Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2020 15:27:17 -0400 From: Vivek Goyal Message-ID: <20200618192717.GE3814@redhat.com> References: <20200416164907.244868-1-stefanha@redhat.com> <20200618190816.GD3814@redhat.com> <20200618191655.GI2769@work-vm> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <20200618191655.GI2769@work-vm> Subject: Re: [Virtio-fs] [PATCH 0/2] virtiofsd: drop Linux capabilities(7) List-Id: Development discussions about virtio-fs List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" Cc: virtio-fs@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Miklos Szeredi On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 08:16:55PM +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote: > * Vivek Goyal (vgoyal@redhat.com) wrote: > > On Thu, Apr 16, 2020 at 05:49:05PM +0100, Stefan Hajnoczi wrote: > > > virtiofsd doesn't need of all Linux capabilities(7) available to root. Keep a > > > whitelisted set of capabilities that we require. This improves security in > > > case virtiofsd is compromised by making it hard for an attacker to gain further > > > access to the system. > > > > Hi Stefan, > > > > I just noticed that this patch set breaks overlayfs on top of virtiofs. > > > > overlayfs sets "trusted.overlay.*" and xattrs in trusted domain > > need CAP_SYS_ADMIN. > > > > man xattr says. > > > > Trusted extended attributes > > Trusted extended attributes are visible and accessible only to pro‐ > > cesses that have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability. Attributes in this > > class are used to implement mechanisms in user space (i.e., outside the > > kernel) which keep information in extended attributes to which ordinary > > processes should not have access. > > > > There is a chance that overlay moves away from trusted xattr in future. > > But for now we need to make it work. This is an important use case for > > kata docker in docker build. > > > > May be we can add an option to virtiofsd say "--add-cap " and > > ask user to pass in "--add-cap cap_sys_admin" if they need to run daemon > > with this capaibility. > > I'll admit I don't like the idea of giving it cap_sys_admin. > Can you explain: > a) What overlayfs uses trusted for? overlayfs stores bunch of metadata and uses "trusted" xattrs for it. > b) If something nasty was to write junk into the trusted attributes, > what would happen? This directory is owned by guest. So it should be able to write anything it wants, as long as process in guest has CAP_SYS_ADMIN, right? > c) I see overlayfs has a fallback check if xattr isn't supported at > all - what is the consequence? It falls back to I think read only mode. For a moment forget about overlayfs. Say a user process in guest with CAP_SYS_ADMIN is writing trusted.foo. Should that succeed? Is a passthrough filesystem, so it should go through. But currently it wont. Thanks Vivek