Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 207144307AD; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 20:10:54 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784664655; cv=none; b=IBTGsrQGhN1f/Mj5ApdAldIt4SUoy7nmLHQo8CYuOki8a3jtpIWVx6gI2LdEhH2YIuEWWaE08FeQW7QkXWyc+IE/Kcnl2JxrqULtJImaoFN+WrdjuHALr7T+TB26NyMlh6GrYjzlfy3CCaSD06sA4/KE1A2R5fuDf5RqGTW1FbI= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784664655; c=relaxed/simple; bh=tG7fLh8FlJ1zwr5GgiUFHfvxPQbSpixDwEbmO3CfNVE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=R3CHIuyx13YcIA9TDbvxrD2aPpW/3Z4flWZ8tteOwLO1252q3pT3m0VwGrMKgs/jY8znyxMzZG0GkprcZ0J3be+YgASK3n45cmiVmD50Cvw8FNMhvTtN1iR+yqM182gPAQG2pbp7wBBIEocNRu8La1ydp6RW7ROFPSaCxVysMSo= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=yx5XbdBJ; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="yx5XbdBJ" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 84A931F000E9; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 20:10:53 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1784664654; bh=mMSeybww4KYW+tzjRhy0kNQMG5IlHBATDXCFPbf2N4I=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=yx5XbdBJTXtu3V4DNL7xM00vIMyFjday+nz8LcnEp941Huyz/DY+kGt2FRLas5F4R Sxen9pCm15LlDNdnKMSuhqyFT1D0tP8zmwqwCakIjXzIYwcUCeBiAa6dII2r25RUWy vbXQDGq2uFZ0L3JXEcZn98ZcE0r0wM/fqeidK1nw= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Gil Portnoy , Namjae Jeon , Steve French Subject: [PATCH 6.12 1252/1276] ksmbd: fix durable reconnect double-bind race in ksmbd_reopen_durable_fd Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2026 17:28:15 +0200 Message-ID: <20260721152514.111239409@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260721152446.065700225@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260721152446.065700225@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Gil Portnoy commit 7ce4fc40018de07f05f3035241122d992610dbfb upstream. Two concurrent same-user DHnC reconnects can both observe fp->conn == NULL before either sets it. ksmbd_reopen_durable_fd() checks fp->conn to guard against a handle already being reconnected, but the check and the binding assignment are not atomic: both threads pass the guard, both call ksmbd_conn_get() on the same fp, and both eventually reach kfree(fp->owner.name) -- a double-free of the owner.name slab object. The double-bound ksmbd_file also causes a write-UAF on the 344-byte ksmbd_file_cache object when a concurrent smb2_close() spins on fp->f_lock after the object has been freed by the losing reconnect path. KASAN on 7.1-rc5 (48-thread concurrent reconnect, 3000 cycles): BUG: KASAN: double-free in ksmbd_reopen_durable_fd+0x268/0x308 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0xac/0x150 Write of size 4 at offset 24 into freed ksmbd_file_cache object Five double-bind windows observed; 63 total KASAN reports triggered. Fix: validate and claim fp->conn under write_lock(&global_ft.lock) so the check-and-claim is atomic. ksmbd_lookup_durable_fd() already treats fp->conn != NULL as "in use" and skips such an fp; setting fp->conn before dropping the lock closes the race. ksmbd_conn_get() is a non-sleeping refcount increment, safe under the rwlock. The rollback path on __open_id() failure also clears fp->conn/tcon under the lock so concurrent readers see a consistent state. Fixes: b1f1e80620de ("ksmbd: centralize ksmbd_conn final release to plug transport leak") Assisted-by: Henry (Claude):claude-opus-4 Signed-off-by: Gil Portnoy Acked-by: Namjae Jeon Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/vfs_cache.c @@ -1185,19 +1185,19 @@ int ksmbd_reopen_durable_fd(struct ksmbd struct ksmbd_lock *smb_lock; unsigned int old_f_state; + write_lock(&global_ft.lock); if (!fp->is_durable || fp->conn || fp->tcon) { + write_unlock(&global_ft.lock); pr_err("Invalid durable fd [%p:%p]\n", fp->conn, fp->tcon); return -EBADF; } if (has_file_id(fp->volatile_id)) { + write_unlock(&global_ft.lock); pr_err("Still in use durable fd: %llu\n", fp->volatile_id); return -EBADF; } - old_f_state = fp->f_state; - fp->f_state = FP_NEW; - /* * Initialize fp's connection binding before publishing fp into the * session's file table. If __open_id() is ordered first, a @@ -1208,11 +1208,17 @@ int ksmbd_reopen_durable_fd(struct ksmbd */ fp->conn = ksmbd_conn_get(conn); fp->tcon = work->tcon; + write_unlock(&global_ft.lock); + + old_f_state = fp->f_state; + fp->f_state = FP_NEW; __open_id(&work->sess->file_table, fp, OPEN_ID_TYPE_VOLATILE_ID); if (!has_file_id(fp->volatile_id)) { + write_lock(&global_ft.lock); fp->conn = NULL; fp->tcon = NULL; + write_unlock(&global_ft.lock); ksmbd_conn_put(conn); fp->f_state = old_f_state; return -EBADF;