Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BE651C352A1 for ; Sat, 3 Dec 2022 18:46:15 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229813AbiLCSqO (ORCPT ); Sat, 3 Dec 2022 13:46:14 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:36632 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229808AbiLCSqN (ORCPT ); Sat, 3 Dec 2022 13:46:13 -0500 Received: from mx0a-00082601.pphosted.com (mx0a-00082601.pphosted.com [67.231.145.42]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E2F1718B3E for ; Sat, 3 Dec 2022 10:46:06 -0800 (PST) Received: from pps.filterd (m0148461.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-00082601.pphosted.com (8.17.1.19/8.17.1.19) with ESMTP id 2B3CuiTQ009529 for ; Sat, 3 Dec 2022 10:46:06 -0800 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=fb.com; h=from : to : cc : subject : date : message-id : in-reply-to : references : content-type : content-transfer-encoding : mime-version; s=facebook; bh=Ms8fphjeR3/WkU986ZaU/bo1TI/SbJ3v28t4ofQUu/8=; b=S+2YZz8uYUAxuwVzK44a84B99GZIt9B3M0ZE4mcWns7RBXyzRpbPqkdFtCxidyvyHH1z eCGh2egnauqEttvI62bH1cW3wDiXncZyO4x2o7CQt0y4/SldFwnj8eDhUlflJCyNgRW0 Gk3PxZ+QyYfDHxf+2XPrE/M/i97M/rAlQYk= Received: from mail.thefacebook.com ([163.114.132.120]) by mx0a-00082601.pphosted.com (PPS) with ESMTPS id 3m84eyacsf-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128 verify=NOT) for ; Sat, 03 Dec 2022 10:46:06 -0800 Received: from twshared25383.14.frc2.facebook.com (2620:10d:c085:108::4) by mail.thefacebook.com (2620:10d:c085:11d::6) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.2375.31; Sat, 3 Dec 2022 10:46:05 -0800 Received: by devbig309.ftw3.facebook.com (Postfix, from userid 128203) id 898A81320E6A2; Sat, 3 Dec 2022 10:46:02 -0800 (PST) From: Yonghong Song To: CC: Alexei Starovoitov , Andrii Nakryiko , Daniel Borkmann , , Martin KaFai Lau Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/3] bpf: Handle MEM_RCU type properly Date: Sat, 3 Dec 2022 10:46:02 -0800 Message-ID: <20221203184602.477272-1-yhs@fb.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.30.2 In-Reply-To: <20221203184557.476871-1-yhs@fb.com> References: <20221203184557.476871-1-yhs@fb.com> X-FB-Internal: Safe Content-Type: text/plain X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: WbN-CXN2isfV5q6tg5JYFHwlIyn2n3hX X-Proofpoint-GUID: WbN-CXN2isfV5q6tg5JYFHwlIyn2n3hX Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Proofpoint-UnRewURL: 0 URL was un-rewritten MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.205,Aquarius:18.0.923,Hydra:6.0.545,FMLib:17.11.122.1 definitions=2022-12-03_10,2022-12-01_01,2022-06-22_01 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: bpf@vger.kernel.org Commit 9bb00b2895cb ("bpf: Add kfunc bpf_rcu_read_lock/unlock()") introduced MEM_RCU and bpf_rcu_read_lock/unlock() support. In that commit, a rcu pointer is tagged with both MEM_RCU and PTR_TRUSTED so that it can be passed into kfuncs or helpers as an argument. Martin raised a good question in [1] such that the rcu pointer, although being able to accessing the object, might have reference count of 0. This might cause a problem if the rcu pointer is passed to a kfunc which expects trusted arguments where ref count should be greater than 0. This patch makes the following changes related to MEM_RCU pointer: - MEM_RCU pointer might be NULL (PTR_MAYBE_NULL). - Introduce KF_RCU so MEM_RCU ptr can be acquired with a KF_RCU tagged kfunc which assumes ref count of rcu ptr could be zero. - For mem access 'b =3D ptr->a', say 'ptr' is a MEM_RCU ptr, and 'a' is tagged with __rcu as well. Let us mark 'b' as MEM_RCU | PTR_MAYBE_NULL. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/ac70f574-4023-664e-b711-e0d3b18117fd@linux= .dev/ Fixes: 9bb00b2895cb ("bpf: Add kfunc bpf_rcu_read_lock/unlock()") Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song --- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 2 +- include/linux/btf.h | 1 + kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 14 +++++++++++ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 4 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h index b5090e89cb3f..c07b351a5bc7 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h @@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ static inline bool bpf_prog_check_recur(const struct bp= f_prog *prog) } } =20 -#define BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS (MEM_ALLOC | MEM_RCU | PTR_TRUSTED) +#define BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS (MEM_ALLOC | PTR_TRUSTED) =20 static inline bool bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(u32 type) { diff --git a/include/linux/btf.h b/include/linux/btf.h index 9ed00077db6e..cbd6e4096f8c 100644 --- a/include/linux/btf.h +++ b/include/linux/btf.h @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ #define KF_TRUSTED_ARGS (1 << 4) /* kfunc only takes trusted pointer argum= ents */ #define KF_SLEEPABLE (1 << 5) /* kfunc may sleep */ #define KF_DESTRUCTIVE (1 << 6) /* kfunc performs destructive actions */ +#define KF_RCU (1 << 7) /* kfunc only takes rcu pointer arguments= */ =20 /* * Return the name of the passed struct, if exists, or halt the build if f= or diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c index a5a511430f2a..cca642358e80 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c @@ -1837,6 +1837,19 @@ struct task_struct *bpf_task_acquire(struct task_str= uct *p) return p; } =20 +/** + * bpf_task_acquire_not_zero - Acquire a reference to a rcu task object. A= task + * acquired by this kfunc which is not stored in a map as a kptr, must be + * released by calling bpf_task_release(). + * @p: The task on which a reference is being acquired. + */ +struct task_struct *bpf_task_acquire_not_zero(struct task_struct *p) +{ + if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&p->rcu_users)) + return NULL; + return p; +} + /** * bpf_task_kptr_get - Acquire a reference on a struct task_struct kptr. A= task * kptr acquired by this kfunc which is not subsequently stored in a map, = must @@ -2013,6 +2026,7 @@ BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_list_push_back) BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_list_pop_front, KF_ACQUIRE | KF_RET_NULL) BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_list_pop_back, KF_ACQUIRE | KF_RET_NULL) BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_task_acquire, KF_ACQUIRE | KF_TRUSTED_ARGS) +BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_task_acquire_not_zero, KF_ACQUIRE | KF_RCU | KF_RET= _NULL) BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_task_kptr_get, KF_ACQUIRE | KF_KPTR_GET | KF_RET_NU= LL) BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_task_release, KF_RELEASE) #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index b0db9c10567b..66b82f52b5bc 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -4275,7 +4275,7 @@ static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state= *reg) return true; =20 /* If a register is not referenced, it is trusted if it has the - * MEM_ALLOC, MEM_RCU or PTR_TRUSTED type modifiers, and no others. Some = of the + * MEM_ALLOC or PTR_TRUSTED type modifiers, and no others. Some of the * other type modifiers may be safe, but we elect to take an opt-in * approach here as some (e.g. PTR_UNTRUSTED and PTR_MAYBE_NULL) are * not. @@ -4287,6 +4287,11 @@ static bool is_trusted_reg(const struct bpf_reg_stat= e *reg) !bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type); } =20 +static bool is_rcu_reg(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) +{ + return reg->type & MEM_RCU; +} + static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off, int size, bool strict) @@ -4785,14 +4790,16 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verif= ier_env *env, =20 if (flag & MEM_RCU) { /* Mark value register as MEM_RCU only if it is protected by - * bpf_rcu_read_lock() and the ptr reg is trusted. MEM_RCU + * bpf_rcu_read_lock() and the ptr reg is rcu or trusted. MEM_RCU * itself can already indicate trustedness inside the rcu - * read lock region. Also mark it as PTR_TRUSTED. + * read lock region. Also mark rcu pointer as PTR_MAYBE_NULL since + * it could be null in some cases. */ - if (!env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock || !is_trusted_reg(reg)) + if (!env->cur_state->active_rcu_lock || + !(is_trusted_reg(reg) || is_rcu_reg(reg))) flag &=3D ~MEM_RCU; else - flag |=3D PTR_TRUSTED; + flag |=3D PTR_MAYBE_NULL; } else if (reg->type & MEM_RCU) { /* ptr (reg) is marked as MEM_RCU, but the struct field is not tagged * with __rcu. Mark the flag as PTR_UNTRUSTED conservatively. @@ -5957,7 +5964,7 @@ static const struct bpf_reg_types btf_ptr_types =3D { .types =3D { PTR_TO_BTF_ID, PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED, - PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU | PTR_TRUSTED, + PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU, }, }; static const struct bpf_reg_types percpu_btf_ptr_types =3D { @@ -6136,7 +6143,7 @@ int check_func_arg_reg_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *e= nv, case PTR_TO_BTF_ID: case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC: case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED: - case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU | PTR_TRUSTED: + case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_RCU: case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_TRUSTED: /* When referenced PTR_TO_BTF_ID is passed to release function, * it's fixed offset must be 0. In the other cases, fixed offset @@ -8038,6 +8045,11 @@ static bool is_kfunc_destructive(struct bpf_kfunc_ca= ll_arg_meta *meta) return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_DESTRUCTIVE; } =20 +static bool is_kfunc_rcu(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) +{ + return meta->kfunc_flags & KF_RCU; +} + static bool is_kfunc_arg_kptr_get(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, in= t arg) { return arg =3D=3D 0 && (meta->kfunc_flags & KF_KPTR_GET); @@ -8722,13 +8734,20 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env= *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ switch (kf_arg_type) { case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_BTF_ID: case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: - if (!is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta)) + if (!is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) && !is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) break; =20 if (!is_trusted_reg(reg)) { - verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced or trusted\n", regno); - return -EINVAL; + if (!is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) { + verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced or trusted\n", regno); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (!is_rcu_reg(reg)) { + verbose(env, "R%d must be a rcu pointer\n", regno); + return -EINVAL; + } } + fallthrough; case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX: /* Trusted arguments have the same offset checks as release arguments */ @@ -8839,7 +8858,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *= env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: /* Only base_type is checked, further checks are done here */ if ((base_type(reg->type) !=3D PTR_TO_BTF_ID || - bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type)) && + (bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type) && !is_rcu_reg(reg))) && !reg2btf_ids[base_type(reg->type)]) { verbose(env, "arg#%d is %s ", i, reg_type_str(env, reg->type)); verbose(env, "expected %s or socket\n", @@ -8954,7 +8973,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *= env, struct bpf_insn *insn, } else if (rcu_unlock) { bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate(env->cur_state, state, reg, ({ if (reg->type & MEM_RCU) { - reg->type &=3D ~(MEM_RCU | PTR_TRUSTED); + reg->type &=3D ~(MEM_RCU | PTR_MAYBE_NULL); reg->type |=3D PTR_UNTRUSTED; } })); @@ -11294,7 +11313,7 @@ static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_st= ate *state, bool is_null) { if (type_may_be_null(reg->type) && reg->id =3D=3D id && - !WARN_ON_ONCE(!reg->id)) { + (is_rcu_reg(reg) || !WARN_ON_ONCE(!reg->id))) { /* Old offset (both fixed and variable parts) should have been * known-zero, because we don't allow pointer arithmetic on * pointers that might be NULL. If we see this happening, don't --=20 2.30.2