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With p == end after ceph_start_decoding() accepts struct_len=0, this reads sizeof(ceph_entity_name) = 9 bytes past the validated buffer boundary. 2. *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec) after the locker_info_t header is an unchecked pointer advance. A malicious OSD can position p past end, causing all subsequent _safe checks to pass against a bogus boundary. 3. len = ceph_decode_32(p) has no preceding bounds check, and the immediately following *p += len is uncapped. A malicious OSD can send len=0xffffffff, advancing p gigabytes past end and escaping the decode window entirely. Fix all three by replacing bare operations with their safe variants: ceph_decode_copy -> ceph_decode_copy_safe *p += sizeof(...) -> ceph_decode_skip_n ceph_decode_32(p) -> ceph_decode_32_safe *p += len -> ceph_decode_skip_n A new out_bad: label is added to return -EINVAL on any bounds violation. -EINVAL is appropriate here: the data received from the OSD is structurally malformed, which is an invalid argument to the decode contract regardless of whether the caller or the wire is at fault. KASAN report (kernel 7.0.0-rc7, QEMU/x86_64, KASLR disabled): [ 26.183969] ceph_oob4_poc: buf=ffff888009e31000 end=ffff888009e31fa0 [ 26.186087] ceph_oob4_poc: struct_v=1 struct_len=0 p==end: 1 [ 26.186738] ceph_oob4_poc: triggering bare ceph_decode_32 past slab boundary... [ 26.187679] ================================================================== [ 26.188236] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ceph_oob4_init+0x22b/0xff0 [ceph_oob4_poc] [ 26.188236] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888009e31fa0 by task insmod/59 [ 26.188236] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 59 Comm: insmod Tainted: G O 7.0.0-rc7-g9c2abf69da83-dirty #15 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 26.188236] Call Trace: [ 26.188236] [ 26.188236] dump_stack_lvl+0x4d/0x70 [ 26.188236] print_report+0x170/0x4f3 [ 26.188236] kasan_report+0xda/0x110 [ 26.188236] ceph_oob4_init+0x22b/0xff0 [ceph_oob4_poc] [ 26.188236] do_one_initcall+0x9a/0x3a0 [ 26.188236] do_init_module+0x27c/0x790 [ 26.188236] load_module+0x4a9a/0x6350 [ 26.188236] init_module_from_file+0x15c/0x180 [ 26.188236] idempotent_init_module+0x21f/0x750 [ 26.188236] __x64_sys_finit_module+0xba/0x120 [ 26.188236] do_syscall_64+0xe2/0x570 [ 26.188236] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 26.188236] [ 26.188236] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888009e31000 [ 26.188236] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096 [ 26.188236] The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of [ 26.188236] allocated 4000-byte region [ffff888009e31000, ffff888009e31fa0) [ 26.188236] ffff888009e31f80: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 26.188236] ^ [ 26.188236] ffff888009e32000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 26.188236] ================================================================== [ 26.255513] ceph_oob4_poc: len=0xcccccccc (OOB garbage from KASAN redzone) 0xCCCCCCCC is KASAN redzone poison, confirming the read landed in the slab redzone immediately past the 4000-byte allocation. Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition) without any further privileges beyond OSD session establishment. Fixes: d4ed4a530562 ("libceph: support for lock.lock_info") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha --- v2: Move inline comments above ceph_decode_skip_n calls to stay within the 80-column limit, and rename label bad -> out_bad, per Viacheslav Dubeyko's review. --- net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c index 78276273c..4f27b3d15 100644 --- a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c +++ b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c @@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ static int decode_locker(void **p, void *end, struct ceph_locker *locker) if (ret) return ret; - ceph_decode_copy(p, &locker->id.name, sizeof(locker->id.name)); + ceph_decode_copy_safe(p, end, &locker->id.name, sizeof(locker->id.name), out_bad); s = ceph_extract_encoded_string(p, end, NULL, GFP_NOIO); if (IS_ERR(s)) return PTR_ERR(s); @@ -270,19 +270,23 @@ static int decode_locker(void **p, void *end, struct ceph_locker *locker) if (ret) return ret; - *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec); /* skip expiration */ + /* skip expiration */ + ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, sizeof(struct ceph_timespec), out_bad); ret = ceph_decode_entity_addr(p, end, &locker->info.addr); if (ret) return ret; - len = ceph_decode_32(p); - *p += len; /* skip description */ + ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, len, out_bad); + /* skip description */ + ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, len, out_bad); dout("%s %s%llu cookie %s addr %s\n", __func__, ENTITY_NAME(locker->id.name), locker->id.cookie, ceph_pr_addr(&locker->info.addr)); return 0; +out_bad: + return -EINVAL; } static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag, -- 2.53.0