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All this option does is hide PKU by default from HVM guests, and is therefore redundant with the more generic cpuid=no-pku. The variable ought to be in __initdata given it's single user, but deleting it entirely looks to be a better course of action. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper --- CC: Jan Beulich CC: Roger Pau Monné CC: Wei Liu CC: Henry Wang --- CHANGELOG.md | 3 +++ docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc | 10 ---------- xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c | 7 ------- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md index 7d7e0590f8c6..43f15dc34cbf 100644 --- a/CHANGELOG.md +++ b/CHANGELOG.md @@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/) - Add support for AVX512-FP16 on x86. - On Arm, Xen supports guests running SVE/SVE2 instructions. (Tech Preview) +### Removed + - On x86, the "pku" command line option has been removed. It has never + behaved precisely as described, and redundant with "cpuid=no-pku". ## [4.17.0](https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=shortlog;h=RELEASE-4.17.0) - 2022-12-12 diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc index 4060ebdc5d76..9d66688bd1ff 100644 --- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc +++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc @@ -1950,16 +1950,6 @@ for all of them (`true`), only for those subject to XPTI (`xpti`) or for those not subject to XPTI (`no-xpti`). The feature is used only in case INVPCID is supported and not disabled via `invpcid=false`. -### pku (x86) -> `= ` - -> Default: `true` - -Flag to enable Memory Protection Keys. - -The protection-key feature provides an additional mechanism by which IA-32e -paging controls access to usermode addresses. - ### ple_gap > `= ` diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c index cfcdaace125b..14021ffc66d8 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c @@ -29,10 +29,6 @@ bool __read_mostly opt_dom0_cpuid_faulting = true; bool_t opt_arat = 1; boolean_param("arat", opt_arat); -/* pku: Flag to enable Memory Protection Keys (default on). */ -static bool_t opt_pku = 1; -boolean_param("pku", opt_pku); - unsigned int opt_cpuid_mask_ecx = ~0u; integer_param("cpuid_mask_ecx", opt_cpuid_mask_ecx); unsigned int opt_cpuid_mask_edx = ~0u; @@ -522,9 +518,6 @@ void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) this_cpu->c_init(c); - if (c == &boot_cpu_data && !opt_pku) - setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PKU); - /* * The vendor-specific functions might have changed features. Now * we do "generic changes." -- 2.30.2