Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 59C171C8604 for ; Sat, 22 Feb 2025 15:53:43 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1740239623; cv=none; b=ksPf9xHtpKFw+yJY39662zp8KpDXVfDNO7/qk4HZzzrsw4e/9lHEj0LnHmTWLic3KhMEITgK8d0EeDRr0ODkdQiXYW1572g3QcQtwDFF/2p+gFp89Ktf8lVRHJNPusJrPxyKCQmfRx5S2rYmvbo4rjW3++1/LuO7PH5pxBlELPk= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1740239623; c=relaxed/simple; bh=QH/S0Vqe8yKf/GFjOR1nH5/tIG/zMnHl2gBa8oUCtDI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=AjZy9DOjhvlcCg9tVyisJdO2xPanDJxsRIstIdGc7MfWYQ3QkdPUpSu0usxk9Uo3MC9Agz0ilor1GstfU1sxIZuEnNeM7uXwSFxBKsxnudRDxhtHmpAF6LXxFk5JcT2j1ZOy369U7wz7UWJWusqCiedP7U30zwwsuQaAr89ZMYA= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=WklJqSFb; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="WklJqSFb" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C456DC4CED1; Sat, 22 Feb 2025 15:53:42 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1740239623; bh=QH/S0Vqe8yKf/GFjOR1nH5/tIG/zMnHl2gBa8oUCtDI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=WklJqSFbQBR4X3EZUiSagPJwlBCpH2tEp3tTQr9KGNqx98DRBjRTEdUZmT6HmkpsF eBvJP57JvyHrLZICHE76sFtF3Q65/fEvSL80br3zHEioIaDMYywgtNFLdwlLXhkvDY xkgIOt0A/woQBV977W9si3m9ewaw+tEoJVfjf+Ml3S/E8i1RoJgdO6GTZbdtll1MSI du4DOV9KGUHzmY17aQDJMXg10s2nyxG5dRZmXoWtKrZrB4oKJPo8MJ5vVUJRgu8pg8 pxCL/Me91qHi8qp5M3zP9B+2Riw5igxZ92/V1BUgBRk/UxdimX6Ac70HxNBpfzF7xQ JEHF8sl4c4M5g== From: Sasha Levin To: stable@vger.kernel.org, derkling@google.com Cc: Sasha Levin Subject: Re: [PATCH 6.1] x86/cpu/kvm: SRSO: Fix possible missing IBPB on VM-Exit Date: Sat, 22 Feb 2025 10:53:41 -0500 Message-Id: <20250221194210-7d86ada791744bf6@stable.kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.5 In-Reply-To: <20250221143051.23140-1-derkling@google.com> References: Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit [ Sasha's backport helper bot ] Hi, Summary of potential issues: ℹ️ Patch is missing in 6.6.y (ignore if backport was sent) The upstream commit SHA1 provided is correct: 318e8c339c9a0891c389298bb328ed0762a9935e Status in newer kernel trees: 6.13.y | Present (different SHA1: 0bdda736ef7f) 6.12.y | Present (different SHA1: eea6d16f56e9) 6.6.y | Not found Note: The patch differs from the upstream commit: --- 1: 318e8c339c9a0 ! 1: e509c2d77c608 x86/cpu/kvm: SRSO: Fix possible missing IBPB on VM-Exit @@ Metadata ## Commit message ## x86/cpu/kvm: SRSO: Fix possible missing IBPB on VM-Exit + commit 318e8c339c9a0891c389298bb328ed0762a9935e upstream. + In [1] the meaning of the synthetic IBPB flags has been redefined for a better separation of concerns: - ENTRY_IBPB -- issue IBPB on entry only @@ Commit message Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds ## arch/x86/Kconfig ## -@@ arch/x86/Kconfig: config MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY +@@ arch/x86/Kconfig: config CPU_IBPB_ENTRY depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64 default y help @@ arch/x86/Kconfig: config MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY + Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb and + spec_rstack_overflow={ibpb,ibpb-vmexit} mitigations. - config MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY + config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry" ## arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c ## @@ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET); setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK); -- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT); - mitigate_smt = true; - /* * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated, @@ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void) - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)) { + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) { if (has_microcode) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB); + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT); @@ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void) + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT); } } else { - pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n"); + pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n"); @@ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void) + break; - ibpb_on_vmexit: case SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT: -- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)) { +- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)) { - if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB) && has_microcode) { -+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)) { ++ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) { + if (has_microcode) { setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT); srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT; @@ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void) setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT); } } else { -- pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_SRSO.\n"); +- pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n"); ++ pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n"); + goto pred_cmd; - } -+ pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n"); + } break; + default: - break; --- Results of testing on various branches: | Branch | Patch Apply | Build Test | |---------------------------|-------------|------------| | stable/linux-6.1.y | Success | Success |