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Include MSR_PKRS for migration, and let the guest have full access. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich --- CC: Jan Beulich CC: Roger Pau Monné CC: Wei Liu CC: Kevin Tian v2: * Rebase over the get/set_reg() infrastructure. --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 1 + xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ xen/arch/x86/msr.c | 10 ++++++++++ 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c index 927a221660e8..c6c1eea18003 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c @@ -1333,6 +1333,7 @@ static int cf_check hvm_load_cpu_xsave_states( static const uint32_t msrs_to_send[] = { MSR_SPEC_CTRL, MSR_INTEL_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES, + MSR_PKRS, MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, MSR_IA32_XSS, MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c index b1f493f009fd..57827779c305 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -657,6 +657,11 @@ static void cf_check vmx_cpuid_policy_changed(struct vcpu *v) else vmx_set_msr_intercept(v, MSR_FLUSH_CMD, VMX_MSR_RW); + if ( cp->feat.pks ) + vmx_clear_msr_intercept(v, MSR_PKRS, VMX_MSR_RW); + else + vmx_set_msr_intercept(v, MSR_PKRS, VMX_MSR_RW); + out: vmx_vmcs_exit(v); @@ -2455,6 +2460,7 @@ static uint64_t cf_check vmx_get_reg(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int reg) { const struct vcpu *curr = current; struct domain *d = v->domain; + const struct vcpu_msrs *msrs = v->arch.msrs; uint64_t val = 0; int rc; @@ -2471,6 +2477,9 @@ static uint64_t cf_check vmx_get_reg(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int reg) } return val; + case MSR_PKRS: + return (v == curr) ? rdpkrs() : msrs->pkrs; + case MSR_SHADOW_GS_BASE: if ( v != curr ) return v->arch.hvm.vmx.shadow_gs; @@ -2499,6 +2508,8 @@ static uint64_t cf_check vmx_get_reg(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int reg) static void cf_check vmx_set_reg(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int reg, uint64_t val) { + const struct vcpu *curr = current; + struct vcpu_msrs *msrs = v->arch.msrs; struct domain *d = v->domain; int rc; @@ -2514,6 +2525,12 @@ static void cf_check vmx_set_reg(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int reg, uint64_t val) domain_crash(d); } return; + + case MSR_PKRS: + msrs->pkrs = val; + if ( v == curr ) + wrpkrs(val); + return; } /* Logic which maybe requires remote VMCS acquisition. */ diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c index 317b154d244d..7ddf0078c3a2 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/msr.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/msr.c @@ -325,6 +325,11 @@ int guest_rdmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t *val) *val = 0; break; + case MSR_PKRS: + if ( !cp->feat.pks ) + goto gp_fault; + goto get_reg; + case MSR_X2APIC_FIRST ... MSR_X2APIC_LAST: if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) || v != curr ) goto gp_fault; @@ -616,6 +621,11 @@ int guest_wrmsr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, uint64_t val) break; goto gp_fault; + case MSR_PKRS: + if ( !cp->feat.pks || val != (uint32_t)val ) + goto gp_fault; + goto set_reg; + case MSR_X2APIC_FIRST ... MSR_X2APIC_LAST: if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) || v != curr ) goto gp_fault; -- 2.11.0