Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B46B52E8DEC; Mon, 17 Aug 2026 15:13:02 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1786979583; cv=none; b=syhxora8smTxXuLQ9Kw1w4svKBa/JliLTfwGlaF8Mia5m3Zx+QW6QjIuDjiTkv7eXaGOqdrGTQcmjtwyriKfDrHwddcjE0MPBjqN1qifSK2mL2GDxxE1/VNpD0Hqsz1EHGb9Z3xchLaQEWP5eK9uXBkIiiin+94dFcMEIHKnN/s= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1786979583; c=relaxed/simple; bh=NvKDEch764BE+n3u8ytSY1+0yje8c3t5DMDYl6xy460=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=QQEnY37+eIo9bKHkAHF9K60Ekc3b1MGQbu4BuAqc7EREnAQXvng8aHKaIo5UdH0G/RcLXi/bEZ36QMrF+PBMmKxZ+a9YCkXir85ZeXTYtZIAF3nQ/CJ68nf+JVPKyjmFTREaqU++M8h7JQl4G7qf7tvhM6srOFutDUBWApqJ+iU= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=yx1zVPND; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="yx1zVPND" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 43AC41F000E9; Mon, 17 Aug 2026 15:13:02 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1786979582; bh=SVPv/SwaBlKRfh7PSSkIx58kGHFBiptN6dnZ6bWzEKk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=yx1zVPNDFvq4trPqOXF+jS9A1dJIM7BxTM14RaH0PF24J5PwysKE19hzCvaBgE7pL ENekMGI+3aaJS/+uK7WnsbzfZ4pxfvLC9/O+qizHtoVN5QfalTGtAW82P3qTaBneRW f/ISe+1LQCbiYREVoZ82b92TQnGwP1vcLxr9tmjI= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Simon Horman , Doruk Tan Ozturk , Jakub Kicinski Subject: [PATCH 6.1 274/609] mac802154: llsec: reject frames shorter than the authentication tag Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2026 15:29:30 +0200 Message-ID: <20260817132553.313982946@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260817132543.039278408@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260817132543.039278408@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Doruk Tan Ozturk commit fd3a3f28ed60c6af4b2a39933b151d6b27842c3b upstream. llsec_do_decrypt_auth() computes the associated-data length for the AEAD request as assoclen += datalen - authlen; where datalen is the number of bytes after the MAC header and authlen (4, 8 or 16) is the length of the authentication tag. Nothing verifies that the frame actually carries at least authlen payload bytes. A secured frame whose payload is shorter than the tag makes datalen - authlen negative; assoclen is then passed to aead_request_set_ad() as an unsigned value close to 4 GiB, so crypto_aead_decrypt() walks far off the end of the scatterlist that only spans the real frame. The frame is fully attacker-controlled and reaches this path from any IEEE 802.15.4 peer in radio range. Reject frames whose payload is shorter than the authentication tag before the subtraction. Dynamically reproduced on a KASAN kernel as a general-protection-fault in the AEAD scatterwalk, and the fix confirmed. Fixes: 4c14a2fb5d14 ("mac802154: add llsec decryption method") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260716193423.32498-1-doruk@0sec.ai Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/mac802154/llsec.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) --- a/net/mac802154/llsec.c +++ b/net/mac802154/llsec.c @@ -888,6 +888,11 @@ llsec_do_decrypt_auth(struct sk_buff *sk data = skb_mac_header(skb) + skb->mac_len; datalen = skb_tail_pointer(skb) - data; + if (datalen < authlen) { + kfree_sensitive(req); + return -EBADMSG; + } + sg_init_one(&sg, skb_mac_header(skb), assoclen + datalen); if (!(hdr->sec.level & IEEE802154_SCF_SECLEVEL_ENC)) {