Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from smtp3.osuosl.org (smtp3.osuosl.org [140.211.166.136]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 292FFC433EF for ; Wed, 20 Apr 2022 17:03:50 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp3.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B4D5D60C34; Wed, 20 Apr 2022 17:03:49 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org Received: from smtp3.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp3.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id BAK4zwQwAlnv; Wed, 20 Apr 2022 17:03:48 +0000 (UTC) Received: from ash.osuosl.org (ash.osuosl.org [140.211.166.34]) by smtp3.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3730160D63; Wed, 20 Apr 2022 17:03:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org (smtp2.osuosl.org [140.211.166.133]) by ash.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C08AA1BF4E3 for ; Wed, 20 Apr 2022 17:03:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BC23B40C34 for ; Wed, 20 Apr 2022 17:03:45 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org Authentication-Results: smtp2.osuosl.org (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=zx2c4.com Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp2.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 82QXKXyy6Qqe for ; Wed, 20 Apr 2022 17:03:44 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [145.40.68.75]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 00CC240C1A for ; Wed, 20 Apr 2022 17:03:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B8234B8210C; Wed, 20 Apr 2022 17:03:40 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id EDFE7C385A0; Wed, 20 Apr 2022 17:03:38 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=zx2c4.com header.i=@zx2c4.com header.b="OExp22Wn" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=zx2c4.com; s=20210105; t=1650474217; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding; bh=ubPJ6om5eGBasrvLPlVU2SXwi6ezTfxdh6iUJ0Tvphw=; b=OExp22WnXBJ+IZXmEV5/qOcgD8jz7kqSwe1oDi4eRK6AnYVF7oVbL6WNTb5C733pdsUMsj REYlw95zzqtVU4NxGTw/hGIeLzZeWVMA5hI9wGEKP10m9teeHKlmX+1OOS9jWbJy/o9REL kf5G7Wx4jvwMBqvmnJkXvNwbL+txU88= Received: by mail.zx2c4.com (ZX2C4 Mail Server) with ESMTPSA id b30dc145 (TLSv1.3:AEAD-AES256-GCM-SHA384:256:NO); Wed, 20 Apr 2022 17:03:36 +0000 (UTC) From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" To: buildroot , Peter Korsgaard , Michael Fischer , Arnout Vandecappelle , Thomas Petazzoni Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2022 19:03:26 +0200 Message-Id: <20220420170326.1901572-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Subject: [Buildroot] [PATCH v5] package/urandom-scripts: actually credit seed files via seedrng X-BeenThere: buildroot@buildroot.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Discussion and development of buildroot List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Errors-To: buildroot-bounces@buildroot.org Sender: "buildroot" The RNG can't actually be seeded from a shell script, due to the reliance on ioctls. For this reason, Busybox now contains SeedRNG, a tiny program meant to be called at startup and shutdown (and at arbitrary other points in between if desired). Since this is currently in Busybox's git tree, this commit adds it as a patch to the Busybox package. Then, it wires the init script up to call it. This is a significant improvement over the current init script, which doesn't credit entropy and whose hashing in shell scripts is sort of fragile. NOTE NOTE NOTE: While I've added the patch to the Busybox package directory, I don't really know how to wire this up and what to do about the various config entries. I was hoping that a Buildroot maintainer might have a better idea of the best way to do this, and could just take this patch as a starting point for whatever the real commit winds up being. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld --- Changes v4->v5: - SeedRNG is now part of Busybox, so we don't need to carry the source in-tree here, which was the primary objection to earlier versions. ...eedRNG-utility-for-kernel-RNG-seed-f.patch | 309 ++++++++++++++++++ package/urandom-scripts/Config.in | 4 - package/urandom-scripts/S20urandom | 78 ++--- 3 files changed, 330 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-) create mode 100644 package/busybox/0003-seedrng-import-SeedRNG-utility-for-kernel-RNG-seed-f.patch diff --git a/package/busybox/0003-seedrng-import-SeedRNG-utility-for-kernel-RNG-seed-f.patch b/package/busybox/0003-seedrng-import-SeedRNG-utility-for-kernel-RNG-seed-f.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..493c31b247 --- /dev/null +++ b/package/busybox/0003-seedrng-import-SeedRNG-utility-for-kernel-RNG-seed-f.patch @@ -0,0 +1,309 @@ +From 47660dc9581e251f555ca9b05b630276f1d487ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" +Date: Mon, 4 Apr 2022 18:21:51 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] seedrng: import SeedRNG utility for kernel RNG seed files + +The RNG can't actually be seeded from a shell script, due to the +reliance on ioctls and the fact that entropy written into the +unprivileged /dev/urandom device is not immediately mixed in, making +subsequent seed reads dangerous. For this reason, the seedrng project +provides a basic "C script" meant to be copy and pasted into projects +like Busybox and tweaked as needed: . + +The SeedRNG construction has been part of systemd's seeder since +January, and recently was added to Android, OpenRC, and Void's Runit, +with more integrations on their way depending on context. Virtually +every single Busybox-based distro I have seen seeds things in wrong, +incomplete, or otherwise dangerous way. For example, fixing this issue +in Buildroot requires first for Busybox to have this fix. + +This commit imports it into Busybox and wires up the basic config. The +utility itself is tiny, and unlike the example code from the SeedRNG +project, we can re-use libbb's existing hash functions, rather than +having to ship a standalone BLAKE2s, which makes this even smaller. + +Cherry picked from upstream commits: + - 4b407bacd4c1628782d24c3e044e43780bb057a4 + - 453857899616acf1c77d0d02a4c2989b2cf5f1eb + - 31ec481baf106cf9c6d8f34ae6a55ab1738dea6f + - 3c60711f836b151b8f361098475c3b0cd162dd17 + - 398bb3861aa39ae6d3ada7bb54698653b4de370b + - ce9a345632786d5585044ed71ed4c98c305b918f + - 3cb40f89de42aa694d44cb6e896b732fa062ee75 + - 57fea029cc3d6faf5a8b9ad4b17b543359fe7ccb + +Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld +Signed-off-by: Bernhard Reutner-Fischer +--- + util-linux/seedrng.c | 259 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 259 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 util-linux/seedrng.c + +diff --git a/util-linux/seedrng.c b/util-linux/seedrng.c +new file mode 100644 +index 000000000..5a41addf0 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/util-linux/seedrng.c +@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@ ++// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT ++/* ++ * Copyright (C) 2022 Jason A. Donenfeld . All Rights Reserved. ++ * ++ * SeedRNG is a simple program made for seeding the Linux kernel random number ++ * generator from seed files. It is is useful in light of the fact that the ++ * Linux kernel RNG cannot be initialized from shell scripts, and new seeds ++ * cannot be safely generated from boot time shell scripts either. It should ++ * be run once at init time and once at shutdown time. It can be run at other ++ * times on a timer as well. Whenever it is run, it writes existing seed files ++ * into the RNG pool, and then creates a new seed file. If the RNG is ++ * initialized at the time of creating a new seed file, then that new seed file ++ * is marked as "creditable", which means it can be used to initialize the RNG. ++ * Otherwise, it is marked as "non-creditable", in which case it is still used ++ * to seed the RNG's pool, but will not initialize the RNG. In order to ensure ++ * that entropy only ever stays the same or increases from one seed file to the ++ * next, old seed values are hashed together with new seed values when writing ++ * new seed files. ++ * ++ * This is based on code from . ++ */ ++ ++//config:config SEEDRNG ++//config: bool "seedrng (2 kb)" ++//config: default y ++//config: help ++//config: Seed the kernel RNG from seed files, meant to be called ++//config: once during startup, once during shutdown, and optionally ++//config: at some periodic interval in between. ++ ++//applet:IF_SEEDRNG(APPLET(seedrng, BB_DIR_USR_SBIN, BB_SUID_DROP)) ++ ++//kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_SEEDRNG) += seedrng.o ++ ++//usage:#define seedrng_trivial_usage ++//usage: "[-d SEED_DIRECTORY] [-n]" ++//usage:#define seedrng_full_usage "\n\n" ++//usage: "Seed the kernel RNG from seed files." ++//usage: "\n" ++//usage: "\n -d, --seed-dir DIR Use seed files from specified directory (default: /var/lib/seedrng)" ++//usage: "\n -n, --skip-credit Skip crediting seeds, even if creditable" ++ ++#include "libbb.h" ++ ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++#include ++ ++#ifndef GRND_INSECURE ++#define GRND_INSECURE 0x0004 /* Apparently some headers don't ship with this yet. */ ++#endif ++ ++#define DEFAULT_SEED_DIR "/var/lib/seedrng" ++#define CREDITABLE_SEED_NAME "seed.credit" ++#define NON_CREDITABLE_SEED_NAME "seed.no-credit" ++ ++enum seedrng_lengths { ++ MIN_SEED_LEN = SHA256_OUTSIZE, ++ MAX_SEED_LEN = 512 ++}; ++ ++static size_t determine_optimal_seed_len(void) ++{ ++ char poolsize_str[11] = { 0 }; ++ unsigned long poolsize; ++ ++ if (open_read_close("/proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize", poolsize_str, sizeof(poolsize_str) - 1) < 0) { ++ bb_perror_msg("unable to determine pool size, assuming %u bits", MIN_SEED_LEN * 8); ++ return MIN_SEED_LEN; ++ } ++ poolsize = (bb_strtoul(poolsize_str, NULL, 10) + 7) / 8; ++ return MAX(MIN(poolsize, MAX_SEED_LEN), MIN_SEED_LEN); ++} ++ ++static int read_new_seed(uint8_t *seed, size_t len, bool *is_creditable) ++{ ++ ssize_t ret; ++ ++ *is_creditable = false; ++ ret = getrandom(seed, len, GRND_NONBLOCK); ++ if (ret == (ssize_t)len) { ++ *is_creditable = true; ++ return 0; ++ } else if (ret < 0 && errno == ENOSYS) { ++ struct pollfd random_fd = { ++ .fd = open("/dev/random", O_RDONLY), ++ .events = POLLIN ++ }; ++ if (random_fd.fd < 0) ++ return -1; ++ *is_creditable = safe_poll(&random_fd, 1, 0) == 1; ++ close(random_fd.fd); ++ } else if (getrandom(seed, len, GRND_INSECURE) == (ssize_t)len) ++ return 0; ++ if (open_read_close("/dev/urandom", seed, len) == (ssize_t)len) ++ return 0; ++ return -1; ++} ++ ++static int seed_rng(uint8_t *seed, size_t len, bool credit) ++{ ++ struct { ++ int entropy_count; ++ int buf_size; ++ uint8_t buffer[MAX_SEED_LEN]; ++ } req = { ++ .entropy_count = credit ? len * 8 : 0, ++ .buf_size = len ++ }; ++ int random_fd, ret; ++ ++ if (len > sizeof(req.buffer)) { ++ errno = EFBIG; ++ return -1; ++ } ++ memcpy(req.buffer, seed, len); ++ ++ random_fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY); ++ if (random_fd < 0) ++ return -1; ++ ret = ioctl(random_fd, RNDADDENTROPY, &req); ++ if (ret) ++ ret = -errno ? -errno : -EIO; ++ if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP) ++ close(random_fd); ++ errno = -ret; ++ return ret ? -1 : 0; ++} ++ ++static int seed_from_file_if_exists(const char *filename, int dfd, bool credit, sha256_ctx_t *hash) ++{ ++ uint8_t seed[MAX_SEED_LEN]; ++ ssize_t seed_len; ++ ++ seed_len = open_read_close(filename, seed, sizeof(seed)); ++ if (seed_len < 0) { ++ if (errno == ENOENT) ++ return 0; ++ bb_perror_msg("unable to%s seed", " read"); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ if ((unlink(filename) < 0 || fsync(dfd) < 0) && seed_len) { ++ bb_perror_msg("unable to%s seed", " remove"); ++ return -1; ++ } else if (!seed_len) ++ return 0; ++ ++ sha256_hash(hash, &seed_len, sizeof(seed_len)); ++ sha256_hash(hash, seed, seed_len); ++ ++ printf("Seeding %zd bits %s crediting\n", seed_len * 8, credit ? "and" : "without"); ++ if (seed_rng(seed, seed_len, credit) < 0) { ++ bb_perror_msg("unable to%s seed", ""); ++ return -1; ++ } ++ return 0; ++} ++ ++int seedrng_main(int argc, char *argv[]) MAIN_EXTERNALLY_VISIBLE; ++int seedrng_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char *argv[]) ++{ ++ const char *seed_dir = DEFAULT_SEED_DIR, *creditable_seed, *non_creditable_seed; ++ int ret, fd = -1, dfd = -1, program_ret = 0; ++ uint8_t new_seed[MAX_SEED_LEN]; ++ size_t new_seed_len; ++ bool new_seed_creditable; ++ bool skip_credit = false; ++ struct timespec timestamp = { 0 }; ++ sha256_ctx_t hash; ++ ++ int opt; ++ enum { ++ OPT_d = (1 << 0), ++ OPT_n = (1 << 1) ++ }; ++#if ENABLE_LONG_OPTS ++ static const char longopts[] ALIGN1 = ++ "seed-dir\0" Required_argument "d" ++ "skip-credit\0" No_argument "n" ++ ; ++#endif ++ ++ opt = getopt32long(argv, "d:n", longopts, &seed_dir); ++ skip_credit = opt & OPT_n; ++ creditable_seed = concat_path_file(seed_dir, CREDITABLE_SEED_NAME); ++ non_creditable_seed = concat_path_file(seed_dir, NON_CREDITABLE_SEED_NAME); ++ ++ umask(0077); ++ if (getuid()) ++ bb_simple_error_msg_and_die(bb_msg_you_must_be_root); ++ ++ if (mkdir(seed_dir, 0700) < 0 && errno != EEXIST) ++ bb_perror_msg_and_die("unable to %s seed directory", "create"); ++ ++ dfd = open(seed_dir, O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY); ++ if (dfd < 0 || flock(dfd, LOCK_EX) < 0) { ++ bb_perror_msg("unable to %s seed directory", "lock"); ++ program_ret = 1; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ ++ sha256_begin(&hash); ++ sha256_hash(&hash, "SeedRNG v1 Old+New Prefix", 25); ++ clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, ×tamp); ++ sha256_hash(&hash, ×tamp, sizeof(timestamp)); ++ clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, ×tamp); ++ sha256_hash(&hash, ×tamp, sizeof(timestamp)); ++ ++ ret = seed_from_file_if_exists(non_creditable_seed, dfd, false, &hash); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ program_ret |= 1 << 1; ++ ret = seed_from_file_if_exists(creditable_seed, dfd, !skip_credit, &hash); ++ if (ret < 0) ++ program_ret |= 1 << 2; ++ ++ new_seed_len = determine_optimal_seed_len(); ++ ret = read_new_seed(new_seed, new_seed_len, &new_seed_creditable); ++ if (ret < 0) { ++ bb_perror_msg("unable to%s seed", " read new"); ++ new_seed_len = SHA256_OUTSIZE; ++ memset(new_seed, 0, SHA256_OUTSIZE); ++ program_ret |= 1 << 3; ++ } ++ sha256_hash(&hash, &new_seed_len, sizeof(new_seed_len)); ++ sha256_hash(&hash, new_seed, new_seed_len); ++ sha256_end(&hash, new_seed + new_seed_len - SHA256_OUTSIZE); ++ ++ printf("Saving %zu bits of %screditable seed for next boot\n", new_seed_len * 8, new_seed_creditable ? "" : "non-"); ++ fd = open(non_creditable_seed, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0400); ++ if (fd < 0 || full_write(fd, new_seed, new_seed_len) != (ssize_t)new_seed_len || fsync(fd) < 0) { ++ bb_perror_msg("unable to%s seed", " write"); ++ program_ret |= 1 << 4; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ if (new_seed_creditable && rename(non_creditable_seed, creditable_seed) < 0) { ++ bb_simple_perror_msg("unable to make new seed creditable"); ++ program_ret |= 1 << 5; ++ } ++out: ++ if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP && fd >= 0) ++ close(fd); ++ if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP && dfd >= 0) ++ close(dfd); ++ return program_ret; ++} +-- +2.35.1 + diff --git a/package/urandom-scripts/Config.in b/package/urandom-scripts/Config.in index 987e442e22..070ffa5e9a 100644 --- a/package/urandom-scripts/Config.in +++ b/package/urandom-scripts/Config.in @@ -4,7 +4,3 @@ config BR2_PACKAGE_URANDOM_SCRIPTS depends on !BR2_PACKAGE_SYSTEMD help Initscript to preserve the random seed between reboots. - - WARNING: this is a poor fit to try and get high-quality - entropy at boot. There are better ways, like haveged, or - rng-tools. diff --git a/package/urandom-scripts/S20urandom b/package/urandom-scripts/S20urandom index 6c6aea9eee..346bc5b11e 100644 --- a/package/urandom-scripts/S20urandom +++ b/package/urandom-scripts/S20urandom @@ -3,67 +3,31 @@ # Preserve the random seed between reboots. See urandom(4). # -# Quietly do nothing if /dev/urandom does not exist -[ -c /dev/urandom ] || exit 0 - -URANDOM_SEED="/var/lib/random-seed" +# The following knobs can be adjusted by placing uncommented modified lines +# into /etc/default/urandom: +# +# Set these to change where the seed and runtime lock file are stored: +# +# seed_dir=/var/lib/seedrng +# +# Set this to true only if you do not want seed files to actually credit the +# RNG, for example if you plan to replicate this file system image and do not +# have the wherewithal to first delete the contents of /var/lib/seedrng: +# +# skip_credit=false +# -# shellcheck source=/dev/null +unset seed_dir skip_credit [ -r "/etc/default/urandom" ] && . "/etc/default/urandom" -if pool_bits=$(cat /proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize 2> /dev/null); then - pool_size=$((pool_bits/8)) -else - pool_size=512 -fi - -init_rng() { - [ -f "$URANDOM_SEED" ] || return 0 - printf 'Initializing random number generator: ' - dd if="$URANDOM_SEED" bs="$pool_size" of=/dev/urandom count=1 2> /dev/null - status=$? - if [ "$status" -eq 0 ]; then - echo "OK" - else - echo "FAIL" - fi - return "$status" -} - -save_random_seed() { - printf 'Saving random seed: ' - status=1 - if touch "$URANDOM_SEED.new" 2> /dev/null; then - old_umask=$(umask) - umask 077 - dd if=/dev/urandom of="$URANDOM_SEED.tmp" bs="$pool_size" count=1 2> /dev/null - cat "$URANDOM_SEED" "$URANDOM_SEED.tmp" 2>/dev/null \ - | sha256sum \ - | cut -d ' ' -f 1 > "$URANDOM_SEED.new" && \ - mv "$URANDOM_SEED.new" "$URANDOM_SEED" && status=0 - rm -f "$URANDOM_SEED.tmp" - umask "$old_umask" - if [ "$status" -eq 0 ]; then - echo "OK" - else - echo "FAIL" - fi - - else - echo "SKIP (read-only file system detected)" - fi - return "$status" -} - case "$1" in - start|restart|reload) - # Carry a random seed from start-up to start-up - # Load and then save the whole entropy pool - init_rng && save_random_seed;; - stop) - # Carry a random seed from shut-down to start-up - # Save the whole entropy pool - save_random_seed;; + start|stop|restart|reload) + # Never fail, as this isn't worth making a fuss + # over if it doesn't go as planned. + args="" + [ -n "$seed_dir" ] && args="$args --seed-dir=$seed_dir" + [ "$skip_credit" = "true" ] && args="$args --skip-credit" + seedrng $args || true;; *) echo "Usage: $0 {start|stop|restart|reload}" exit 1 -- 2.35.1 _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list buildroot@buildroot.org https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot