Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7FE293BFE5D for ; Mon, 17 Aug 2026 12:45:05 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1786970706; cv=none; b=oRGc/nKBjSuMYRNJ4sQJFbPKBpC92GN5aLLbZs0iQMQT2MRiTx8u9m3dw13cXETZi4l9rOdjKyJT7kgsxRqtn0ZFGY9mdyE9HxD1vUDNd5Bss3xb8m1msx99ch6kO21kVK2/AOEvEhzDn/0btAnKj1tWL2o9UY6Zi54u+Gpwfv4= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1786970706; c=relaxed/simple; bh=JJnKLc8JQW726PcjBA6iSJLe4afqd1UinyKC0ppodPE=; h=Subject:To:Cc:From:Date:Message-ID:MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=TQM5CVNoBkV67JWyBnEWsVeJ63NPOk25xinyQbBOPzhTuXjatBfS+05LfkMPz5uP+uTz+nHVQwRldvmmFmIaJAVrCVwVghtytw057QR/GmOHLVsZpVuMw1Y5EAeOoJuSVkIJXSyYq/zRPJF7GP/WgFULNxjT9shS5QXUOZiyPjA= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=EZLOnUQN; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="EZLOnUQN" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 38C531F000E9; Mon, 17 Aug 2026 12:45:03 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1786970705; bh=hnWP1cRzJc+wE3JNISjE1URb3Cv9G22DLHbWFXhRw6E=; h=Subject:To:Cc:From:Date; b=EZLOnUQNEwsYQMgWilYVYHo8mDgT86wrInIeQncMfg6UIg0SGm+ZWt0zamf/u4H0s VrmGnKZzeRBTeQwk4+mTKqTpomVrPm6YYa3c/z1vJiclEe2RlW01O6Jd+oL1rsLcFp AHwrxlQxxJNa32WsmTJvbMifvLuq16iFklcmF2EU= Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] net/sched: act_gact, act_police: range check the fallback" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree To: hj351016@gmail.com,jhs@mojatatu.com,kuba@kernel.org,victor@mojatatu.com Cc: From: Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2026 14:44:10 +0200 Message-ID: <2026081710-bronco-grumpily-43a9@gregkh> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ANSI_X3.4-1968 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The patch below does not apply to the 5.10-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to . To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.10.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 883b56ae58fe657d8497806c7059646e9ba6dbd0 # git commit -s git send-email --to '' --in-reply-to '2026081710-bronco-grumpily-43a9@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.10.y' 'HEAD^..' Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 883b56ae58fe657d8497806c7059646e9ba6dbd0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hyunjung Ko Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2026 19:12:52 +0900 Subject: [PATCH] net/sched: act_gact, act_police: range check the fallback control action tcf_action_check_ctrlact() range checks the primary control action: if (!opcode) ret = action > TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX ? -EINVAL : 0; TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX is TC_ACT_TRAP, so kernel-internal verdicts above it cannot be set that way. But act_gact and act_police each carry a second, independent control action supplied by user space that never reaches that helper - TCA_GACT_PROB.paction and TCA_POLICE_RESULT. Both only reject TC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN, so any other value is stored verbatim and returned verbatim from the action. In particular user space can store TC_ACT_CONSUMED, which is TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX + 1 and is deliberately not part of the UAPI value range. That verdict tells every caller the action took ownership of the skb, so nobody frees it: sch_handle_ingress(), sch_handle_egress() and tcf_qevent_handle() all deliberately skip the free for it. The result is one leaked sk_buff plus its data buffer per packet traversing the filter, unbounded, for all traffic on the chain including kernel-generated packets. Both are trivially deterministic. act_gact clamps tcfg_pval to >= 1, so with pval = 1 gact_determ() returns the fallback for every packet. act_police has no mandatory rate, so rate = 0 leaves tcfp_mtu = ~0 and tcf_police_mtu_check() always passes. TC_ACT_CONSUMED was added by commit 720f22fed81b ("net: sched: refactor reinsert action"), after both goto-chain guards were written: commit 9469f375ab09 ("net/sched: act_gact: disallow 'goto chain' on fallback control action") and commit c08f5ed5d625 ("net/sched: act_police: disallow 'goto chain' on fallback control action"). Neither guard was widened when the new verdict appeared. Factor the existing range test out of tcf_action_check_ctrlact() as tcf_action_valid() and apply it to both fallbacks. The helper cannot call tcf_action_check_ctrlact() directly because that also allocates a goto_chain, which is exactly what these two sites must not do. Reproduced on v7.2-rc6: kmemleak reports one leaked 232-byte skbuff_head_cache object plus its 704-byte data buffer per packet. With this patch both configurations are rejected with -EINVAL and kmemleak reports none. Fixes: 720f22fed81b ("net: sched: refactor reinsert action") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.3+ Signed-off-by: Hyunjung Ko Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim Tested-by: Victor Nogueira Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260806101252.809593-1-hj351016@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski diff --git a/include/net/act_api.h b/include/net/act_api.h index 20d9e55f8564..fd03f6319e88 100644 --- a/include/net/act_api.h +++ b/include/net/act_api.h @@ -270,6 +270,25 @@ int tcf_action_check_ctrlact(int action, struct tcf_proto *tp, struct tcf_chain *tcf_action_set_ctrlact(struct tc_action *a, int action, struct tcf_chain *newchain); +/* Range check for a control action supplied by user space. + * + * This is the same test tcf_action_check_ctrlact() applies to the primary + * control action, factored out for the *fallback* control actions + * (act_gact's TCA_GACT_PROB.paction and act_police's TCA_POLICE_RESULT), + * which must not reach tcf_action_check_ctrlact() because they have no + * goto_chain to allocate. Without it, user space can store kernel-internal + * verdicts such as TC_ACT_CONSUMED, which is TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX + 1 and is + * deliberately not part of the UAPI value range. + */ +static inline bool tcf_action_valid(int action) +{ + int opcode = TC_ACT_EXT_OPCODE(action); + + if (!opcode) + return action <= TC_ACT_VALUE_MAX; + return opcode <= TC_ACT_EXT_OPCODE_MAX || action == TC_ACT_UNSPEC; +} + #ifdef CONFIG_INET DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(tcf_frag_xmit_count); #endif diff --git a/net/sched/act_gact.c b/net/sched/act_gact.c index e949280eb800..565860cccba6 100644 --- a/net/sched/act_gact.c +++ b/net/sched/act_gact.c @@ -89,6 +89,11 @@ static int tcf_gact_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla, p_parm = nla_data(tb[TCA_GACT_PROB]); if (p_parm->ptype >= MAX_RAND) return -EINVAL; + if (!tcf_action_valid(p_parm->paction)) { + NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, + "invalid fallback control action"); + return -EINVAL; + } if (TC_ACT_EXT_CMP(p_parm->paction, TC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN)) { NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "goto chain not allowed on fallback"); diff --git a/net/sched/act_police.c b/net/sched/act_police.c index b16468a98c55..ce08f6840ef7 100644 --- a/net/sched/act_police.c +++ b/net/sched/act_police.c @@ -128,6 +128,12 @@ static int tcf_police_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla, if (tb[TCA_POLICE_RESULT]) { tcfp_result = nla_get_u32(tb[TCA_POLICE_RESULT]); + if (!tcf_action_valid(tcfp_result)) { + NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, + "invalid fallback control action"); + err = -EINVAL; + goto failure; + } if (TC_ACT_EXT_CMP(tcfp_result, TC_ACT_GOTO_CHAIN)) { NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "goto chain not allowed on fallback");