From: Jarkko Sakkinen Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2020 15:21:59 +0000 Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 3/5] security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations Message-Id: <20200917152159.GB7389@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable List-Id: References: <20200912172643.9063-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> <20200912172643.9063-4-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> <20200915090950.GB3612@linux.intel.com> <1600285934.7475.19.camel@HansenPartnership.com> In-Reply-To: <1600285934.7475.19.camel@HansenPartnership.com> To: James Bottomley Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Howells On Wed, Sep 16, 2020 at 12:52:14PM -0700, James Bottomley wrote: > On Tue, 2020-09-15 at 12:09 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > On Sat, Sep 12, 2020 at 10:26:41AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote: > > > In TPM 1.2 an authorization was a 20 byte number. The spec > > > actually recommended you to hash variable length passwords and use > > > the sha1 hash as the authorization. Because the spec doesn't > > > require this hashing, the current authorization for trusted keys is > > > a 40 digit hex number. For TPM 2.0 the spec allows the passing in > > > of variable length passwords and passphrases directly, so we should > > > allow that in trusted keys for ease of use. Update the 'blobauth' > > > parameter to take this into account, so we can now use plain text > > > passwords for the keys. > > >=20 > > > so before > > >=20 > > > keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 > > > blobauth=F572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258f" > > >=20 > > > after we will accept both the old hex sha1 form as well as a new > > > directly supplied password: > > >=20 > > > keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=3Dhello keyhandle=81000001" > > >=20 > > > Since a sha1 hex code must be exactly 40 bytes long and a direct > > > password must be 20 or less, we use the length as the discriminator > > > for which form is input. > > >=20 > > > Note this is both and enhancement and a potential bug fix. The TPM > > > 2.0 spec requires us to strip leading zeros, meaning empyty > > > authorization is a zero length HMAC whereas we're currently passing > > > in 20 bytes of zeros. A lot of TPMs simply accept this as OK, but > > > the Microsoft TPM emulator rejects it with TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH, so this > > > patch makes the Microsoft TPM emulator work with trusted keys. > > >=20 > > > Fixes: 0fe5480303a1 ("keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 > > > chips") > > > Signed-off-by: James Bottomley > > > > > > Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen > >=20 > > I created a key: > >=20 > > $ sudo ./tpm2-root-key > > 0x80000000 > > $ sudo ./tpm2-list-handles > > 0x80000000 > > $ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=3Dhello keyhandle=3D0x8000000= 0" > > >=20 > Well, you're getting that because the command isn't complete ... you > need a keyring specifier at the end, like @u. However, even with that > there's a bug in the code that would cause this to return EINVAL: the > blobauth handler has a return 0 where it should have a break ... I > think that happened as a result of the v6 rework which split up the if > ... else if ... else chain. The result is the processing of options > terminates at blobauth, so if it's last, as I've been testing with, > everything is fine. If it's first as you specify, none of the options > following the blobauth get processed. I'll fix this up and add an @u > to the commit message. Ugh, it's true, missing @u from the tail :-) And I was looking for a long time old test script and this and wondering where is the difference... Fix those so that we can finally merge this :-) >=20 > James >=20 /Jarkko