Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 31FE145106F for ; Wed, 27 May 2026 18:07:57 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1779905279; cv=none; b=hWI2S97APUHvMejps+6VIkBN3tw6JUGnV2HOH/MLrMtd7GBE2vXidsNzXkTzeB6CBMv5iZL8T8ZLUrr2PBN72gLyWi8xA80p0pp9AUB8DglvfSRpcKlzdb1gDxcq3pC1yGoJghYGSLaDK08pW5PYtci4IiVlAA2jzRu4mL56avg= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1779905279; c=relaxed/simple; bh=oG/YfU6vpOzLUxoCYyT+JIRQ3SCMPv60omqcVfRXTO4=; h=From:Subject:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Content-Type:Date: Message-Id; b=mOTuFpfK4dzZSFttMwvgVcJO+32MnfbZqYEQz+4c8efSJv6Iz7NGZBf8KLiCmuHJOMkhAThsYVtiyIHnA8TUJLY0Xg5Ksal8Sz+Sxh40CbbVs2CQc695S/skSHX7TUws3nqR9cuAcMr7vS2MyObWIeNxfbxTL8GVVbnZDISv8LM= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=Q3EgSA9N; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="Q3EgSA9N" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B4CEC1F000E9; Wed, 27 May 2026 18:07:57 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1779905277; bh=pg6miN1E9av1/tI8OIzk2W3jO5AZvhMS29E+7E1hyPU=; h=From:Subject:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Date; b=Q3EgSA9N/2x6GBN9vuZ4M609HNqkBv8H64433BtyFv/vuIzV8y9TxUwRnjoOeJWnr sZLtoTUlzOwLIXem6oBj3bDGidAQUpKW3H/cu+LlY3zJTz4c0T8/nvIGVc05dMi1kA guW1hBWas+31MjNbB++55a1LreftltmhwQ4GPtcX6ygj7EqvhHuQiEEF1xX9kX7cEO gDMlzdN+1zvPoI+6mBcdx0JWa9O81Z9j/2gSSD64DWYwzegxlQsnv4tO7Y6AswNd6H UKjqn3WgI0MLfhM7UEcoSCU+rcVDfhV9ZShBGk0aIhGUfBzYucjBbA28smdSZm9D2C VuOr80iHe83+Q== From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] x86/setup: prepend embedded bootconfig cmdline before parse_early_param Reply-To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev To: "Breno Leitao" Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org In-Reply-To: <20260527-bootconfig_using_tools-v1-4-b6906a86e7d5@debian.org> References: <20260527-bootconfig_using_tools-v1-4-b6906a86e7d5@debian.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Date: Wed, 27 May 2026 18:07:57 +0000 Message-Id: <20260527180757.B4CEC1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: bpf@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(= s) to consider: - [High] Unconditional application of embedded bootconfig `kernel` keys byp= asses the `bootconfig` parameter opt-in requirement. -- commit 571add72b0db9b7dbd9f5c179025b85435fd8e31 Author: Breno Leitao x86/setup: prepend embedded bootconfig cmdline before parse_early_param This commit prepends the embedded bootconfig kernel subtree to the command line in setup_arch() before parse_early_param() runs. It allows early parameter handlers to see bootconfig values without runtime parsing, while avoiding duplicate registrations in setup_boot_config(). > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c > index 46882ce79c3a4..592c4c79c974b 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c [ ... ] > @@ -924,6 +925,8 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p) > builtin_cmdline_added =3D true; > #endif > =20 > + xbc_prepend_embedded_cmdline(boot_command_line, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE); > + [Severity: High] Does this unconditional call bypass the bootconfig opt-in requirement? Documentation/admin-guide/bootconfig.rst specifies that embedded bootconfigs must be explicitly enabled via the bootconfig command-line parameter, unless CONFIG_BOOT_CONFIG_FORCE is set. Could this create a semantic inconsistency if a user boots without the bootconfig parameter? It appears setup_boot_config() would correctly ignore the embedded init.* keys, but these embedded kernel.* keys would still be forcefully applied. Furthermore, does this impact the bootconfig fail-safe recovery mechanism? If a malformed embedded kernel.* key (such as an invalid console=3D or mem= =3D) causes a kernel panic, would an administrator be unable to disable it by removing bootconfig from the bootloader command line? > strscpy(command_line, boot_command_line, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE); > *cmdline_p =3D command_line; --=20 Sashiko AI review =C2=B7 https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260527-bootconfig= _using_tools-v1-0-b6906a86e7d5@debian.org?part=3D4