From: Jarkko Sakkinen Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2020 20:08:20 +0000 Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 6/6] security: keys: trusted: implement counter/timer policy Message-Id: <20200303200820.GE5775@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit List-Id: References: <20200302122759.5204-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> <20200302122759.5204-7-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> In-Reply-To: <20200302122759.5204-7-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> To: James Bottomley Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Mar 02, 2020 at 07:27:59AM -0500, James Bottomley wrote: > This is actually a generic policy allowing a range of comparisons > against any value set in the TPM Clock, which includes things like the > reset count, a monotonic millisecond count and the restart count. The > most useful comparison is against the millisecond count for expiring > keys. However, you have to remember that currently Linux doesn't try > to sync the epoch timer with the TPM, so the expiration is actually > measured in how long the TPM itself has been powered on ... the TPM > timer doesn't count while the system is powered down. The millisecond > counter is a u64 quantity found at offset 8 in the timer structure, > and the <= comparision operand is 9, so a policy set to expire after the > TPM has been up for 100 seconds would look like > > 0000016d00000000000f424000080009 > > Where 0x16d is the counter timer policy code and 0xf4240 is 100 000 in > hex. > > Signed-off-by: James Bottomley It is techincally possible to merge 1-5 without this and have something functional? /Jarkko