Received: from mail.stusta.mhn.de (mail.stusta.mhn.de [141.84.69.5]) by mx.groups.io with SMTP id smtpd.web12.4716.1594242489589314929 for ; Wed, 08 Jul 2020 14:08:09 -0700 Authentication-Results: mx.groups.io; dkim=pass header.i=@stusta.de header.s=default header.b=rsLsIPKT; spf=pass (domain: stusta.mhn.de, ip: 141.84.69.5, mailfrom: srs0=z9mr=at=stusta.de=bunk@stusta.mhn.de) Received: from [127.0.0.1] (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail.stusta.mhn.de (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4B2BjL1V83z7s for ; Wed, 8 Jul 2020 23:08:06 +0200 (CEST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=stusta.de; s=default; t=1594242486; bh=9KafT5iIvqhFO69c62EMALdb8ccxihyxZRspyVlcYKQ=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=rsLsIPKTJXxe+MTsjdko/8oqh3HMeSkIWeO2aVPGvAx4nXNdvcPXkV01TGA0d1Xw1 W7uTPU2FB2J1Kvac/Gap2JgT4+MbYwPY9n3Lma6QaHTmE+hQGapMU9UVsjZkg6xUJ9 BviLBXdl/B8PtwZ0hfbtPGqMyNvaMJqeiREpnO79d/iLRqkYRkeNvUY3AQgMKHeyFf 6avPnK9FX5BDY8eLefE99YgqVupYBAkFSHhHwaSjhxS8KutDcLrSkK72PHBPNtcqdX ifbs4eHHyICH49IwXMrSKjGi2GN6227uDCVPUwPKLhXSodInrj9tixbNHBz/L8OUku wdVUWeJtJOVo0sRyXHKAwbrcgVxGHHqS68WNkY8TWVQDec9WtALQDVPyiK0vt5UxCf I744J7wgPgfR9t/mc5eZ5RQFgt05jrojuz0qRwT3hz1jdiD1IEg5JXkw0SrvIpH0r/ QHm1wIUbmXoLirmRd/uVzoxZ3676RFDTojLv7UdDC5o/lCWUhrL5kbDRHgsI8CYGv7 iZAZCKbcRYMzjtSyXVcqXAF1ZrKJYFIt7cjkzewPAGRtPGmAyzkjjK7it/0dSKa8TH L9QBXiD+NMcy+T8MsdWQX742NH7SvFdk6hciDa7Di9eR+08qFbPuaInOTQpvYEZssb 4pXY/vERAIDw/GygClWdJKBc= From: "Adrian Bunk" To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org Subject: [OE-core][zeus][PATCH 07/19] libexif: fix CVE-2020-13114 Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2020 00:07:49 +0300 Message-Id: <20200708210801.5553-7-bunk@stusta.de> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.17.1 In-Reply-To: <20200708210801.5553-1-bunk@stusta.de> References: <20200708210801.5553-1-bunk@stusta.de> From: Lee Chee Yang (From OE-Core rev: 2e497029ee00babbc50f3c1d99580230bc46155c) Signed-off-by: Lee Chee Yang Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk --- .../libexif/libexif/CVE-2020-13114.patch | 73 +++++++++++++++++++ .../recipes-support/libexif/libexif_0.6.21.bb | 4 +- 2 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/libexif/libexif/CVE-2020-13114.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libexif/libexif/CVE-2020-13114.patch b/meta/recipes-support/libexif/libexif/CVE-2020-13114.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..06b8b46c21 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-support/libexif/libexif/CVE-2020-13114.patch @@ -0,0 +1,73 @@ +From 47f51be021f4dfd800d4ff4630659887378baa3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dan Fandrich +Date: Sat, 16 May 2020 19:32:30 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Add a failsafe on the maximum number of Canon MakerNote + + subtags. + +A malicious file could be crafted to cause extremely large values in some +tags without tripping any buffer range checks. This is bad with the libexif +representation of Canon MakerNotes because some arrays are turned into +individual tags that the application must loop around. + +The largest value I've seen for failsafe_size in a (very small) sample of valid +Canon files is <5000. The limit is set two orders of magnitude larger to avoid +tripping up falsely in case some models use much larger values. + +Patch from Google. + +CVE-2020-13114 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libexif/libexif/commit/e6a38a1a23ba94d139b1fa2cd4519fdcfe3c9bab] +CVE: CVE-2020-13114 +Signed-off-by: Lee Chee Yang +--- + libexif/canon/exif-mnote-data-canon.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/libexif/canon/exif-mnote-data-canon.c b/libexif/canon/exif-mnote-data-canon.c +index eb53598..72fd7a3 100644 +--- a/libexif/canon/exif-mnote-data-canon.c ++++ b/libexif/canon/exif-mnote-data-canon.c +@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ + + #define DEBUG + ++/* Total size limit to prevent abuse by DoS */ ++#define FAILSAFE_SIZE_MAX 1000000L ++ + static void + exif_mnote_data_canon_clear (ExifMnoteDataCanon *n) + { +@@ -202,6 +205,7 @@ exif_mnote_data_canon_load (ExifMnoteData *ne, + ExifMnoteDataCanon *n = (ExifMnoteDataCanon *) ne; + ExifShort c; + size_t i, tcount, o, datao; ++ long failsafe_size = 0; + + if (!n || !buf || !buf_size) { + exif_log (ne->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA, +@@ -280,6 +284,23 @@ exif_mnote_data_canon_load (ExifMnoteData *ne, + memcpy (n->entries[tcount].data, buf + dataofs, s); + } + ++ /* Track the size of decoded tag data. A malicious file could ++ * be crafted to cause extremely large values here without ++ * tripping any buffer range checks. This is especially bad ++ * with the libexif representation of Canon MakerNotes because ++ * some arrays are turned into individual tags that the ++ * application must loop around. */ ++ failsafe_size += mnote_canon_entry_count_values(&n->entries[tcount]); ++ ++ if (failsafe_size > FAILSAFE_SIZE_MAX) { ++ /* Abort if the total size of the data in the tags extraordinarily large, */ ++ exif_mem_free (ne->mem, n->entries[tcount].data); ++ exif_log (ne->log, EXIF_LOG_CODE_CORRUPT_DATA, ++ "ExifMnoteCanon", "Failsafe tag size overflow (%lu > %ld)", ++ failsafe_size, FAILSAFE_SIZE_MAX); ++ break; ++ } ++ + /* Tag was successfully parsed */ + ++tcount; + } diff --git a/meta/recipes-support/libexif/libexif_0.6.21.bb b/meta/recipes-support/libexif/libexif_0.6.21.bb index d847beab18..3f6fa32b25 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-support/libexif/libexif_0.6.21.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-support/libexif/libexif_0.6.21.bb @@ -7,7 +7,9 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=243b725d71bb5df4a1e5920b344b86ad" SRC_URI = "${SOURCEFORGE_MIRROR}/libexif/libexif-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://CVE-2017-7544.patch \ file://CVE-2016-6328.patch \ - file://CVE-2018-20030.patch" + file://CVE-2018-20030.patch \ + file://CVE-2020-13114.patch \ +" SRC_URI[md5sum] = "27339b89850f28c8f1c237f233e05b27" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "16cdaeb62eb3e6dfab2435f7d7bccd2f37438d21c5218ec4e58efa9157d4d41a" -- 2.17.1