From: Lev Stipakov Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2020 10:30:17 +0300 Message-Id: <20200415073017.22839-1-lstipakov@...277...> In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Subject: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v2] Fix illegal client float List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit To: openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: Lev Stipakov From: Lev Stipakov There is a time frame between allocating peer-id and initializing data channel key, which is performed on receiving push request. If a "rogue" data channel packet arrives during that time frame from another address and with same peer-id, this would cause client to float to that new address. This is because: - tls_pre_decrypt() sets packet length to zero if data channel key has not been initialized, which leads to - openvpn_decrypt() returns true if packet length is zero, which leads to - process_incoming_link_part1() returns true, which calls multi_process_float(), which commits float Note that problem doesn't happen when data channel key is initialized, since in this case openvpn_decrypt() returns false. Fix illegal float by adding buffer length check before calling multi_process_float(). This should fix Trac #1272. Signed-off-by: Lev Stipakov --- v2: add comment explaning why nonzero check needed src/openvpn/multi.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/openvpn/multi.c b/src/openvpn/multi.c index da0aeeba..37d2a6f2 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/multi.c +++ b/src/openvpn/multi.c @@ -2555,7 +2555,8 @@ multi_process_incoming_link(struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *inst orig_buf = c->c2.buf.data; if (process_incoming_link_part1(c, lsi, floated)) { - if (floated) + /* nonzero length means that we have a valid, decrypted packed */ + if (floated && c->c2.buf.len > 0) { multi_process_float(m, m->pending); } -- 2.24.1 (Apple Git-126)