From: Christoph Hellwig Subject: [PATCH 1/6] syscalls: use uaccess_kernel in addr_limit_user_check Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2020 12:55:00 +0200 Message-ID: <20200714105505.935079-2-hch@lst.de> References: <20200714105505.935079-1-hch@lst.de> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Return-path: Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:49586 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726041AbgGNK7c (ORCPT ); Tue, 14 Jul 2020 06:59:32 -0400 In-Reply-To: <20200714105505.935079-1-hch@lst.de> Sender: linux-arch-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: To: Nick Hu , Greentime Hu , Vincent Chen , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Andrew Morton , Linus Torvalds Cc: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Use the uaccess_kernel helper instead of duplicating it. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig --- include/linux/syscalls.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h index b951a87da9877c..e933a43d4a69ac 100644 --- a/include/linux/syscalls.h +++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h @@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ static inline void addr_limit_user_check(void) return; #endif - if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS), + if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(uaccess_kernel(), "Invalid address limit on user-mode return")) force_sig(SIGKILL); -- 2.26.2