Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 21F3E46C4B9; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 18:29:21 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784658562; cv=none; b=S0CcBFkCH+v49smeU0m4bXzKU0otwX9bPeuQhQy73jr1KymsYWXHVHsja82O7msoVTpSw1hmYg74KcUzO2W2AVtL9+ZAkNFZVkrTUWU3/l80z1OCe2C/E9iyJodwero1YY2TUU6t3F4RG9YOC4Ro1CgizVWjhzpAMgwTyXEoXwk= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784658562; c=relaxed/simple; bh=H+362mlocoLiOeLSqnxc3MCFZLBDt22KHnEHKlYf68w=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=G0Oagp0uQ/VJGFtfjT+cpo/cnzYtcTHnWxzmzQIQ9MvS8iZahC+bvmzcZ/LpDzyD9C2CoeAlHv2uxcBqlfpJwoBEWi+0KieVsqvDbxOVKPYix9lwLGNXtlSPg7icWHASLAHbGWnTk7gEFcZd7xW/bUr13duJLruv70gzeNvMwbs= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=q2umv00r; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="q2umv00r" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 8886C1F000E9; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 18:29:20 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1784658561; bh=YJ92pxy6RH0kTEuBgRf1Z5Pcb87tWqjG6z6toveAhKQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=q2umv00rKgUt3vXUthwMqmuYTq2sUBGvp/JD8Nc5+lVfkIjcztICK32okc60FJ3oY wtx3TbO45KfzTcJQ6Nt7CJcMl2wISKSdd2vygHv99+weP9jKyPOaVOQ7waTdk9mfJA a2cmBD8MJcltfbWwS/N9f33doSU1epwepfr/BRAg= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Sashiko , Sandipan Das , Ingo Molnar , Peter Zijlstra , Stephane Eranian Subject: [PATCH 6.18 1189/1611] perf/x86/amd/brs: Fix kernel address leakage Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2026 17:21:45 +0200 Message-ID: <20260721152542.176779302@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260721152514.750365251@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260721152514.750365251@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Sandipan Das commit 47915e855fb38b42133e31ba917d99565f862154 upstream. A user-only branch stack can contain branches that originate from the kernel. As a result, kernel addresses are exposed to user space even when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. On AMD processors supporting X86_FEATURE_BRS (Zen 3 only), perf can still report entries such as SYSRET/interrupt returns for which the branch-from addresses are in the kernel. E.g. $ perf record -j any,u -c 4000 -e branch-brs -o - -- \ perf bench syscall basic --loop 1000 | \ perf script -i - -F brstack|tr ' ' '\n'| \ grep -E '0x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}' ... 0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2e32955eb/-/-/-/0//- 0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2d94a9821/-/-/-/0//- 0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2d94ffa1b/-/-/-/0//- ... BRS provides no hardware branch filtering, so privilege level filtering is performed entirely in software. However, amd_brs_match_plm() only validates the branch-to address against the requested privilege levels. For branches from the kernel to user space, the branch-from address is left unchecked and is leaked. Extend the software filter to also validate the branch-from address, so that any branch record whose branch-from address is in the kernel is dropped when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. Fixes: 8910075d61a3 ("perf/x86/amd: Enable branch sampling priv level filtering") Reported-by: Sashiko Signed-off-by: Sandipan Das Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Stephane Eranian Link: https://patch.msgid.link/f05931c4f89a146c364bd5dc6b8170b1ac611c65.1783701239.git.sandipan.das@amd.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260710110235.F3FD81F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/ Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/events/amd/brs.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/events/amd/brs.c +++ b/arch/x86/events/amd/brs.c @@ -259,13 +259,13 @@ void amd_brs_disable_all(void) amd_brs_disable(); } -static bool amd_brs_match_plm(struct perf_event *event, u64 to) +static bool amd_brs_match_plm(struct perf_event *event, u64 from, u64 to) { int type = event->attr.branch_sample_type; int plm_k = PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_KERNEL | PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_HV; int plm_u = PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER; - if (!(type & plm_k) && kernel_ip(to)) + if (!(type & plm_k) && (kernel_ip(to) || kernel_ip(from))) return 0; if (!(type & plm_u) && !kernel_ip(to)) @@ -338,11 +338,11 @@ void amd_brs_drain(void) */ to = (u64)(((s64)to << shift) >> shift); - if (!amd_brs_match_plm(event, to)) - continue; - rdmsrq(brs_from(brs_idx), from); + if (!amd_brs_match_plm(event, from, to)) + continue; + perf_clear_branch_entry_bitfields(br+nr); br[nr].from = from;