Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A38D6488764 for ; Wed, 29 Jul 2026 13:48:12 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1785332894; cv=none; b=LktnBN2h3BirhXs+du5996lpy14ZKnCbFj9Dkz9yoVhgt20x3qPbLkHISE2luUaex+oBnggv1YXjZeC4M/7Uo6fe/fxcx5nZWVh+2v6yCsG9+dRfDfC/PWzS0Tei5o6CsdViL7LkA1Z6EHAtfRzzJD8LY4XUCc6/lgaY5hBNv20= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1785332894; c=relaxed/simple; bh=sk0PHUEaRYUBhjvsF+cSjDAC0PZTLAj/R2uv6gGEpyY=; h=Subject:To:Cc:From:Date:Message-ID:MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=JYte/0kqHtiNfNPkgDleiFtlD5HwCSQrR3M3sBAzT4snaAMONiB+ynqgda4RkwAU+frsD07drB8+tni/C9oIvEnomuT/LyXsAmKZiv6vKZrVCkb6F0hjVgh/i5oDIR2Mdf03ZZhLvr14UUeYzegYCvGjoOhC6jhjYSSed3Sx/D0= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=xEY6qph/; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="xEY6qph/" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id ACF2D1F00A3D; Wed, 29 Jul 2026 13:48:11 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1785332892; bh=B/8ZtSSLv6VGwn4TbRR0fJC+0N3YW33uBHLD2Eo7pIk=; h=Subject:To:Cc:From:Date; b=xEY6qph/Dv7wG+5jZqRhSNnr4xdY7L9Zd+P4meVJ5eAYYziDUylKdqVr4iVxlZhx/ t/udC3a+idFY8HsuS0ecRE0fJgI8GOcSiJO+mgoRnHfXLXIzQv8GKbJeaTB2DjUMCZ v2grJfPUdTJZgcx3s81z1CsWunRgtdRsW8cdixdE= Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] libceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in decode_lockers()" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree To: jhapavitra98@gmail.com,Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com,idryomov@gmail.com Cc: From: Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2026 15:47:46 +0200 Message-ID: <2026072946-spotted-unvented-f2e7@gregkh> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ANSI_X3.4-1968 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to . To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x a109a556115271ca7896dcda7b4b7e45e156c227 # git commit -s git send-email --to '' --in-reply-to '2026072946-spotted-unvented-f2e7@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' 'HEAD^..' Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From a109a556115271ca7896dcda7b4b7e45e156c227 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Pavitra Jha Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2026 00:17:35 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] libceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in decode_lockers() decode_lockers() in cls_lock_client.c contains two bare decode operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger slab-out-of-bounds reads: 1. ceph_decode_32(p) at the num_lockers field has no preceding bounds check. ceph_start_decoding() accepts struct_len=0 as valid -- the internal ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes -- so when an OSD sends struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with p == end. The immediately following bare ceph_decode_32(p) then reads 4 bytes past the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is passed directly to kzalloc_objs() as the locker count. The sibling function decode_watchers() in osd_client.c already uses ceph_decode_32_safe() after its own ceph_start_decoding() call. decode_lockers() was the only site using the bare variant. 2. ceph_decode_8(p) after the decode_locker() loop has no preceding bounds check. If an OSD crafts num_lockers such that the loop advances p exactly to end, the subsequent bare ceph_decode_8(p) reads one byte past the validated buffer boundary. The result is passed directly into *type, which is used as a lock type discriminator by callers, giving an OSD-controlled one-byte OOB read with direct influence over the lock type field. Fix both by replacing bare operations with their safe variants: ceph_decode_32(p) -> ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, *num_lockers, err_inval) ceph_decode_8(p) -> ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, *type, err_free_lockers) The goto targets differ intentionally: err_inval: is a new label returning -EINVAL directly. It is used for the pre-allocation failure path where *lockers is not yet allocated and must not be passed to ceph_free_lockers(). err_free_lockers: is the existing label. It is used for the post-allocation failure path where *lockers is allocated and must be freed. ret is set to -EINVAL before ceph_decode_8_safe() so that err_free_lockers returns the correct error code on bounds violation. Without this, err_free_lockers would return a stale ret value (0 from the successful decode_locker() loop), silently swallowing the error. -EINVAL is correct for both failure paths. The data received from the OSD is structurally malformed. -ENOMEM would misrepresent the failure class to callers and to stable@ backporters triaging error paths. Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition). [ idryomov: trim changelog, formatting ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: d4ed4a530562 ("libceph: support for lock.lock_info") Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov diff --git a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c index c6956f1df333..377336982f7d 100644 --- a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c +++ b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c @@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag, if (ret) return ret; - *num_lockers = ceph_decode_32(p); + ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, *num_lockers, err_inval); *lockers = kzalloc_objs(**lockers, *num_lockers, GFP_NOIO); if (!*lockers) return -ENOMEM; @@ -310,7 +310,8 @@ static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag, goto err_free_lockers; } - *type = ceph_decode_8(p); + ret = -EINVAL; + ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, *type, err_free_lockers); s = ceph_extract_encoded_string(p, end, NULL, GFP_NOIO); if (IS_ERR(s)) { ret = PTR_ERR(s); @@ -320,6 +321,9 @@ static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag, *tag = s; return 0; +err_inval: + return -EINVAL; + err_free_lockers: ceph_free_lockers(*lockers, *num_lockers); return ret;