Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 095E63AF662; Mon, 23 Mar 2026 15:13:58 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1774278838; cv=none; b=uLrCNxI8eAi73+7U3zLM+xO2IhWNDEiBe9OKiX0xWfY5eZoTRTL3sCc3p/Hn0zgdxZYzCXuVU+fE/ZsKodiKFXMmSe5Ta4kATXKoASzsCC1U/muYtZMFfPmJuXR/Fb7ep2bisBTIgBdKwylN59TtqzdQB7cHPp1WQAR9SCplb+Y= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1774278838; c=relaxed/simple; bh=Qey1Gt+uNVzPmq96uXWAyjs2YM6nGg9Mt1NBJvh8Hjw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=dyBGe2g0sHTOzvAPXO5XlSmTlo/gLHVP6cftaIUJJhLAZLFt4BIEHSXUSlzxYJCs1p8475liSlCvK3QejosfO9x803fNT7aG7g4LFGQ7gU954MY2b7CiDPbGfXsTohvB9cs+9YkrfMkhTIImfO4B6j5fByA/jllhtmEmH3FQNJ8= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=Ip05WPwZ; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="Ip05WPwZ" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 83739C2BC9E; Mon, 23 Mar 2026 15:13:57 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1774278837; bh=Qey1Gt+uNVzPmq96uXWAyjs2YM6nGg9Mt1NBJvh8Hjw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Ip05WPwZK4bx4CQc9vw6r3NPUncJ90c/aoNZF6OQlvDElVnZLGKKd1zmJJ9AZhQVP J146/k3g8DDH5PRxjwOyz1BRMTYL+vQXUCErIpI+DCzPyIKDpjE2mFVACPlRd0U9xk 0+8vPQ1oINWbseC3zqmTT0lSey0fNM9aKFJeMzls= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Jeongjun Park Subject: [PATCH 6.6 435/567] drm/exynos: vidi: use ctx->lock to protect struct vidi_context member variables related to memory alloc/free Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2026 14:45:55 +0100 Message-ID: <20260323134544.697316299@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <20260323134533.749096647@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260323134533.749096647@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Jeongjun Park [ Upstream commit 52b330799e2d6f825ae2bb74662ec1b10eb954bb ] Exynos Virtual Display driver performs memory alloc/free operations without lock protection, which easily causes concurrency problem. For example, use-after-free can occur in race scenario like this: ``` CPU0 CPU1 CPU2 ---- ---- ---- vidi_connection_ioctl() if (vidi->connection) // true drm_edid = drm_edid_alloc(); // alloc drm_edid ... ctx->raw_edid = drm_edid; ... drm_mode_getconnector() drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes() vidi_get_modes() if (ctx->raw_edid) // true drm_edid_dup(ctx->raw_edid); if (!drm_edid) // false ... vidi_connection_ioctl() if (vidi->connection) // false drm_edid_free(ctx->raw_edid); // free drm_edid ... drm_edid_alloc(drm_edid->edid) kmemdup(edid); // UAF!! ... ``` To prevent these vulns, at least in vidi_context, member variables related to memory alloc/free should be protected with ctx->lock. Cc: Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_vidi.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_vidi.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_vidi.c @@ -186,15 +186,17 @@ static ssize_t vidi_store_connection(str const char *buf, size_t len) { struct vidi_context *ctx = dev_get_drvdata(dev); - int ret; + int ret, new_connected; - ret = kstrtoint(buf, 0, &ctx->connected); + ret = kstrtoint(buf, 0, &new_connected); if (ret) return ret; - if (ctx->connected > 1) + if (new_connected > 1) return -EINVAL; + mutex_lock(&ctx->lock); + /* use fake edid data for test. */ if (!ctx->raw_edid) ctx->raw_edid = (struct edid *)fake_edid_info; @@ -202,14 +204,21 @@ static ssize_t vidi_store_connection(str /* if raw_edid isn't same as fake data then it can't be tested. */ if (ctx->raw_edid != (struct edid *)fake_edid_info) { DRM_DEV_DEBUG_KMS(dev, "edid data is not fake data.\n"); - return -EINVAL; + ret = -EINVAL; + goto fail; } + ctx->connected = new_connected; + mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock); + DRM_DEV_DEBUG_KMS(dev, "requested connection.\n"); drm_helper_hpd_irq_event(ctx->drm_dev); return len; +fail: + mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock); + return ret; } static DEVICE_ATTR(connection, 0644, vidi_show_connection, @@ -244,11 +253,14 @@ int vidi_connection_ioctl(struct drm_dev return -EINVAL; } + mutex_lock(&ctx->lock); if (ctx->connected == vidi->connection) { + mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock); DRM_DEV_DEBUG_KMS(ctx->dev, "same connection request.\n"); return -EINVAL; } + mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock); if (vidi->connection) { struct edid *raw_edid; @@ -271,20 +283,27 @@ int vidi_connection_ioctl(struct drm_dev "failed to allocate raw_edid.\n"); return -ENOMEM; } + mutex_lock(&ctx->lock); ctx->raw_edid = raw_edid; + mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock); } else { /* * with connection = 0, free raw_edid * only if raw edid data isn't same as fake data. */ + mutex_lock(&ctx->lock); if (ctx->raw_edid && ctx->raw_edid != (struct edid *)fake_edid_info) { kfree(ctx->raw_edid); ctx->raw_edid = NULL; } + mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock); } + mutex_lock(&ctx->lock); ctx->connected = vidi->connection; + mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock); + drm_helper_hpd_irq_event(ctx->drm_dev); return 0; @@ -299,7 +318,7 @@ static enum drm_connector_status vidi_de * connection request would come from user side * to do hotplug through specific ioctl. */ - return ctx->connected ? connector_status_connected : + return READ_ONCE(ctx->connected) ? connector_status_connected : connector_status_disconnected; } @@ -321,22 +340,24 @@ static int vidi_get_modes(struct drm_con struct vidi_context *ctx = ctx_from_connector(connector); struct edid *edid; int edid_len; - int count; + int count = 0; /* * the edid data comes from user side and it would be set * to ctx->raw_edid through specific ioctl. */ + + mutex_lock(&ctx->lock); if (!ctx->raw_edid) { DRM_DEV_DEBUG_KMS(ctx->dev, "raw_edid is null.\n"); - return 0; + goto fail; } edid_len = (1 + ctx->raw_edid->extensions) * EDID_LENGTH; edid = kmemdup(ctx->raw_edid, edid_len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!edid) { DRM_DEV_DEBUG_KMS(ctx->dev, "failed to allocate edid\n"); - return 0; + goto fail; } drm_connector_update_edid_property(connector, edid); @@ -345,6 +366,8 @@ static int vidi_get_modes(struct drm_con kfree(edid); +fail: + mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock); return count; } @@ -490,11 +513,15 @@ static int vidi_remove(struct platform_d { struct vidi_context *ctx = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); + mutex_lock(&ctx->lock); + if (ctx->raw_edid != (struct edid *)fake_edid_info) { kfree(ctx->raw_edid); ctx->raw_edid = NULL; } + mutex_unlock(&ctx->lock); + component_del(&pdev->dev, &vidi_component_ops); return 0;