Received: from mail-pl1-f176.google.com (mail-pl1-f176.google.com [209.85.214.176]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D1119226533 for ; Wed, 11 Jun 2025 20:28:03 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=209.85.214.176 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1749673685; cv=none; b=Oay7gg/jXZE9+vWlUeHn7x8DyJE6eKNUmVTPFdLSusxtPjiu3g6o8vUrxQ9Eo2GRSzusgd+HxeRUs7X4NZUfkr/z4EuRlJ5DijF32KaonxeN/jP2ygpcrL/jzXAfz2/eKWqEKCYwoj07B+i7S8DM9ijPv4UZtf/oan7FTV6mifk= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1749673685; c=relaxed/simple; bh=vcsqVxisUPc2TNyIU7mVHCCESP4ZmB0UPj7WkvpPZLs=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=DfstKgeRBUki3MDjRCwEIMWelaVKXtqfUPGQo3cC8uQFvMlZ44pE3LDpcVF5/R1px31YgK2nTyHm9F8vPcuJl+2PB4Z+APTWPvMrIIxc1sFCPV7uQ5wEDwteQaiGZ3zgGCtC8Wx1FKigJ9UWIIBs+7jrZ+gdWKLbmqxY1cX/Lmc= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=gmail.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=gmail.com; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.b=OSEsMWNn; arc=none smtp.client-ip=209.85.214.176 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=gmail.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=gmail.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.b="OSEsMWNn" Received: by mail-pl1-f176.google.com with SMTP id d9443c01a7336-2363616a1a6so2073145ad.3 for ; Wed, 11 Jun 2025 13:28:03 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20230601; t=1749673683; x=1750278483; darn=vger.kernel.org; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:message-id:date:subject:cc :to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=CPn/nOhiBHOc30YRYig5J+Si7Mht5Fbl958sc6/rV7E=; b=OSEsMWNnPgQviMWZyZUpNioyZkeEH3ZWqeonSAM8O1R/RjWkqtyO4tCMBMDWwhvYeC /Gld3IpBA4qjcBGl9NeeJw0DL5uHAyivn/ivdhh6dGb9F/uC830oFklnBa9tTi6LexOx T7jgXZxKDPytB+28Aii0l9hESTZi3/I8udadfhKfpWIIPFFE1EmQX4+PRaarvTtK3ark qRkD7jLVJky94HgviuEkbM8I3uz9E/5Mwa3gosFslqwvNXC2ub2W5XY7bxVR+OaTsd0u +XgGv7IwyblFHR/mJPtw/H3+cmVuxVWNl2q2XZr4ljfyNaMkp0jtwQP+3Y/V8ZgcBfNT cAdQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1749673683; x=1750278483; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:message-id:date:subject:cc :to:from:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to; bh=CPn/nOhiBHOc30YRYig5J+Si7Mht5Fbl958sc6/rV7E=; b=s8Mm+BfzM74hlIb4qeBzJgJQxTGwnZwQ6YDI954b8DTgu7FnCfefkjZ8KbLKwCxiOO k7qac6Ge5E6/FHYpSRwsOCshDUO6rj8D1o84EpN0G9dh162AZ693jQosm8ZLSTCQX6AA expjPhlPgQjgvAtL6tPl4S9/8IjNVxum0sXUpTvQrxlsfpYS1SPw5D59lkNkXpwGoTOU J+EDGmdMNkSD4jXy2A5o0U65jREYHDmIkZ9fOQUvCzBJ6gysCNf+p91giIDjlrlwCcqi oc74RgrEMyCq8Au7tnzfuZkbbEDnLMi+4y2CjFoMTxqFTaH8qagZJvhMDeBROTApehxj exww== X-Forwarded-Encrypted: i=1; AJvYcCUQ83U9i7+eBzqJM7J4eBXwVlDtmbgQcHdbIrVVABkZ5gia1D1xB6iCJIEkgzhDm5WE0o0OBh4=@vger.kernel.org X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0Yz3OTLSkj5dK4x+rDPs8RSsx69CJvnoii+uE2XqllqFW/U01SRt tR3JRo8zX6obKYDDEH8sMI/so1Vj4Pw9+devj+FE/oW4l9vB5voTfKc= X-Gm-Gg: ASbGncuOX61Zu+9SXgqDr3AS2Pr9rsQjHIGt6Kyw5/6naIrvQj8FLl4NKQIt0BLhjgd s8Xwp31kmNzd1lU2bJ1DhbbklAyMjBReWl+BMfa0j0dJLBfXR7PLJXjU0mmTEDjUZokjtu8636Z rf4yoJrsKrfx3U8+iVW1HylowSlZS7kzMkv8RRjJYFQAbMsqldJf1FDeeSb+oRAkN5iP4l2leUH XAufUe8BcgA4eX5X1wmW4ZXCxtxVWkhspeWgc6oAXdVIGf2nXxYDPBy/TuXmenE4js3FQxXW5l4 NR3tkEl8PMmLbBmnrAB8dZ5Uj5CElj/Jw5YNVKY= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IGa1Ct+tVRFRFHHQpeLrf5yWNQn/r6n/mg6TmR/QM76HAMgDVxZzaJA3MQovmnHQPNchfV05w== X-Received: by 2002:a17:903:2ec6:b0:234:aa98:7d41 with SMTP id d9443c01a7336-2364d8ecf7cmr6212165ad.42.1749673683010; Wed, 11 Jun 2025 13:28:03 -0700 (PDT) Received: from fedora.. ([2601:647:6700:3390::c8d1]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id d9443c01a7336-236034056f8sm92345525ad.161.2025.06.11.13.28.01 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 11 Jun 2025 13:28:02 -0700 (PDT) From: Kuniyuki Iwashima To: "David S. Miller" , Eric Dumazet , Jakub Kicinski , Paolo Abeni Cc: Simon Horman , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Christian Heusel , =?UTF-8?q?Andr=C3=A9=20Almeida?= , netdev@vger.kernel.org, =?UTF-8?q?Jacek=20=C5=81uczak?= Subject: [PATCH v1 net] af_unix: Allow passing cred for embryo without SO_PASSCRED/SO_PASSPIDFD. Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2025 13:27:35 -0700 Message-ID: <20250611202758.3075858-1-kuni1840@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.49.0 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Before the cited commit, the kernel unconditionally embedded SCM credentials to skb for embryo sockets even when both the sender and listener disabled SO_PASSCRED and SO_PASSPIDFD. Now, the credentials are added to skb only when configured by the sender or the listener. However, as reported in the link below, it caused a regression for some programs that assume credentials are included in every skb, but sometimes not now. The only problematic scenario would be that a socket starts listening before setting the option. Then, there will be 2 types of non-small race window, where a client can send skb without credentials, which the peer receives as an "invalid" message (and aborts the connection it seems ?): Client Server ------ ------ s1.listen() <-- No SO_PASS{CRED,PIDFD} s2.connect() s2.send() <-- w/o cred s1.setsockopt(SO_PASS{CRED,PIDFD}) s2.send() <-- w/ cred or Client Server ------ ------ s1.listen() <-- No SO_PASS{CRED,PIDFD} s2.connect() s2.send() <-- w/o cred s3, _ = s1.accept() <-- Inherit cred options s2.send() <-- w/o cred but not set yet s3.setsockopt(SO_PASS{CRED,PIDFD}) s2.send() <-- w/ cred It's unfortunate that buggy programs depend on the behaviour, but let's restore the previous behaviour. Fixes: 3f84d577b79d ("af_unix: Inherit sk_flags at connect().") Reported-by: Jacek Ɓuczak Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/68d38b0b-1666-4974-85d4-15575789c8d4@gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima --- net/unix/af_unix.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c index fd6b5e17f6c4..87439d7f965d 100644 --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c @@ -1971,7 +1971,8 @@ static void unix_maybe_add_creds(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sock *sk, if (UNIXCB(skb).pid) return; - if (unix_may_passcred(sk) || unix_may_passcred(other)) { + if (unix_may_passcred(sk) || unix_may_passcred(other) || + !other->sk_socket) { UNIXCB(skb).pid = get_pid(task_tgid(current)); current_uid_gid(&UNIXCB(skb).uid, &UNIXCB(skb).gid); } -- 2.49.0