriminator > > for which form is input. > >=20 > > Note this is both and enhancement and a potential bug fix. The TPM > > 2.0 spec requires us to strip leading zeros, meaning empyty > > authorization is a zero length HMAC whereas we're currently passing in > > 20 bytes of zeros. A lot of TPMs simply accept this as OK, but the > > Microsoft TPM emulator rejects it with TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH, so this patch > > makes the Microsoft TPM emulator work with trusted keys. > >=20 > > Signed-off-by: James Bottomley >=20 > Should have a fixes tag. >=20 > > --- > > include/keys/trusted-type.h | 1 + > > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++--= --- > > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 10 ++++++---- > > 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) > >=20 > > diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h > > index a94c03a61d8f..b2ed3481c6a0 100644 > > --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h > > +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h > > @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ struct trusted_key_options { > > uint16_t keytype; > > uint32_t keyhandle; > > unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; > > + uint32_t blobauth_len; > > unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; > > uint32_t pcrinfo_len; > > unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; > > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/= trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c > > index d2c5ec1e040b..3f33d3f74d3c 100644 > > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c > > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c > > @@ -781,12 +781,28 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key= _payload *pay, > > return -EINVAL; > > break; > > case Opt_blobauth: > > - if (strlen(args[0].from) !=3D 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) > > - return -EINVAL; > > - res =3D hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, > > - SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); > > - if (res < 0) > > + /* > > + * TPM 1.2 authorizations are sha1 hashes > > + * passed in as hex strings. TPM 2.0 > > + * authorizations are simple passwords > > + * (although it can take a hash as well) >=20 > Justify to the 80 character line length. >=20 > > + */ > > + opt->blobauth_len =3D strlen(args[0].from); > > + if (opt->blobauth_len =3D 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { > > + res =3D hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, > > + TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); > > + if (res < 0) > > + return -EINVAL; > > + > > + opt->blobauth_len =3D TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; > > + } else if (tpm2 && > > + opt->blobauth_len <=3D sizeof(opt->blobauth)) { > > + memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, > > + opt->blobauth_len); > > + } else { > > return -EINVAL; > > + } >=20 > This starts to be unnecessarily complicated. >=20 > This is what I would suggest: >=20 > opt->blobauth_len =3D strlen(args[0].from); > if (opt->blobauth_len =3D 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { > res =3D hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, > TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); > if (res < 0) > return -EINVAL; >=20 > opt->blobauth_len =3D TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; > return 0; > } >=20 > if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <=3D sizeof(opt->blobauth)) { > memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, > opt->blobauth_len); > return 0; > } >=20 > return -EINVAL; >=20 > Easier to see quickly "when happens what". >=20 > /Jarkko And in short summary "TPM2" instead of tpm2. /Jarkko