Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2020 18:55:38 +0100 From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" Message-ID: <20200723175538.GW2621@work-vm> References: <20200722130206.224898-1-stefanha@redhat.com> <20200722130206.224898-3-stefanha@redhat.com> <20200722190318.GM2660@work-vm> <20200723123229.GK186372@stefanha-x1.localdomain> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20200723123229.GK186372@stefanha-x1.localdomain> Subject: Re: [Virtio-fs] [PATCH for-5.1 2/3] virtiofsd: add container-friendly -o chroot sandboxing option List-Id: Development discussions about virtio-fs List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: Stefan Hajnoczi Cc: virtio-fs@redhat.com, rmohr@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, vromanso@redhat.com * Stefan Hajnoczi (stefanha@redhat.com) wrote: > On Wed, Jul 22, 2020 at 08:03:18PM +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote: > > * Stefan Hajnoczi (stefanha@redhat.com) wrote: > > > + /* > > > + * Make the shared directory the file system root so that FUSE_OPEN > > > + * (lo_open()) cannot escape the shared directory by opening a symlink. > > > + * > > > + * It's still possible to escape the chroot via lo->proc_self_fd but that > > > + * requires gaining control of the process first. > > > + */ > > > + if (chroot(lo->source) != 0) { > > > + fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "chroot(\"%s\"): %m\n", lo->source); > > > + exit(1); > > > + } > > > > I'm seeing suggestions that you should drop CAP_SYS_CHROOT after > > chroot'ing to stop an old escape (where you create another jail inside > > the jail and the kernel then lets you walk outside of the old one). > > That's already the case: > > 1. setup_seccomp() blocks further chroot(2) calls. > 2. setup_capabilities() drops CAP_SYS_CHROOT. Ah yes; could you add a comment if you respin; it's not obvious that the capability to chroot allows you to break out of an existing chroot you're in. Dave > Stefan -- Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK