Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2F1DCC04AA5 for ; Wed, 24 Aug 2022 22:13:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229765AbiHXWNN (ORCPT ); Wed, 24 Aug 2022 18:13:13 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:45838 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229486AbiHXWNI (ORCPT ); Wed, 24 Aug 2022 18:13:08 -0400 Received: from mail-pg1-x549.google.com (mail-pg1-x549.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::549]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C52D17CB4B for ; Wed, 24 Aug 2022 15:13:05 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pg1-x549.google.com with SMTP id i191-20020a6387c8000000b0042b44ad723bso401153pge.19 for ; Wed, 24 Aug 2022 15:13:05 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20210112; h=cc:to:from:subject:references:mime-version:message-id:in-reply-to :date:from:to:cc; bh=jb99RodiI+WU16IcT6CXLp9CnBkyr2LtMQhOPJ79YSg=; b=nUss7YRreV9GLEMCFtc39RiHCj7DKGc0PpHHP9vfCb8G5MHeh/G8HmDv0Lkj4Ht1Sf q0+rd3ZZCq5Vl0qElzGjsrALK0I+6cYmUJKVnw+JXOucWHDVVlkMAGXlFh+P29idpeCk ktDKk+p6ss8WYRC1riIG4x7b5G3cCILh/sM5Vm4cSMu3ded4RT5wwUFxQow2l2lAkeJ+ h9KWRR0biZ/DKsihwspo4NiHxpozXtIiGXRIO261BtsfRFSq+Tu+rbCA+0+MEP8pgvhb Y0T/8Kita4cT9rCdV/Z22O1bR1ijpWg/hhbwqmx0Peb4H2SrEoLlo06LL76EWbajb+CM H8og== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=cc:to:from:subject:references:mime-version:message-id:in-reply-to :date:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc; bh=jb99RodiI+WU16IcT6CXLp9CnBkyr2LtMQhOPJ79YSg=; b=i4DsIZdrL+TaZ46oDKQVxWT0kd2vHpvlJ8Z8YJ04JA894odR2UjgTFlVJ8jefzJq/i kbbeO9zQFb1ilBuGQTnOH7ZuUgoQqKqpMyisk7431t+yA7LVhxrn+uQL+guEGHno9prE U0xn2B+Ejl1dvQA9yOqlkHDZag6u138+mAbLGZMHRBvt3Q+QFfDZekIxA7/Ixzhm/q1p gGZqizTDLYmG1L62heybiwisAAHz0m34uqeJb3lL6xgCefazrpjyBsoQpLiWQ8V2rghd aIesD8AmhlNwGxMUsN5y3+JxH0PJ0PBDXuCm7L5oszwHUzL3xCBP3abbz19efqcCuh6f iBtw== X-Gm-Message-State: ACgBeo2ZownQRiMU68LlopbBgy6bgKGBFMVkLPaLZd+d9BmvscoPkf8R gq6Iio/KmWCneDZ0QWYnxwm4JRjVL0h5obRszZo= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AA6agR7skmm80CIcsY7zGmElnaP7RZWXtjdbpFgxlc6nm3guIrQ/iSnwXrJSxXC8uvXMDW5zySqh1Q4xndLa0j8ByR8= X-Received: from obsessiveorange-c1.c.googlers.com ([fda3:e722:ac3:cc00:7f:e700:c0a8:3039]) (user=benedictwong job=sendgmr) by 2002:a63:1e48:0:b0:429:e6ee:780d with SMTP id p8-20020a631e48000000b00429e6ee780dmr730253pgm.383.1661379185090; Wed, 24 Aug 2022 15:13:05 -0700 (PDT) Date: Wed, 24 Aug 2022 22:12:51 +0000 In-Reply-To: <20220824221252.4130836-1-benedictwong@google.com> Message-Id: <20220824221252.4130836-2-benedictwong@google.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20220824221252.4130836-1-benedictwong@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.37.1.595.g718a3a8f04-goog Subject: [PATCH v2 ipsec 1/2] xfrm: Skip checking of already-verified secpath entries From: Benedict Wong To: steffen.klassert@secunet.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: nharold@google.com, benedictwong@google.com, lorenzo@google.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org This change fixes a bug where inbound packets to nested IPsec tunnels fails to pass policy checks due to the inner tunnel's policy checks not having a reference to the outer policy/template. This causes the policy check to fail, since the first entries in the secpath correlate to the outer tunnel, while the templates being verified are for the inner tunnel. In order to ensure that the appropriate policy and template context is searchable, the policy checks must be done incrementally between each decryption step. As such, this marks secpath entries as having been successfully matched, skipping them (treating as optional) on subsequent policy checks By skipping the immediate error return in the case where the secpath entry had previously been validated, this change allows secpath entries that matched a policy/template previously, while still requiring that each searched template find a match in the secpath. For security: - All templates must have matching secpath entries - Unchanged by current patch; templates that do not match any secpath entry still return -1. This patch simply allows skipping earlier blocks of verified secpath entries - All entries (except trailing transport mode entries) must have a matching template - Unvalidated entries, including transport-mode entries still return the errored index if it does not match the correct template. Test: Tested against Android Kernel Unit Tests Signed-off-by: Benedict Wong --- include/net/xfrm.h | 1 + net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c | 1 + net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h index c39d910d4b45..a2f2840aba6b 100644 --- a/include/net/xfrm.h +++ b/include/net/xfrm.h @@ -1031,6 +1031,7 @@ struct xfrm_offload { struct sec_path { int len; int olen; + int verified_cnt; struct xfrm_state *xvec[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH]; struct xfrm_offload ovec[XFRM_MAX_OFFLOAD_DEPTH]; diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c index 144238a50f3d..bcb9ee25474b 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c @@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ struct sec_path *secpath_set(struct sk_buff *skb) memset(sp->ovec, 0, sizeof(sp->ovec)); sp->olen = 0; sp->len = 0; + sp->verified_cnt = 0; return sp; } diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c index f1a0bab920a5..71a5beebb6a0 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c @@ -3261,7 +3261,7 @@ xfrm_state_ok(const struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, const struct xfrm_state *x, */ static inline int xfrm_policy_ok(const struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, const struct sec_path *sp, int start, - unsigned short family) + unsigned short family) { int idx = start; @@ -3274,6 +3274,13 @@ xfrm_policy_ok(const struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, const struct sec_path *sp, int star if (xfrm_state_ok(tmpl, sp->xvec[idx], family)) return ++idx; if (sp->xvec[idx]->props.mode != XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT) { + if (idx < sp->verified_cnt) { + /* Secpath entry previously verified, consider optional and + * continue searching + */ + continue; + } + if (start == -1) start = -2-idx; break; @@ -3650,6 +3657,8 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb, * Order is _important_. Later we will implement * some barriers, but at the moment barriers * are implied between each two transformations. + * Upon success, marks secpath entries as having been verified to allow + * them to be skipped in future policy checks (e.g. nested tunnels). */ for (i = xfrm_nr-1, k = 0; i >= 0; i--) { k = xfrm_policy_ok(tpp[i], sp, k, family); @@ -3668,6 +3677,8 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb, } xfrm_pols_put(pols, npols); + sp->verified_cnt = k; + return 1; } XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINPOLBLOCK); -- 2.37.1.595.g718a3a8f04-goog