Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.5 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 80E99C433E4 for ; Fri, 21 Aug 2020 14:09:35 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.xenproject.org (lists.xenproject.org [192.237.175.120]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5334B20FC3 for ; Fri, 21 Aug 2020 14:09:35 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=citrix.com header.i=@citrix.com header.b="VIO1XzHE" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 5334B20FC3 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=reject dis=none) header.from=citrix.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=lists.xenproject.org) by lists.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1k97jK-00035v-Pr; Fri, 21 Aug 2020 14:09:18 +0000 Received: from us1-rack-iad1.inumbo.com ([172.99.69.81]) by lists.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1k97jJ-00035q-2e for xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org; Fri, 21 Aug 2020 14:09:17 +0000 X-Inumbo-ID: b78b7d8a-7225-467e-9834-c318185e71ed Received: from esa4.hc3370-68.iphmx.com (unknown [216.71.155.144]) by us1-rack-iad1.inumbo.com (Halon) with ESMTPS id b78b7d8a-7225-467e-9834-c318185e71ed; Fri, 21 Aug 2020 14:09:15 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=simple/simple; d=citrix.com; s=securemail; t=1598018955; h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references: mime-version:content-transfer-encoding:in-reply-to; bh=MvTI4GCrqU8QCpcRH2TZ1aJeIUfRaP3iBExWnxE1K7Y=; b=VIO1XzHEuJDsXKyCTn2mINwchWsgA2rx0bBa/VCzLrhudNRGxRFXuApV ip1yz6zUrYeolh9k6oTpNFkuJl7XGrzh4mAYBv6CTyJu98ib8oBXXnpgE 9u/eOkgOw72g/B+UV/kuLQ9H2AujbxL7SmjyJuyUgOF5wkE8GmCGS9HrY E=; Authentication-Results: esa4.hc3370-68.iphmx.com; dkim=none (message not signed) header.i=none IronPort-SDR: LG5Xareh6zOr1vGErC2r+q5Sz2+bh0TW/3t9BD0GMKPYhGKF2WJsBgNkz2Q7aDgRO29lS/07CG ohiiw+qWUCYDnszkRmMHccD0mVt07Jk4zE1CV9Mitw03IvescGBWdjshOiNQcez22EjpQ0IVj1 Sj186m3jsgaucRB7YjPBr5KZiJeooE34gqmCcuhARlgaRt0PfD2jsbO+BVKKh4F1A0+sQKAf6s B1RhweeI3NkAllVFoNQOovZxTIBnDLzLBz//uEivFPp/TXdD2OZq3YSjkhdZvO1j7J53LJX2Xq h+k= X-SBRS: 2.7 X-MesageID: 25966188 X-Ironport-Server: esa4.hc3370-68.iphmx.com X-Remote-IP: 162.221.158.21 X-Policy: $RELAYED X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.76,335,1592884800"; d="scan'208";a="25966188" Date: Fri, 21 Aug 2020 16:09:04 +0200 From: Roger Pau =?utf-8?B?TW9ubsOp?= To: Andrew Cooper CC: , Jan Beulich , Wei Liu Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/8] x86/msr: explicitly handle AMD DE_CFG Message-ID: <20200821140904.GB1587@Air-de-Roger> References: <20200820150835.27440-1-roger.pau@citrix.com> <20200820150835.27440-4-roger.pau@citrix.com> <50eef25c-8054-89e7-3b83-a233a0faa6f8@citrix.com> <20200821115218.GA1587@Air-de-Roger> <587e06b2-17f7-918d-1aad-fe14bc90f4f5@citrix.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <587e06b2-17f7-918d-1aad-fe14bc90f4f5@citrix.com> X-ClientProxiedBy: AMSPEX02CAS02.citrite.net (10.69.22.113) To AMSPEX02CL02.citrite.net (10.69.22.126) X-BeenThere: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Xen developer discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org Sender: "Xen-devel" On Fri, Aug 21, 2020 at 03:03:08PM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 21/08/2020 12:52, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > > On Thu, Aug 20, 2020 at 06:08:53PM +0100, Andrew Cooper wrote: > >> On 20/08/2020 16:08, Roger Pau Monne wrote: > >> > >>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c > >>> index ca4307e19f..a890cb9976 100644 > >>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c > >>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c > >>> @@ -274,6 +274,14 @@ int guest_rdmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val) > >>> *val = msrs->tsc_aux; > >>> break; > >>> > >>> + case MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG: > >>> + if ( !(cp->x86_vendor & (X86_VENDOR_AMD | X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) || > >>> + !(boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor & (X86_VENDOR_AMD | > >>> + X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) || > >>> + rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, *val) ) > >>> + goto gp_fault; > >>> + break; > >> Ah.  What I intended was to read just bit 2 and nothing else. > >> > >> Leaking the full value is non-ideal from a migration point of view, and > >> in this case, you can avoid querying hardware entirely. > >> > >> Just return AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALISE here.  The only case where it > >> won't be true is when the hypervisor running us (i.e. Xen) failed to set > >> it up, and the CPU boot path failed to adjust it, at which point the > >> whole system has much bigger problems. > > Right, the rest are just model specific workarounds AFAICT, so it's > > safe to not display them. A guest might attempt to set them, but we > > should simply drop the write, see below. > > Most of the layout is model specific.  It's only by chance that the > LFENCE bits line up in all generations. > > The bit used to work around Speculative Store Bypass in LS_CFG doesn't > line up across generations. > > >>> + > >>> case MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK: > >>> case MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK ... MSR_AMD64_DR3_ADDRESS_MASK: > >>> if ( !cp->extd.dbext ) > >>> @@ -499,6 +507,12 @@ int guest_wrmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val) > >>> wrmsr_tsc_aux(val); > >>> break; > >>> > >>> + case MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG: > >>> + if ( !(cp->x86_vendor & (X86_VENDOR_AMD | X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) || > >>> + !(boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor & (X86_VENDOR_AMD | X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) ) > >>> + goto gp_fault; > >>> + break; > >> There should be no problem yielding #GP here (i.e. dropping this hunk). > >> > >> IIRC, it was the behaviour of certain hypervisors when Spectre hit, so > >> all guests ought to cope.  (And indeed, not try to redundantly set the > >> bit to start with). > > It seems like OpenBSD will try to do so unconditionally, see: > > > > https://www.illumos.org/issues/12998 > > > > According to the report there returning #GP when trying to WRMSR > > DE_CFG will cause OpenBSD to panic, so I think we need to keep this > > behavior of silently dropping writes. > > /sigh - there is always one.  Comment please, and lets leave it as > write-discard. > > As for the vendor-ness, drop the checks to just cp->x86_vendor.  There > is no boot_cpu_data interaction how that you've taken the rdmsr() out. Sure, will wait for comments on other patches before sending the updated version. Thanks, Roger.