Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 09B513C3F4C; Thu, 30 Jul 2026 14:52:00 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1785423121; cv=none; b=pkqhoPW8ufq7NduxzNSdVFKTX6Qx57FNKG1972WXD+Nk1E1IAmrX5XkmUEGuzuIUOzPjAnaXRLgxhe9k4eVrD2lUtoSXOsE4Ue9UY1pihvrdGjBamP5b9o1U5OLR7wjXmmVMWiRhLXW1QrtFfwy/reGmkhjLAeCSV2S9ph9kyNk= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1785423121; c=relaxed/simple; bh=79lqkEh8O91KQM2A9eaT0UM8PG9IlQI3QYp30NBB790=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=DAMFimW+hoP8i8LA3aF9Pj+IbD8VpxwZJelOXvf/L5RcX5WVJ/06GUtzFHd/vBm2GYrqs9VypwJnaDhtdBWzOe+flSTZ1LZfuc82CKw7zFOJPOGSE0bfA14dWLsOtdLTKkbIS6E8bWAsyVvZmWB/zz0YyaerFd70Ywyx59jwjUk= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=tj6V4qb9; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="tj6V4qb9" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5DE941F000E9; Thu, 30 Jul 2026 14:51:59 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1785423119; bh=2vzkAZ5hnlntjTqN2H6Q9vaM6KG7Qqp08GCvIfJ/Fu0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=tj6V4qb9+tLDIb39+QYZoIg+7s6zz6cFd2nxQ9RZPxcYhVVsyA2NilP6KkI7X22TA UJroEOVNIW/0W1BKsQgA19IFPfw74EYRK7e6rTTztV44sD46MjXbfk7Hta5Mtf574Z en2dvy2wefTNKd+r7iewfZzxP1NQ88RaDFt9V6Qc= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, James Montgomery , Namjae Jeon , Steve French Subject: [PATCH 7.1 673/744] ksmbd: defer destroy_previous_session() until after NTLM authentication Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2026 16:15:46 +0200 Message-ID: <20260730141458.567079103@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260730141444.267951807@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260730141444.267951807@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: James Montgomery commit c74801ee524f477c174a1899782b6c3b6918d407 upstream. In ntlm_authenticate(), destroy_previous_session() is called using a user pointer resolved from the client-supplied NTLM blob username field before the NTLMv2 response is validated. An authenticated attacker can set the NTLM blob username to match a victim account and set PreviousSessionId to the victim's session ID; destroy_previous_session() destroys the victim's session while ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() subsequently rejects the request with -EPERM. Move destroy_previous_session() and the prev_id assignment to after ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() returns success and use sess->user rather than the pre-authentication lookup result. This matches the ordering already used by krb5_authenticate(), where destroy_previous_session() is called only after ksmbd_krb5_authenticate() returns success. Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-cifs/20260702155449.3639773-1-james_montgomery@disroot.org/ Signed-off-by: James Montgomery Acked-by: Namjae Jeon Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 9 ++++----- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c @@ -1535,11 +1535,6 @@ static int ntlm_authenticate(struct ksmb return -EPERM; } - /* Check for previous session */ - prev_id = le64_to_cpu(req->PreviousSessionId); - if (prev_id && prev_id != sess->id) - destroy_previous_session(conn, user, prev_id); - if (sess->state == SMB2_SESSION_VALID) { /* * Reuse session if anonymous try to connect @@ -1579,6 +1574,10 @@ static int ntlm_authenticate(struct ksmb } } + prev_id = le64_to_cpu(req->PreviousSessionId); + if (prev_id && prev_id != sess->id) + destroy_previous_session(conn, sess->user, prev_id); + /* * If session state is SMB2_SESSION_VALID, We can assume * that it is reauthentication. And the user/password