Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=google.com header.i=@google.com header.b="d3xi1vjs" Received: from mail-yw1-x114a.google.com (mail-yw1-x114a.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::114a]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D70C11734 for ; Fri, 8 Dec 2023 07:51:52 -0800 (PST) Received: by mail-yw1-x114a.google.com with SMTP id 00721157ae682-5d032ab478fso27864267b3.0 for ; Fri, 08 Dec 2023 07:51:52 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20230601; t=1702050712; x=1702655512; darn=vger.kernel.org; h=content-transfer-encoding:cc:to:from:subject:references :mime-version:message-id:in-reply-to:date:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=mju3ViF0d/Jk5ieUylmRq+FCfb/T1IaKWcGes5aRqrg=; b=d3xi1vjsnSePZ9gKnl5DnsyJMIaC89AB7KtUMIuv6H/X8Ml+PliexLQ+fuQ2JWt67Q hxU74XTmUQxC0dsq62N4cOi3ax26DJthPOAyg+BZfJU6XCm6NFdQcCw9QtAuGPQM23Rw /poNFRcwK0OtFbyxjseHuJ5YL1BsKuoaLhiWybWSf7BdiVI52tYHNfA1izYFxQxFOgPG Vb1/VtcbOv1FJIjvoM64l3v5m0qeAgj9FJ9g4mny1rIUSNrXZrzTqNIT2iMSpQxNWKWI iazEB6rWGoIMN+uqmcyqlp0gpKItID0txamnJOJ/j5FhKwlXBtvArd4czmGp63e4Z7il 6xmg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1702050712; x=1702655512; h=content-transfer-encoding:cc:to:from:subject:references :mime-version:message-id:in-reply-to:date:x-gm-message-state:from:to :cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=mju3ViF0d/Jk5ieUylmRq+FCfb/T1IaKWcGes5aRqrg=; b=QeRxoZuW0w88nP38HzReEgxTd4mgfnwYm/3s9BNdDnwjXRckRrVea/HgUtc8Vhvd0A 4+7JkjhAZHlzqqxafGj8Qbc9nWBiLicjK2VJXY+RKm7gW+OwCoVAGP/5x0FLWn68oroP ztBcaQy1gidmhQ+fKrTPVA4HXjJyxeHAkBmwcUbz5t2XYV5cUI8nKYA3AJWgaudYQkBx fiTJUXScHiM5jHg8PXzxrdVhxY+mfgO+x6lxNNS4V56nJMBStV7tMBxZybgHYZ1doOhx egHHS0EzdEXiSDS2niosIkpNX96D3x1NE3fmLSkMT5t0wuRHtheDhSmAPIKMpjMiOQEH RMZg== X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0Yyd/pHj/15TSBLzrwgiLwKMEZ62MRIkTD9dzRSSr1yAqfW1PgET AqYrT+aNyVUVf25VWIiXsZDGg2neVrM= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IF08Rhtqy3Dy8W8OMYKeuBaF2V/tUXkUmZOLclD76Htb9sZGykZKBCDCf47NU7fqO4KDAlQIZtzMwE= X-Received: from sport.zrh.corp.google.com ([2a00:79e0:9d:4:d80e:bfc8:2891:24c1]) (user=gnoack job=sendgmr) by 2002:a05:690c:b9d:b0:5a8:33ab:d545 with SMTP id ck29-20020a05690c0b9d00b005a833abd545mr2810ywb.2.1702050712043; Fri, 08 Dec 2023 07:51:52 -0800 (PST) Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2023 16:51:21 +0100 In-Reply-To: <20231208155121.1943775-1-gnoack@google.com> Message-Id: <20231208155121.1943775-10-gnoack@google.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Mime-Version: 1.0 References: <20231208155121.1943775-1-gnoack@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.43.0.472.g3155946c3a-goog Subject: [PATCH v8 9/9] landlock: Document IOCTL support From: "=?UTF-8?q?G=C3=BCnther=20Noack?=" To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, "=?UTF-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl=20Sala=C3=BCn?=" Cc: Jeff Xu , Jorge Lucangeli Obes , Allen Webb , Dmitry Torokhov , Paul Moore , Konstantin Meskhidze , Matt Bobrowski , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, "=?UTF-8?q?G=C3=BCnther=20Noack?=" Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable In the paragraph above the fallback logic, use the shorter phrasing from the landlock(7) man page. Signed-off-by: G=C3=BCnther Noack --- Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 119 ++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 104 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/users= pace-api/landlock.rst index 2e3822677061..8398851964e6 100644 --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst @@ -75,7 +75,8 @@ to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights. LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER | - LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE, + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL, .handled_access_net =3D LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP, @@ -84,10 +85,10 @@ to be explicit about the denied-by-default access right= s. Because we may not know on which kernel version an application will be executed, it is safer to follow a best-effort security approach. Indeed, = we should try to protect users as much as possible whatever the kernel they a= re -using. To avoid binary enforcement (i.e. either all security features or -none), we can leverage a dedicated Landlock command to get the current ver= sion -of the Landlock ABI and adapt the handled accesses. Let's check if we sho= uld -remove access rights which are only supported in higher versions of the AB= I. +using. + +To be compatible with older Linux versions, we detect the available Landlo= ck ABI +version, and only use the available subset of access rights: =20 .. code-block:: c =20 @@ -113,6 +114,10 @@ remove access rights which are only supported in highe= r versions of the ABI. ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &=3D ~(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP); + __attribute__((fallthrough)); + case 4: + /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL for ABI < 5 */ + ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &=3D ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL; } =20 This enables to create an inclusive ruleset that will contain our rules. @@ -224,6 +229,7 @@ access rights per directory enables to change the locat= ion of such directory without relying on the destination directory access rights (except those t= hat are required for this operation, see ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER`` documentation). + Having self-sufficient hierarchies also helps to tighten the required acce= ss rights to the minimal set of data. This also helps avoid sinkhole directo= ries, i.e. directories where data can be linked to but not linked from. Howeve= r, @@ -317,18 +323,69 @@ It should also be noted that truncating files does no= t require the system call, this can also be done through :manpage:`open(2)` with the fla= gs ``O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC``. =20 -When opening a file, the availability of the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE= `` -right is associated with the newly created file descriptor and will be use= d for -subsequent truncation attempts using :manpage:`ftruncate(2)`. The behavio= r is -similar to opening a file for reading or writing, where permissions are ch= ecked -during :manpage:`open(2)`, but not during the subsequent :manpage:`read(2)= ` and +The truncate right is associated with the opened file (see below). + +Rights associated with file descriptors +--------------------------------------- + +When opening a file, the availability of the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE= `` and +``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL`` rights is associated with the newly created f= ile +descriptor and will be used for subsequent truncation and ioctl attempts u= sing +:manpage:`ftruncate(2)` and :manpage:`ioctl(2)`. The behavior is similar = to +opening a file for reading or writing, where permissions are checked durin= g +:manpage:`open(2)`, but not during the subsequent :manpage:`read(2)` and :manpage:`write(2)` calls. =20 -As a consequence, it is possible to have multiple open file descriptors fo= r the -same file, where one grants the right to truncate the file and the other d= oes -not. It is also possible to pass such file descriptors between processes, -keeping their Landlock properties, even when these processes do not have a= n -enforced Landlock ruleset. +As a consequence, it is possible that a process has multiple open file +descriptors referring to the same file, but Landlock enforces different th= ings +when operating with these file descriptors. This can happen when a Landlo= ck +ruleset gets enforced and the process keeps file descriptors which were op= ened +both before and after the enforcement. It is also possible to pass such f= ile +descriptors between processes, keeping their Landlock properties, even whe= n some +of the involved processes do not have an enforced Landlock ruleset. + +Restricting IOCTL commands +-------------------------- + +When the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL`` access right is handled, Landlock wi= ll +restrict the invocation of IOCTL commands. However, to *permit* these IOC= TL +commands again, some of these IOCTL commands are then granted through othe= r, +preexisting access rights. + +For example, consider a program which handles ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL``= and +``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE``. The program *permits* +``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE`` on a file ``foo.log``. + +By virtue of granting this access on the ``foo.log`` file, it is now possi= ble to +use common and harmless IOCTL commands which are useful when reading files= , such +as ``FIONREAD``. + +On the other hand, if the program permits ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL`` on +another file, ``FIONREAD`` will not work on that file when it is opened. = As +soon as ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE`` is *handled* in the ruleset, the = IOCTL +commands affected by it can not be reenabled though ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_I= OCTL`` +any more, but are then governed by ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE``. + +The following table illustrates how IOCTL attempts for ``FIONREAD`` are +filtered, depending on how a Landlock ruleset handles and permits the +``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL`` and ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE`` access r= ights: + ++------------------------+-------------+-------------------+--------------= -----+ +| | ``IOCTL`` | ``IOCTL`` handled | ``IOCTL`` han= dled | +| | not handled | and permitted | and not permi= tted | ++------------------------+-------------+-------------------+--------------= -----+ +| ``READ_FILE`` not | allow | allow | deny = | +| handled | | | = | ++------------------------+ +-------------------+--------------= -----+ +| ``READ_FILE`` handled | | allow = | +| and permitted | | = | ++------------------------+ +-------------------+--------------= -----+ +| ``READ_FILE`` handled | | deny = | +| and not permitted | | = | ++------------------------+-------------+-------------------+--------------= -----+ + +The full list of IOCTL commands and the access rights which affect them is +documented below. =20 Compatibility =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D @@ -457,6 +514,28 @@ Memory usage Kernel memory allocated to create rulesets is accounted and can be restric= ted by the Documentation/admin-guide/cgroup-v1/memory.rst. =20 +IOCTL support +------------- + +The ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL`` access right restricts the use of +:manpage:`ioctl(2)`, but it only applies to newly opened files. This mean= s +specifically that pre-existing file descriptors like stdin, stdout and std= err +are unaffected. + +Users should be aware that TTY devices have traditionally permitted to con= trol +other processes on the same TTY through the ``TIOCSTI`` and ``TIOCLINUX`` = IOCTL +commands. It is therefore recommended to close inherited TTY file descrip= tors, +or to reopen them from ``/proc/self/fd/*`` without the +``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL`` right, if possible. The :manpage:`isatty(3)` +function checks whether a given file descriptor is a TTY. + +Landlock's IOCTL support is coarse-grained at the moment, but may become m= ore +fine-grained in the future. Until then, users are advised to establish th= e +guarantees that they need through the file hierarchy, by only permitting t= he +``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL`` right on files where it is really harmless. = In +cases where you can control the mounts, the ``nodev`` mount option can hel= p to +rule out that device files can be accessed. + Previous limitations =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D =20 @@ -494,6 +573,16 @@ bind and connect actions to only a set of allowed port= s thanks to the new ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP`` and ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP`` access rights. =20 +IOCTL (ABI < 5) +--------------- + +IOCTL operations could not be denied before the fifth Landlock ABI, so +:manpage:`ioctl(2)` is always allowed when using a kernel that only suppor= ts an +earlier ABI. + +Starting with the Landlock ABI version 5, it is possible to restrict the u= se of +:manpage:`ioctl(2)` using the new ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_IOCTL`` access righ= t. + .. _kernel_support: =20 Kernel support --=20 2.43.0.472.g3155946c3a-goog