Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2020 19:40:13 +0100 From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" Message-ID: <20200827184013.GG2837@work-vm> References: <20200727190223.422280-1-stefanha@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20200727190223.422280-1-stefanha@redhat.com> Subject: Re: [Virtio-fs] [PATCH v2 0/3] virtiofsd: allow virtiofsd to run in a container List-Id: Development discussions about virtio-fs List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: Stefan Hajnoczi Cc: vromanso@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, rmohr@redhat.com, virtio-fs@redhat.com, mpatel@redhat.com, vgoyal@redhat.com * Stefan Hajnoczi (stefanha@redhat.com) wrote: > v2: > * Update virtiofsd.rst documentation on sandboxing modes > * Change syntax to -o sandbox=namespace|chroot > * Add comment explaining that unshare(CLONE_FS) has no visible side-effect > while single-threaded > * xfstests and pjdfstest pass. Did not run tests on overlayfs because required > xattrs do not work without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. > > Mrunal and Dan: This patch series adds a sandboxing mode where virtiofsd relies > on the container runtime for isolation. It only does > chroot("path/to/shared-dir"), seccomp, and drops Linux capabilities. Previously > it created a new mount, pid, and net namespace but cannot do this without > CAP_SYS_ADMIN when run inside a container. pivot_root("path/to/shared-dir") has > been replaced with chroot("path/to/shared-dir"), again because CAP_SYS_ADMIN is > unavailable. The point of the chroot() is to prevent escapes from the shared > directory during path traversal. Does this ring any alarm bells or does it > sound sane? > > Container runtimes handle namespace setup and remove privileges needed by > virtiofsd to perform sandboxing. Luckily the container environment already > provides most of the sandbox that virtiofsd needs for security. > > Introduce a new "virtiofsd -o sandbox=chroot" option that uses chroot(2) > instead of namespaces. This option allows virtiofsd to work inside a container. > > Please see the individual patches for details on the changes and security > implications. > > Given that people are starting to attempt running virtiofsd in containers I > think this should go into QEMU 5.1. I've queued 1 and 3; waiting for someone with better knowledge of chroot to review 2. Dave > Stefan Hajnoczi (3): > virtiofsd: drop CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH > virtiofsd: add container-friendly -o sandbox=chroot option > virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an error > > tools/virtiofsd/fuse_virtio.c | 16 +++++++++ > tools/virtiofsd/helper.c | 8 +++++ > tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst | 32 ++++++++++++++---- > 4 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) > > -- > 2.26.2 > -- Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK