Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D50653EF672; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 17:16:48 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784654210; cv=none; b=f/N9sW3zAh+kku+zGwCuWQWTOmfxYCQRRV7zQSdaXzoXH1zkvTnLRFD+kjbANj3YbdBWIoj0c0KpVfxnG60f0ReMezKbg3Miud1CVt8jb8qEQMO7HZHkHy9/zaoKSC1kkik+JGZJmvy28M3c2hRzIblQFAwzDXJcJIqh3A3h8IA= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784654210; c=relaxed/simple; bh=EB+x13KUNriWUSh9VQaZN6pMsJlqOlQMv18ShBWPf8U=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=s6qwgP/ovZPQrFFfg3R6vvTdov/H0eF/29QefYuLxNejdasGel5mVVoyHJbqghAuFs02We4qQaKiZJp/9ALJFw0kF6xM014CP6XGqLlD7ta0J1ojNujF8upSzcioN2LpZdoBJJ3V89n1ef79urj+G7SJKQ10aIjdt9BPXxZke4w= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=jW5IEyW8; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="jW5IEyW8" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 41E3A1F00A3A; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 17:16:48 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1784654208; bh=/R8NiLHk7+A+/0d/AkK9mu0DjmaNqQlfCe4jKNo6ZvY=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=jW5IEyW8J1j+ZSBT2SmcEISvoPwqpYMuX/T2/arHZi9t4u38Fs2J63BYsqtFMolU0 ByQlevJVCU1teAuYbLWRZwlrqA38jMfnvquqZGnLs57khEosrIywQhD3Rz/qSOT1lt +sq6rP19KdrboNbioK2dkthZXpmVjiirHAmRVv2c= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Oliver Upton , Marc Zyngier Subject: [PATCH 7.1 1575/2077] KVM: arm64: nv: Respect read-only PFN when mapping L1 VNCR Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2026 17:20:48 +0200 Message-ID: <20260721152629.926818102@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260721152552.646164743@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260721152552.646164743@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Oliver Upton commit 2684e02bac41c5220f6c1ab2bdcc957b71812977 upstream. KVM currently maps the L1 VNCR into the host stage-1 by relying entirely on the permissions of the guest stage-1. At the same time, it is entirely possible that the backing PFN is read-only (e.g. RO memslot), meaning that the L1 VNCR should use at most a read-only mapping. Cache the writability of the PFN in the VNCR TLB and use it to constrain the resulting fixmap permissions. Promote VNCR permission faults to an SEA in the case where the guest attempts to write to a read-only endpoint. Conveniently, this also plugs a page leak found by Sashiko [*] resulting from the early return for a read-only PFN. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 2a359e072596 ("KVM: arm64: nv: Handle mapping of VNCR_EL2 at EL2") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20260608082603.16AEC1F00893@smtp.kernel.org/ Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260618234207.1063941-2-oupton@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ struct vncr_tlb { struct s1_walk_result wr; u64 hpa; + bool hpa_writable; /* -1 when not mapped on a CPU */ int cpu; @@ -1315,7 +1316,7 @@ static int kvm_translate_vncr(struct kvm if (!*is_gmem) { pfn = __kvm_faultin_pfn(memslot, gfn, write_fault ? FOLL_WRITE : 0, &writable, &page); - if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn) || (write_fault && !writable)) + if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn)) return -EFAULT; } else { ret = kvm_gmem_get_pfn(vcpu->kvm, memslot, gfn, &pfn, &page, NULL); @@ -1324,6 +1325,8 @@ static int kvm_translate_vncr(struct kvm write_fault, false, false); return ret; } + + writable = !(memslot->flags & KVM_MEM_READONLY); } scoped_guard(write_lock, &vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock) { @@ -1334,28 +1337,41 @@ static int kvm_translate_vncr(struct kvm vt->gva = va; vt->hpa = pfn << PAGE_SHIFT; + vt->hpa_writable = writable; vt->valid = true; vt->cpu = -1; kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_MAP_L1_VNCR_EL2, vcpu); - kvm_release_faultin_page(vcpu->kvm, page, false, vt->wr.pw); + kvm_release_faultin_page(vcpu->kvm, page, false, vt->wr.pw && vt->hpa_writable); } - if (vt->wr.pw) + if (vt->wr.pw && vt->hpa_writable) mark_page_dirty(vcpu->kvm, gfn); return 0; } -static void inject_vncr_perm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +static void handle_vncr_perm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { struct vncr_tlb *vt = vcpu->arch.vncr_tlb; u64 esr = kvm_vcpu_get_esr(vcpu); + u64 fsc; + + /* + * Promote to an external abort if the stage-1 permits writes but the + * HPA is read-only (e.g. RO memslot). + */ + if (kvm_is_write_fault(vcpu) && vt->wr.pw && !vt->hpa_writable) + fsc = ESR_ELx_FSC_EXTABT; + /* + * Otherwise, inject a permission fault using the guest's translation + * level rather than the host's. + */ + else + fsc = ESR_ELx_FSC_PERM_L(vt->wr.level); - /* Adjust the fault level to reflect that of the guest's */ esr &= ~ESR_ELx_FSC; - esr |= FIELD_PREP(ESR_ELx_FSC, - ESR_ELx_FSC_PERM_L(vt->wr.level)); + esr |= FIELD_PREP(ESR_ELx_FSC, fsc); kvm_inject_nested_sync(vcpu, esr); } @@ -1389,7 +1405,7 @@ int kvm_handle_vncr_abort(struct kvm_vcp return kvm_handle_guest_sea(vcpu); if (esr_fsc_is_permission_fault(esr)) { - inject_vncr_perm(vcpu); + handle_vncr_perm(vcpu); } else if (esr_fsc_is_translation_fault(esr)) { bool valid, is_gmem = false; int ret; @@ -1437,7 +1453,7 @@ int kvm_handle_vncr_abort(struct kvm_vcp break; case -EPERM: /* Hack to deal with POE until we get kernel support */ - inject_vncr_perm(vcpu); + handle_vncr_perm(vcpu); break; case 0: break; @@ -1481,7 +1497,7 @@ static void kvm_map_l1_vncr(struct kvm_v vt->cpu = smp_processor_id(); - if (vt->wr.pw && vt->wr.pr) + if (vt->hpa_writable && vt->wr.pw && vt->wr.pr) prot = PAGE_KERNEL; else if (vt->wr.pr) prot = PAGE_KERNEL_RO;