Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED, USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BB8DDC43381 for ; Fri, 15 Jan 2021 08:30:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.xenproject.org (lists.xenproject.org [192.237.175.120]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5694023118 for ; Fri, 15 Jan 2021 08:30:34 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 5694023118 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=quarantine dis=none) header.from=suse.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org Received: from list by lists.xenproject.org with outflank-mailman.67714.120998 (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1l0KUq-0008JX-2s; Fri, 15 Jan 2021 08:30:16 +0000 X-Outflank-Mailman: Message body and most headers restored to incoming version Received: by outflank-mailman (output) from mailman id 67714.120998; Fri, 15 Jan 2021 08:30:16 +0000 Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=lists.xenproject.org) by lists.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1l0KUp-0008JQ-VD; Fri, 15 Jan 2021 08:30:15 +0000 Received: by outflank-mailman (input) for mailman id 67714; Fri, 15 Jan 2021 08:30:14 +0000 Received: from us1-rack-iad1.inumbo.com ([172.99.69.81]) by lists.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1l0KUo-0008Gh-Ee for xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org; Fri, 15 Jan 2021 08:30:14 +0000 Received: from mx2.suse.de (unknown [195.135.220.15]) by us1-rack-iad1.inumbo.com (Halon) with ESMTPS id f24ecc88-757a-4488-9397-2a88204bbb7f; Fri, 15 Jan 2021 08:30:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: from relay2.suse.de (unknown [195.135.221.27]) by mx2.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id D6F45B96C; Fri, 15 Jan 2021 08:30:06 +0000 (UTC) X-BeenThere: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org List-Id: Xen developer discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org Precedence: list Sender: "Xen-devel" X-Inumbo-ID: f24ecc88-757a-4488-9397-2a88204bbb7f X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at test-mx.suse.de DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=suse.com; s=susede1; t=1610699407; h=from:from:reply-to:date:date:message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc: mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=TDOKCm1PBekJ/I7OVe/tbhyex8V7rdSW9/SSHYEJKQE=; b=R6NxtkjDSpZKiQOIQXgpnyRxDVwEyOd/MmrX3tCPvzeiogY82qn4AZFK3KMC+Ee6OCzEPR HGfNLtR+ltnGxrlFx+DmJxau6B4VkIRU231uNMp13Hx1apZ4oFtUtPMQOn6b6ihCY2Bwlv gbcIC5mMvGH/+3mNPhC3Dbw9k5qT8SM= From: Juergen Gross To: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Cc: Juergen Gross , Ian Jackson , Wei Liu , Julien Grall Subject: [PATCH v12 05/27] tools/libxenevtchn: add possibility to not close file descriptor on exec Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2021 09:29:38 +0100 Message-Id: <20210115083000.14186-6-jgross@suse.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.26.2 In-Reply-To: <20210115083000.14186-1-jgross@suse.com> References: <20210115083000.14186-1-jgross@suse.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Today the file descriptor for the access of the event channel driver is being closed in case of exec(2). For the support of live update of a daemon using libxenevtchn this can be problematic, so add a way to keep that file descriptor open. Add support of a flag XENEVTCHN_NO_CLOEXEC for xenevtchn_open() which will result in _not_ setting O_CLOEXEC when opening the event channel driver node. The caller can then obtain the file descriptor via xenevtchn_fd(). Add an alternative open function xenevtchn_fdopen() which takes that file descriptor as an additional parameter. This allows to allocate a xenevtchn_handle and to associate it with that file descriptor. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross Reviewed-by: Wei Liu Reviewed-by: Julien Grall --- V7: - new patch V8: - some minor comments by Julien Grall addressed V11: - rename to xenevtchn_fdopen() (Andrew Cooper) V12: - better comments in header file (Andrew Cooper) - reject flags != 0 if fdopen (Andrew Cooper) - style (Andrew Cooper) --- tools/include/xenevtchn.h | 50 +++++++++++++++--------- tools/libs/evtchn/Makefile | 2 +- tools/libs/evtchn/core.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------- tools/libs/evtchn/freebsd.c | 7 +++- tools/libs/evtchn/libxenevtchn.map | 4 ++ tools/libs/evtchn/linux.c | 6 ++- tools/libs/evtchn/minios.c | 4 ++ 7 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) diff --git a/tools/include/xenevtchn.h b/tools/include/xenevtchn.h index 3e9b6e7323..10dbe1a06e 100644 --- a/tools/include/xenevtchn.h +++ b/tools/include/xenevtchn.h @@ -42,35 +42,47 @@ struct xentoollog_logger; */ /* - * Return a handle to the event channel driver, or NULL on failure, in - * which case errno will be set appropriately. + * Opens the evtchn device node. Return a handle to the event channel + * driver, or NULL on failure, in which case errno will be set + * appropriately. * - * Note: After fork(2) a child process must not use any opened evtchn - * handle inherited from their parent, nor access any grant mapped - * areas associated with that handle. + * On fork(2): * - * The child must open a new handle if they want to interact with - * evtchn. + * After fork, a child process must not use any opened evtchn handle + * inherited from their parent. This includes operations such as + * poll() on the underlying file descriptor. Calling xenevtchn_close() + * is the only safe operation on a xenevtchn_handle which has been + * inherited. * - * Calling exec(2) in a child will safely (and reliably) reclaim any - * allocated resources via a xenevtchn_handle in the parent. + * The child must open a new handle if they want to interact with + * evtchn. * - * A child which does not call exec(2) may safely call - * xenevtchn_close() on a xenevtchn_handle inherited from their - * parent. This will attempt to reclaim any resources associated with - * that handle. Note that in some implementations this reclamation may - * not be completely effective, in this case any affected resources - * remain allocated. + * On exec(2): * - * Calling xenevtchn_close() is the only safe operation on a - * xenevtchn_handle which has been inherited. + * Wherever possible, the device node will be opened with O_CLOEXEC, + * so it is not inherited by the subsequent program. + * + * However the XENEVTCHN_NO_CLOEXEC flag may be used to avoid opening + * the device node with O_CLOEXEC. This is intended for use by + * daemons which support a self-reexec method of updating themselves. + * + * In this case, the updated daemon should pass the underlying file + * descriptor it inherited to xenevtchn_fdopen() to reconstruct the + * library handle. */ -/* Currently no flags are defined */ + +/* Don't set O_CLOEXEC when opening event channel driver node. */ +#define XENEVTCHN_NO_CLOEXEC (1U <<0) + xenevtchn_handle *xenevtchn_open(struct xentoollog_logger *logger, unsigned int flags); +/* Flag XENEVTCHN_NO_CLOEXEC is rejected by xenevtchn_fdopen(). */ +xenevtchn_handle *xenevtchn_fdopen(struct xentoollog_logger *logger, + int fd, unsigned open_flags); + /* - * Close a handle previously allocated with xenevtchn_open(). + * Close a handle previously allocated with xenevtchn_{,fd}open(). */ int xenevtchn_close(xenevtchn_handle *xce); diff --git a/tools/libs/evtchn/Makefile b/tools/libs/evtchn/Makefile index ad01a17b3d..b8c37b5b97 100644 --- a/tools/libs/evtchn/Makefile +++ b/tools/libs/evtchn/Makefile @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ XEN_ROOT = $(CURDIR)/../../.. include $(XEN_ROOT)/tools/Rules.mk MAJOR = 1 -MINOR = 1 +MINOR = 2 SRCS-y += core.c SRCS-$(CONFIG_Linux) += linux.c diff --git a/tools/libs/evtchn/core.c b/tools/libs/evtchn/core.c index d3cc93e98f..abebf72559 100644 --- a/tools/libs/evtchn/core.c +++ b/tools/libs/evtchn/core.c @@ -30,18 +30,10 @@ static int all_restrict_cb(Xentoolcore__Active_Handle *ah, domid_t domid) return xenevtchn_restrict(xce, domid); } -xenevtchn_handle *xenevtchn_open(xentoollog_logger *logger, unsigned int flags) +static xenevtchn_handle *xenevtchn_alloc_handle(xentoollog_logger *logger) { - xenevtchn_handle *xce; - int rc; - - if ( flags ) - { - errno = EINVAL; - return NULL; - } + xenevtchn_handle *xce = malloc(sizeof(*xce)); - xce = malloc(sizeof(*xce)); if ( !xce ) return NULL; @@ -60,21 +52,59 @@ xenevtchn_handle *xenevtchn_open(xentoollog_logger *logger, unsigned int flags) goto err; } + return xce; + +err: + xenevtchn_close(xce); + return NULL; +} + +xenevtchn_handle *xenevtchn_open(xentoollog_logger *logger, unsigned int flags) +{ + xenevtchn_handle *xce; + int rc; + + if ( flags & ~XENEVTCHN_NO_CLOEXEC ) + { + errno = EINVAL; + return NULL; + } + + xce = xenevtchn_alloc_handle(logger); + if ( !xce ) + return NULL; + rc = osdep_evtchn_open(xce, flags); if ( rc < 0 ) goto err; return xce; - err: - xentoolcore__deregister_active_handle(&xce->tc_ah); - osdep_evtchn_close(xce); - xtl_logger_destroy(xce->logger_tofree); - free(xce); - +err: + xenevtchn_close(xce); return NULL; } +xenevtchn_handle *xenevtchn_fdopen(struct xentoollog_logger *logger, + int fd, unsigned int flags) +{ + xenevtchn_handle *xce; + + if ( flags ) + { + errno = EINVAL; + return NULL; + } + + xce = xenevtchn_alloc_handle(logger); + if ( !xce ) + return NULL; + + xce->fd = fd; + + return xce; +} + int xenevtchn_close(xenevtchn_handle *xce) { int rc; diff --git a/tools/libs/evtchn/freebsd.c b/tools/libs/evtchn/freebsd.c index bb601f350f..7427ab2408 100644 --- a/tools/libs/evtchn/freebsd.c +++ b/tools/libs/evtchn/freebsd.c @@ -33,8 +33,13 @@ int osdep_evtchn_open(xenevtchn_handle *xce, unsigned int flags) { - int fd = open(EVTCHN_DEV, O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC); + int open_flags = O_RDWR; + int fd; + if ( !(flags & XENEVTCHN_NO_CLOEXEC) ) + open_flags |= O_CLOEXEC; + + fd = open(EVTCHN_DEV, open_flags); if ( fd == -1 ) return -1; diff --git a/tools/libs/evtchn/libxenevtchn.map b/tools/libs/evtchn/libxenevtchn.map index 33a38f953a..4c180ea65d 100644 --- a/tools/libs/evtchn/libxenevtchn.map +++ b/tools/libs/evtchn/libxenevtchn.map @@ -21,3 +21,7 @@ VERS_1.1 { global: xenevtchn_restrict; } VERS_1.0; +VERS_1.2 { + global: + xenevtchn_fdopen; +} VERS_1.1; diff --git a/tools/libs/evtchn/linux.c b/tools/libs/evtchn/linux.c index 62adc0e574..60bb75a791 100644 --- a/tools/libs/evtchn/linux.c +++ b/tools/libs/evtchn/linux.c @@ -36,8 +36,12 @@ int osdep_evtchn_open(xenevtchn_handle *xce, unsigned int flags) { - int fd = open("/dev/xen/evtchn", O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC); + int open_flags = O_RDWR; + int fd; + if ( !(flags & XENEVTCHN_NO_CLOEXEC) ) + open_flags |= O_CLOEXEC; + fd = open("/dev/xen/evtchn", open_flags); if ( fd == -1 ) return -1; diff --git a/tools/libs/evtchn/minios.c b/tools/libs/evtchn/minios.c index 3afc8e2517..57f712ade3 100644 --- a/tools/libs/evtchn/minios.c +++ b/tools/libs/evtchn/minios.c @@ -69,6 +69,10 @@ static void port_dealloc(struct evtchn_port_info *port_info) free(port_info); } +/* + * XENEVTCHN_NO_CLOEXEC is being ignored, as there is no exec() call supported + * in Mini-OS. + */ int osdep_evtchn_open(xenevtchn_handle *xce, unsigned int flags) { int fd = alloc_fd(FTYPE_EVTCHN); -- 2.26.2