Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 55CF430C159 for ; Sat, 8 Aug 2026 02:52:25 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1786157546; cv=none; b=KSpqkXOh9k+KOJSTUaBZ/zyAlPUtFGbedFBv6X/z0kwCBfMN4Vc63kMv6z4U5v3FnQMbWc/oVxIngUjJeWpD0+yNqViNjQK0a2W6vVIHgilPKHWSGzM1RYZImT2cz6ZAdh0fplKJT/0obzfEziF3CbDQZ0oBy0/uR+AVxFAQfr0= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1786157546; c=relaxed/simple; bh=IyrLD+xOFGegidxPyTKb2SJKhYGf8XZnAXwmn3D7l4o=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=lvC8XzKS4DhvPeoPfXollL65EYDeDNMWpFtZc1rQ57WY8FlN4BMh6DvAKaknAuPnXAbRVsFVdHe4kgOO7/iwc5BF6pjXCogbGxTbys1jGCRk0623C4E9GT3JOrpXYmbOLlvUsLNVTTfpvYCho59R9dvEQ0VMXav5ISJUdKdVL4c= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=WTxEZVnp; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="WTxEZVnp" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 624F81F000E9; Sat, 8 Aug 2026 02:52:24 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1786157545; bh=92AbvF1fdfv5VQPfXd7FU6e6xgX6YeJMiU0+N3WLGRI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=WTxEZVnpoXvhWNerAWSrjhIACR/reIxYzY7sVm7LFwFBh7Hnacyg8du2JZkszuQ4/ 1iPCP1qQbo4zhPbg/rqt4U95YqWgykzWIcRphEvs8bFI9Ce3d+QzQF4nqchTnNjiVs c8O0uHFv3px7J8xuiAIL7c+TTo4Y96MBnrtXO9NWJN/2rHEHT070KjtyRZTLekyi8n USQz4kJQYffis5f8Xl3TcE/8zNzCyKpEI1n9mK3mbOrgxIZyDB9+qmpVgLG9Mv3Jgg NIwORLiYj5h0JCZO4fu+hkl++ostxdoOAA3GDTcAsMBaEiMyzngXxHTHwVJ2EuDDQy F20mSO9NVPlFw== From: Sasha Levin To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Pavitra Jha , Viacheslav Dubeyko , Ilya Dryomov , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.18.y] libceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in decode_lockers() Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2026 22:52:22 -0400 Message-ID: <20260808025222.4027615-1-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <2026072945-stegosaur-unseemly-ca25@gregkh> References: <2026072945-stegosaur-unseemly-ca25@gregkh> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Pavitra Jha [ Upstream commit a109a556115271ca7896dcda7b4b7e45e156c227 ] decode_lockers() in cls_lock_client.c contains two bare decode operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger slab-out-of-bounds reads: 1. ceph_decode_32(p) at the num_lockers field has no preceding bounds check. ceph_start_decoding() accepts struct_len=0 as valid -- the internal ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes -- so when an OSD sends struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with p == end. The immediately following bare ceph_decode_32(p) then reads 4 bytes past the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is passed directly to kzalloc_objs() as the locker count. The sibling function decode_watchers() in osd_client.c already uses ceph_decode_32_safe() after its own ceph_start_decoding() call. decode_lockers() was the only site using the bare variant. 2. ceph_decode_8(p) after the decode_locker() loop has no preceding bounds check. If an OSD crafts num_lockers such that the loop advances p exactly to end, the subsequent bare ceph_decode_8(p) reads one byte past the validated buffer boundary. The result is passed directly into *type, which is used as a lock type discriminator by callers, giving an OSD-controlled one-byte OOB read with direct influence over the lock type field. Fix both by replacing bare operations with their safe variants: ceph_decode_32(p) -> ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, *num_lockers, err_inval) ceph_decode_8(p) -> ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, *type, err_free_lockers) The goto targets differ intentionally: err_inval: is a new label returning -EINVAL directly. It is used for the pre-allocation failure path where *lockers is not yet allocated and must not be passed to ceph_free_lockers(). err_free_lockers: is the existing label. It is used for the post-allocation failure path where *lockers is allocated and must be freed. ret is set to -EINVAL before ceph_decode_8_safe() so that err_free_lockers returns the correct error code on bounds violation. Without this, err_free_lockers would return a stale ret value (0 from the successful decode_locker() loop), silently swallowing the error. -EINVAL is correct for both failure paths. The data received from the OSD is structurally malformed. -ENOMEM would misrepresent the failure class to callers and to stable@ backporters triaging error paths. Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition). [ idryomov: trim changelog, formatting ] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: d4ed4a530562 ("libceph: support for lock.lock_info") Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c index 66136a4c1ce7f..639793597b76c 100644 --- a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c +++ b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c @@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag, if (ret) return ret; - *num_lockers = ceph_decode_32(p); + ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, *num_lockers, err_inval); *lockers = kcalloc(*num_lockers, sizeof(**lockers), GFP_NOIO); if (!*lockers) return -ENOMEM; @@ -310,7 +310,8 @@ static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag, goto err_free_lockers; } - *type = ceph_decode_8(p); + ret = -EINVAL; + ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, *type, err_free_lockers); s = ceph_extract_encoded_string(p, end, NULL, GFP_NOIO); if (IS_ERR(s)) { ret = PTR_ERR(s); @@ -320,6 +321,9 @@ static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag, *tag = s; return 0; +err_inval: + return -EINVAL; + err_free_lockers: ceph_free_lockers(*lockers, *num_lockers); return ret; -- 2.53.0