Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DD46140928C; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 19:10:00 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784661002; cv=none; b=JFomycMrS7ljBflNWbHo2nKDWMdm3bc8gfbRu99SSk+PpZJcIEJNtG5USGTGM6vYFljBUkoT/Tn8y0Eyv55D4DAHPAEZqa+E+r3+Ib3NPXs1AhXUBDrI52GFh9ydl2K7bxZVRsfr43cp4QaacT/V1QsCR/D89IiPB9gTjSZqZBU= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784661002; c=relaxed/simple; bh=r0vy+Hb2prCxE+cdsLH22yctzbdEmC52iBghKx5dfM4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=KEFYJQS2zCal3hHOnxAP+51oiGxuaoPjpbSvt3AOriuxFdC4xgl5fCbn3VYlZnP7lrSWJNPNvQ/c2ewF+mqjdBkSTnDRmTGyxe88SeWsVmge5JJD2j27Yw5tD/69PpqegpLq6AW13rCZjwtj4XNKltBkQlOIYJAYMWDVVD9+eXs= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=Czp5Z5Jg; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="Czp5Z5Jg" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 81C111F00A3A; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 19:09:59 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1784661000; bh=/MpfZV6Z6b9OcoLD2nhdcHz87VLqOXgxrAU4loH6CmA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=Czp5Z5Jgc/o2GDa9bDkO/SOgkvgUlRyFdWCO4Z5L2D6k1UqmO04vy3Sib/0pVWNqL 6OBcN4Y5lsqTwjfeGAu61XjX72E2fFjqKw5j3uMoLwc27ScF03wd6R8dV9zEtfBxlx CtafQiFfCNwfzf+wtzNBmuAcJFJSYS89LxVAJxDI= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Luis Gerhorst , Jiayuan Chen , Emil Tsalapatis , Nuoqi Gui , Alexei Starovoitov , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 7.1 1191/2077] bpf: Fix stack slot index in nospec checks Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2026 17:14:24 +0200 Message-ID: <20260721152620.908487015@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260721152552.646164743@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260721152552.646164743@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Nuoqi Gui [ Upstream commit d1d53aa30ab3b5ae89161c9cc840b3f7489ad386 ] check_stack_write_fixed_off() computes the byte slot for a fixed-offset stack write as -off - 1, and records each written byte in slot_type[] with (slot - i) % BPF_REG_SIZE. The Spectre v4 sanitization pre-check uses slot_type[i] instead. For a 4-byte write at fp-8 after the lower half of fp-8 has been zeroed, the pre-check scans bytes 0..3 and sees STACK_ZERO while the actual write updates bytes 7..4. That can leave the second half-slot write without nospec_result even though the bytes being overwritten still require sanitization. Use the same slot index in the sanitization pre-check that the write path uses when updating slot_type[]. Fixes: 2039f26f3aca ("bpf: Fix leakage due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation") Acked-by: Luis Gerhorst Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis Signed-off-by: Nuoqi Gui Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260618-f01-11-stack-nospec-slot-index-v3-1-780297041721@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index c34bf4169d5c9c..bda2b2f149468b 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -3836,7 +3836,8 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, bool sanitize = reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type); for (i = 0; i < size; i++) { - u8 type = state->stack[spi].slot_type[i]; + u8 type = state->stack[spi].slot_type[(slot - i) % + BPF_REG_SIZE]; if (type != STACK_MISC && type != STACK_ZERO) { sanitize = true; -- 2.53.0