Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8B2DEBE47 for ; Sat, 29 Jun 2024 02:30:51 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1719628251; cv=none; b=mynWJrftBEHJTDrFgm8V/WptOoq4pqxpouQUN73XCnoPjQdD9kWA8LOohUmTugnAINZgVe+SHfG4meWi0lyxXdzNaIryK7El3k9qJh79sBKcxl85qIJWbuEhanhmgHasjQ8JKBDmwaeCz/7vlvxbKASCAPybpMTRw0bU5f6nfxA= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1719628251; c=relaxed/simple; bh=hmti92g1DtSHO2bLxc1lUObMjWzo2yQWdrWrS0ugFko=; h=Date:To:From:Subject:Message-Id; b=Yeu8ryV+vubPzerXoAzGLnoY1mEWRE7Lmlq25xjOwi+imUxKsR/5TC7MQibp3JaPMPw6IhuoRkZ2BsHf0bOcoZ4n6Qir6Z2fsCbEma2bwYNUKfGQ7EcUZvIBrgMY3VjX9RMwuo0utc4jC3VAxVjLgDstTqJfdWsx2n+AL24NYAg= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux-foundation.org header.i=@linux-foundation.org header.b=KHUc8POJ; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux-foundation.org header.i=@linux-foundation.org header.b="KHUc8POJ" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 62B97C116B1; Sat, 29 Jun 2024 02:30:51 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linux-foundation.org; s=korg; t=1719628251; bh=hmti92g1DtSHO2bLxc1lUObMjWzo2yQWdrWrS0ugFko=; h=Date:To:From:Subject:From; b=KHUc8POJXEpS9Ec5jrrUOCxUk8urIpPlNlvbWInEgZ4Ohb0w+AGmZsMWJIMBj8wBv Zv4FJvlT4ER5DXCSKqpP8VI6muflMvpnpj4Z7dLD7eyh+fJNiqb3umh3YVAveKNpOu j6rhLqyMwTjNQde4+T7I2ib4seCUNz+4COmkebaA= Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2024 19:30:50 -0700 To: mm-commits@vger.kernel.org,vbabka@suse.cz,svens@linux.ibm.com,rostedt@goodmis.org,roman.gushchin@linux.dev,rientjes@google.com,penberg@kernel.org,mhiramat@kernel.org,mark.rutland@arm.com,kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com,hca@linux.ibm.com,gor@linux.ibm.com,glider@google.com,elver@google.com,dvyukov@google.com,cl@linux.com,borntraeger@linux.ibm.com,agordeev@linux.ibm.com,42.hyeyoo@gmail.com,iii@linux.ibm.com,akpm@linux-foundation.org From: Andrew Morton Subject: [merged mm-stable] kmsan-support-slab_poison.patch removed from -mm tree Message-Id: <20240629023051.62B97C116B1@smtp.kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: mm-commits@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: The quilt patch titled Subject: kmsan: support SLAB_POISON has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was kmsan-support-slab_poison.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-stable branch of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm ------------------------------------------------------ From: Ilya Leoshkevich Subject: kmsan: support SLAB_POISON Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 13:34:57 +0200 Avoid false KMSAN negatives with SLUB_DEBUG by allowing kmsan_slab_free() to poison the freed memory, and by preventing init_object() from unpoisoning new allocations by using __memset(). There are two alternatives to this approach. First, init_object() can be marked with __no_sanitize_memory. This annotation should be used with great care, because it drops all instrumentation from the function, and any shadow writes will be lost. Even though this is not a concern with the current init_object() implementation, this may change in the future. Second, kmsan_poison_memory() calls may be added after memset() calls. The downside is that init_object() is called from free_debug_processing(), in which case poisoning will erase the distinction between simply uninitialized memory and UAF. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-14-iii@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko Cc: Alexander Gordeev Cc: Christian Borntraeger Cc: Christoph Lameter Cc: David Rientjes Cc: Dmitry Vyukov Cc: Heiko Carstens Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim Cc: Cc: Marco Elver Cc: Mark Rutland Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) Cc: Pekka Enberg Cc: Roman Gushchin Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) Cc: Sven Schnelle Cc: Vasily Gorbik Cc: Vlastimil Babka Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton --- mm/kmsan/hooks.c | 2 +- mm/slub.c | 15 +++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c~kmsan-support-slab_poison +++ a/mm/kmsan/hooks.c @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ void kmsan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache * return; /* RCU slabs could be legally used after free within the RCU period */ - if (unlikely(s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON))) + if (unlikely(s->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU)) return; /* * If there's a constructor, freed memory must remain in the same state --- a/mm/slub.c~kmsan-support-slab_poison +++ a/mm/slub.c @@ -1139,7 +1139,13 @@ static void init_object(struct kmem_cach unsigned int poison_size = s->object_size; if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) { - memset(p - s->red_left_pad, val, s->red_left_pad); + /* + * Here and below, avoid overwriting the KMSAN shadow. Keeping + * the shadow makes it possible to distinguish uninit-value + * from use-after-free. + */ + memset_no_sanitize_memory(p - s->red_left_pad, val, + s->red_left_pad); if (slub_debug_orig_size(s) && val == SLUB_RED_ACTIVE) { /* @@ -1152,12 +1158,13 @@ static void init_object(struct kmem_cach } if (s->flags & __OBJECT_POISON) { - memset(p, POISON_FREE, poison_size - 1); - p[poison_size - 1] = POISON_END; + memset_no_sanitize_memory(p, POISON_FREE, poison_size - 1); + memset_no_sanitize_memory(p + poison_size - 1, POISON_END, 1); } if (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) - memset(p + poison_size, val, s->inuse - poison_size); + memset_no_sanitize_memory(p + poison_size, val, + s->inuse - poison_size); } static void restore_bytes(struct kmem_cache *s, char *message, u8 data, _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from iii@linux.ibm.com are