Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C02C03D3321; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 17:21:57 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784654518; cv=none; b=lRN7vxo0TzzH055lHK6ugH0KbCQZ3d7tNxEQIVP51Srf1mXuMFzheIII7ybgQoKtZSyhI2dj6iW+cJwDqOVGqFGaZBfWbLAinI0Hv/Ixx0+FVnbj/Z/sBCkxVWY4yREvn5Lc7E9mEV8AmCOV20WimKgYA7oeQ58ZfMTQx00kGAg= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784654518; c=relaxed/simple; bh=0FzgTO91/BNOH179nsoEwoByy82YkvlX9CjlU2SBoW4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=mqbEHmw+La1bGhuN8k0487qPrKKDoVxwMNXA3LaxO3YK8oxNKXKmu0Ge8DjM9fMqAfv4e+PribLRixYZsKXqkNntITcRDXon7aTc7/uqFqbgElmBd7gh4vTZ2MacY/m2+x1Ja0RbXNBoDsVviuHE9emFhIh5vdTPWzx/79dotY8= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=IZRukdZD; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="IZRukdZD" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 32DEC1F000E9; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 17:21:57 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1784654517; bh=t0/klv+lsi9wWSkw6URsg4VbaEB+u3DB9pT4Q0U8L4s=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=IZRukdZDFlkIZfmfQavi4xLK+SUCpfDXUNfqqcXSYyX7oFNYt02wqUsF45Jcylau3 x8QJk0QovCVis6OUH7hhR6MfW0gksfvm3oIT4n4X/ElZtYlKuKDST1rF63NtjViT/g vgwNJNp/+5guTFx4O2jPeYP4sHyT8wVzN3EKQL1Q= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Michael Bommarito , Konstantin Komarov Subject: [PATCH 7.1 1708/2077] ntfs3: cap RESTART_TABLE free-chain walker at rt->used Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2026 17:23:01 +0200 Message-ID: <20260721152633.045466565@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260721152552.646164743@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260721152552.646164743@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Michael Bommarito commit 9611f644302c07d21bc8af97e3e06a3d30064253 upstream. A crafted NTFS3 disk image triggers an in-kernel infinite loop at mount time, hanging the mounting thread and firing the soft-lockup watchdog within ~22s on multi-CPU hosts (panic with kernel.softlockup_panic=1). The bug is reachable from desktop USB auto-mount on distributions where udisks2 routes the NTFS signature to the in-tree ntfs3 driver (Arch family and an increasing fraction of Fedora / openSUSE / RHEL deployments); CAP_SYS_ADMIN-class manual mount elsewhere. check_rstbl()'s second walker iterates the free-entry singly-linked list headed by rt->first_free with no upper bound on iteration count: for (off = ff; off;) { if (off == RESTART_ENTRY_ALLOCATED) return false; off = le32_to_cpu(*(__le32 *)Add2Ptr(rt, off)); if (off > ts - sizeof(__le32)) return false; } The existing guards cover three exits: end-of-list (off == 0), the in-use marker (off == RESTART_ENTRY_ALLOCATED), and out-of-bounds (off > ts - sizeof(__le32)). None of the three prevents an in-bounds cycle. A crafted on-disk RESTART_TABLE whose free chain contains a self-loop or A->B->A cycle whose offsets satisfy: - in range [sizeof(struct RESTART_TABLE), ts - sizeof(__le32)] - (off - sizeof(struct RESTART_TABLE)) % rsize == 0 passes all existing guards and spins the mount-time thread forever. Reproduced in UML by hand-forging a 2 MB NTFS3 image whose journal RESTART_TABLE first_free = 0x18 and whose entry at offset 0x18 stores 0x18 as its next pointer; mount of the forged image with the in-tree ntfs3 driver never returns. Bound the walker by rt->used. Each entry on a legitimate free chain is unique, and the total slot count is ne = le16_to_cpu (rt->used). A traversal that visits more than ne slots is by construction malformed; reject it as a corrupt RESTART_TABLE. After this patch, mount of the forged image returns with -EINVAL and a log_replay failure message, and mkntfs-produced legitimate images mount cleanly (verified in the same UML harness). Fixes: b46acd6a6a62 ("fs/ntfs3: Add NTFS journal") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ntfs3/fslog.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c +++ b/fs/ntfs3/fslog.c @@ -764,8 +764,19 @@ static bool check_rstbl(const struct RES /* * Walk through the list headed by the first entry to make * sure none of the entries are currently being used. + * + * Bound traversal by ne (rt->used) to defeat a crafted on-disk + * cycle in the free chain. Each entry in a legitimate free + * list is unique, so a chain that visits more than ne slots + * is malformed. Without this guard, an attacker-controlled + * RESTART_TABLE with a self-loop or A->B->A cycle whose + * offsets satisfy the existing alignment + in-bounds guards + * spins forever at mount time. */ - for (off = ff; off;) { + for (off = ff, i = 0; off; i++) { + if (i > ne) + return false; + if (off == RESTART_ENTRY_ALLOCATED) return false;