From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	patches@lists.linux.dev,
	Lincoln Wallace <locnnil0@gmail.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.10 359/389] ima: fix out-of-bounds read in xattr_verify()
Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2026 15:33:18 +0200
Message-ID: <20260817132552.752532850@linuxfoundation.org>
In-Reply-To: <20260817132538.796021292@linuxfoundation.org>
References: <20260817132538.796021292@linuxfoundation.org>
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5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lincoln Wallace <locnnil0@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 5ff232d31106f45ac87c3b64e1d35a0667777797 ]

The digest-length check in xattr_verify() mixes int and size_t:

	if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >=
			iint->ima_hash->length)

sizeof() yields size_t, so the usual arithmetic conversions promote
the whole left-hand side to unsigned 64-bit before the subtraction
runs. For a truncated xattr this underflows instead of going negative:
a 1-byte IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG xattr (xattr_len == 1, hash_start == 1)
turns "1 - 1 - 1" into SIZE_MAX, which is trivially >= ima_hash->length.
The check then passes and the following memcmp() reads
iint->ima_hash->length bytes starting past the end of the buffer
vfs_getxattr_alloc() allocated for it.

Nothing upstream clamps xattr_len back into a safe range first:
ima_get_hash_algo() only special-cases xattr_len < 2 to pick a default
algorithm, and evm_verifyxattr() returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN rather than
failing when no HMAC key is loaded, so a truncated security.ima value
reaches the length check as-is.

Rewrite the comparison so every operand stays a signed int and no
implicit conversion to size_t can occur.

Fixes: 3ea7a56067e6 ("ima: provide hash algo info in the xattr")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lincoln Wallace <locnnil0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Lincoln Wallace <locnnil0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 7122a359a268e..615a20b9eb52b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -242,8 +242,13 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			break;
 		}
 		clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
-		if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >=
-				iint->ima_hash->length)
+		/*
+		 * Use addition, not subtraction: sizeof() forces unsigned
+		 * math and a short xattr_len would wrap around, bypassing
+		 * this bounds check.
+		 */
+		if (xattr_len >= (int)sizeof(xattr_value->type) + hash_start +
+				(int)iint->ima_hash->length)
 			/*
 			 * xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous
 			 * version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16
-- 
2.53.0