Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BCBBA468C17 for ; Wed, 5 Aug 2026 12:44:10 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1785933851; cv=none; b=A/ArxQ8OdICDYcNOmMM/oDchtmXV4E2djDsYaa3vEYfR101JKRZFIPHiv2fLanFMB0voqDHP4EX8k3PSMGdrYmg1BtbF4YF7Ew1WMxGPjbfTn16N/94XyB8GbiUNlOvZxSESn3TatD5iEYjk8zpccus7ozPLx5NocZUpsatec7U= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1785933851; c=relaxed/simple; bh=QOKwCIzSCMVfNZuBhAmNJ1OJITkCHDcE1hanXXO5Pbg=; h=From:Subject:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Content-Type:Date: Message-Id; b=DwewzW+LIil9PLmbw3P1ycS48K/zA+mOIn1RlrSVY0fv2RnqWBOHal0wXNTg8mmqomq/E0QyFcTWfSdWbzMnRyFt6Bdbbdxvc3bx14NmmDoLTJl3w5mDkJcM3ay72X2WrmouQiI3W2DOEYFezKtfu72Hmiy0yRcC8GYKHosE3uQ= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=ULMXWvu9; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="ULMXWvu9" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 112A81F000E9; Wed, 5 Aug 2026 12:44:10 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1785933850; bh=YTlj0etYJvXaai/H6ZBm6FGVW11vzZ2JiXwLVLcMvDg=; h=From:Subject:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Date; b=ULMXWvu9gjWztbe8se4Did911+ullZjfWE7xqpjxpyqx5L4ipKJU/ghO9K3AOr7ms jZb4tqRHPxnBfFkS6qJzOgwaec8Wp0k6E8O9a+JvtUQWNL1I6Io7djttXQWsbi94MT fGa+giQiN32KxeSXFS93wNvsfH+X/L/73ugd1dnh5BynUdld9OSJoo9+iVa0n6UtD4 ALjUPOb4FhLIKSeGEmxvzABNKp1mjjEyW+aNIZOJI98D0mb3uDvYlBF8tZtT5KbG/O /6AZIH3Ot3aOBYp9dgzsCbI6Em7mhY1iVsDTzgQ3EafpoiHGWfglaFY0QOmfYSvIVI qC7jYA5PFVXUg== From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 03/19] s390/dasd: Guard sysfs discipline callbacks against unallocated private data Reply-To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev To: "Stefan Haberland" Cc: "Alexander Gordeev" , "Heiko Carstens" , linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, "Vasily Gorbik" In-Reply-To: <20260805111612.1285190-4-sth@linux.ibm.com> References: <20260805111612.1285190-1-sth@linux.ibm.com> <20260805111612.1285190-4-sth@linux.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Date: Wed, 05 Aug 2026 12:44:09 +0000 Message-Id: <20260805124410.112A81F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(= s) to consider: Pre-existing issues: - [Critical] This problem wasn't introduced by this patch, but a Time-Of-Ch= eck to Time-Of-Use (TOCTOU) Use-After-Free vulnerability exists in world-re= adable sysfs handlers when the initialization function `dasd_eckd_check_cha= racteristics()` encounters an error. - [High] The patch fixes NULL pointer dereferences in world-readable sysfs = show handlers by guarding them against an unallocated `device->private` dur= ing `dasd_generic_set_online()`. However, it misses the `copy_pair` sysfs s= tore handler, leaving it vulnerable to a NULL pointer dereference. - [High] The patch leaves a vulnerable window where `device->private` is al= located but its internal pointers (like `private->conf.gneq`) are still NUL= L, causing a NULL pointer dereference when a sysfs attribute is written. -- --- Patch [3]: [PATCH 03/19] s390/dasd: Guard sysfs discipline callbacks ag= ainst unallocated private data --- commit 3d2b943842a29d7f0ee2ab694c84c9d52b911329 Author: Stefan Haberland s390/dasd: Guard sysfs discipline callbacks against unallocated private data Several sysfs show/store handlers call a discipline callback that dereferences device->private, either directly or through the DASD_DEFINE_ATTR() macro. During dasd_generic_set_online() the discipline is assigned before check_device() allocates device->private, so an unprivileged read of one of these world-readable attributes in that window dereferences a NULL pointer and panics. > diff --git a/drivers/s390/block/dasd_eckd.c b/drivers/s390/block/dasd_eck= d.c > index d356a9f8f016f..b64ca714b53e7 100644 > --- a/drivers/s390/block/dasd_eckd.c > +++ b/drivers/s390/block/dasd_eckd.c > @@ -1492,6 +1492,8 @@ static void dasd_eckd_reset_path(struct dasd_device= *device, __u8 pm) > struct dasd_eckd_private *private =3D device->private; > unsigned long flags; > =20 > + if (!private) > + return; > if (!private->fcx_max_data) > private->fcx_max_data =3D get_fcx_max_data(device); [Severity: High] This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but does this leave a window where private->conf.gneq is dereferenced while NULL? In dasd_eckd_check_characteristics(), device->private is allocated and assigned, but then blocking I/O (dasd_eckd_read_conf()) occurs before private->conf.gneq is set. If a sysfs write for reset_path occurs during this sleep, the new !private check passes and get_fcx_max_data() is called: drivers/s390/block/dasd_eckd.c:get_fcx_max_data() { ... fcx_in_gneq =3D private->conf.gneq->reserved2[7] & 0x04; ... } Can this cause a kernel panic if private->conf.gneq is still NULL? [ ... ] > @@ -1647,6 +1649,9 @@ static int dasd_eckd_is_ese(struct dasd_device *dev= ice) > { > struct dasd_eckd_private *private =3D device->private; > =20 > + if (!private) > + return 0; > + > return private->vsq.vol_info.ese; > } [Severity: Critical] This is a pre-existing issue, but does this lockless check introduce a Time-Of-Check to Time-Of-Use (TOCTOU) Use-After-Free? If dasd_generic_set_online() is running concurrently and dasd_eckd_check_characteristics() encounters an error (like an I/O failure), it manually frees private: drivers/s390/block/dasd_eckd.c:dasd_eckd_check_characteristics() { ... out_err1: dasd_eckd_clear_conf_data(device); dasd_path_remove_kobjects(device); kfree(device->private); device->private =3D NULL; ... } Since sysfs readers like dasd_eckd_is_ese() don't hold a lock protecting device->private, could private be freed immediately after the !private check but before private->vsq.vol_info.ese is accessed? [ ... ] [Severity: High] This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but it looks like the copy_pair sysfs store handler is missing a similar safeguard. If an administrator writes to copy_pair concurrently with dasd_generic_set_online(), it executes dasd_copy_pair_store() which locklessly accesses the discipline: drivers/s390/block/dasd_devmap.c:dasd_copy_pair_store() { ... if (device->discipline->pprc_enabled) { pprc_enabled =3D device->discipline->pprc_enabled(device); ... } If device->discipline is NULL during the window before it is assigned, could this cause a NULL pointer dereference? Furthermore, even if discipline is assigned, dasd_eckd_pprc_enabled() unconditionally dereferences device->private without checking if it is allocated: drivers/s390/block/dasd_eckd.c:dasd_eckd_pprc_enabled() { struct dasd_eckd_private *private =3D device->private; =20 return private->rdc_data.facilities.PPRC_enabled; } Should these locations be guarded as well? --=20 Sashiko AI review =C2=B7 https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260805111612.1285= 190-1-sth@linux.ibm.com?part=3D3