From: Patrick Wildt Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2020 23:20:38 +0200 Subject: [PATCH v3] spl: allow board_spl_fit_post_load() to fail In-Reply-To: <20200605195414.GJ24893@bill-the-cat> References: <20200531172526.GA15781@nox.fritz.box> <8121484f-5a02-3351-84c1-768b97b7f38d@denx.de> <20200605195414.GJ24893@bill-the-cat> Message-ID: <20200722212038.GA4943@nox.fritz.box> List-Id: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: u-boot@lists.denx.de On Fri, Jun 05, 2020 at 03:54:14PM -0400, Tom Rini wrote: > On Mon, Jun 01, 2020 at 12:08:45PM +0200, Marek Vasut wrote: > > On 6/1/20 4:30 AM, Peng Fan wrote: > > >> Subject: [PATCH v3] spl: allow board_spl_fit_post_load() to fail > > >> > > >> On i.MX platforms board_spl_fit_post_load() can check the loaded SPL image > > >> for authenticity using its HAB engine. U-Boot's SPL mechanism allows > > >> booting images from other sources as well, but in the current setup the SPL > > >> would just hang if it encounters an image that does not pass scrutiny. > > > > > > security. > > > > > >> Allowing the function to return an error, allows the SPL to try booting from > > >> another source as a fallback instead of ending up as a brick. > > > > > > This will break secure boot chain. > > > > How? Please elaborate. > > > > jump_to_image_no_args() will authenticate the image before starting it, > > so I don't think so. However, that is still prone to > > time-of-check/time-of-use attack anyway. > > Yes, please elaborate, thanks! Ping? How will this break the secure boot chain?