Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9DF9642DA51 for ; Mon, 13 Jul 2026 13:45:07 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1783950308; cv=none; b=hdMRUpNRU+At0YwzhCuzI8R7O2yqY1bJj7XI4PU6tTTw6qifdsZ6MgPeJTnRGGzx6w+IGS4kBQquPS+BmAVU0MGN7gzYOhE70tjXK+z0fRts1TTf4fYO2Q9+IqFY6fF8sQki9HtIvxhlA4kI5RsBlPQQOWyGmQOhQX8l7ujv91U= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1783950308; c=relaxed/simple; bh=S0j/0hfPHKI3OJl7oKlPeRy/V8WqudeONtnpFw8EJto=; h=Subject:To:Cc:From:Date:Message-ID:MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=XkPIjUm6Kd/0Bu70+eZ/Qpl/vCb2v+9WrwpzdnSjyTddXXdX8fW3u6MhCkJqy1DgH4pU0wDt1Ekp4ILDNFpU4diTTd3rJGnZEknWcIZjh7+io8MnYSvZgx907Ld2r1GS8feZQn3Z6iCCqgMB97BzlCo3pGWm2YJKYr6jB2wkP2E= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=gwJ/jtT3; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="gwJ/jtT3" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 0FAD91F000E9; Mon, 13 Jul 2026 13:45:06 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1783950307; bh=Aus1jRbnzzcDBGy6aTfs4qHGy+622kn5GmRvo6McSAU=; h=Subject:To:Cc:From:Date; b=gwJ/jtT3gIsL8bVOVD/TWSsaIISK4Q4kJnmxuruyaDvsnDK14TIQrPJKvV1pS8oZw Ww6/kUpBzBmlZmfittZ2AOnq37wN9hdgH6foR3SLvAM/SSSZVpwTZoODnITcxrh3kk SgoG/gVTJU9qb4ZzMKxCCcXbheCMeu06OEaEb6kc= Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] staging: rtl8723bs: fix WEP length underflow and OOB read in" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree To: hossu.alexandru@gmail.com,gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,stable@kernel.org Cc: From: Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 15:32:52 +0200 Message-ID: <2026071352-wreckage-humorless-3481@gregkh> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ANSI_X3.4-1968 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to . To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x a1fc19d61f661d47204f095b593de507884849f7 # git commit -s git send-email --to '' --in-reply-to '2026071352-wreckage-humorless-3481@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' 'HEAD^..' Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From a1fc19d61f661d47204f095b593de507884849f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexandru Hossu Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 02:46:05 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] staging: rtl8723bs: fix WEP length underflow and OOB read in OnAuth() OnAuth() has two bugs in the shared-key authentication path. When the Privacy bit is set, rtw_wep_decrypt() is called without verifying that the frame is long enough to contain a valid WEP IV and ICV. Inside rtw_wep_decrypt(), length is computed as: length = len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - iv_len and then passed as (length - 4) to crc32_le(). If len is less than WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + iv_len + icv_len (32 bytes), length - 4 is negative and, after the implicit cast to size_t, causes crc32_le() to read far beyond the frame buffer. Add a minimum length check before accessing the IV field and calling the decryption path. When processing a seq=3 response, rtw_get_ie() stores the Challenge Text IE length in ie_len, but the subsequent memcmp() always reads 128 bytes regardless of ie_len. IEEE 802.11 mandates a challenge text of exactly 128 bytes; reject any IE whose length field differs, matching the check already applied to OnAuthClient(). Fixes: 554c0a3abf21 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable Signed-off-by: Alexandru Hossu Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260522004605.1039209-1-hossu.alexandru@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c index a86d6f97cf02..7198be795000 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c +++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c @@ -677,6 +677,9 @@ unsigned int OnAuth(struct adapter *padapter, union recv_frame *precv_frame) if ((pmlmeinfo->state&0x03) != WIFI_FW_AP_STATE) return _FAIL; + if (len < WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN) + return _FAIL; + sa = GetAddr2Ptr(pframe); auth_mode = psecuritypriv->dot11AuthAlgrthm; @@ -688,6 +691,9 @@ unsigned int OnAuth(struct adapter *padapter, union recv_frame *precv_frame) prxattrib->hdrlen = WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN; prxattrib->encrypt = _WEP40_; + if (len < WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + 8) + return _FAIL; + iv = pframe+prxattrib->hdrlen; prxattrib->key_index = ((iv[3]>>6)&0x3); @@ -787,7 +793,7 @@ unsigned int OnAuth(struct adapter *padapter, union recv_frame *precv_frame) p = rtw_get_ie(pframe + WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + 4 + _AUTH_IE_OFFSET_, WLAN_EID_CHALLENGE, (int *)&ie_len, len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - _AUTH_IE_OFFSET_ - 4); - if (!p || ie_len <= 0) { + if (!p || ie_len != 128) { status = WLAN_STATUS_CHALLENGE_FAIL; goto auth_fail; }