Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4A12237C925; Thu, 20 Aug 2026 15:18:41 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1787239122; cv=none; b=NhwEEOc90Lz8W4YhfDZqp9G5ixqYhmiHjTi0StR84cnn9Gbg7gpY2A/MiTPJgd16rITQpB5Z09SZeG+VjeBc1ghwIxDG/TGv426nTa9wHYUSiFZ7wOMXpQ3s7+igWKQjuSxtkKPpxk+pI9BIavl1seDdVEEw86qKIuLgSkEt7rQ= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1787239122; c=relaxed/simple; bh=L3BjrioiV59UtC228zzJa/9LCHICANpzO7ThxR1+crQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=Vrxs/n0shKCG7ocBR5lX6g7eMn7zyvuBpHqUbwNo8Xm0J7QqjtfGv+O0zQioWCRTV3rLZdfY3CVU0wy3X9gbhoBQ4OngJsstCPLZMj6MdnubFG67Oa6HAhtg2Ue4VNVvdGuVGymbdkRlCctyP2pjkW/wq2c9cnZhuaM64UmCjB4= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=nT4FtA47; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="nT4FtA47" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A6BE41F000E9; Thu, 20 Aug 2026 15:18:40 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1787239121; bh=/Ee4bl2KjDnwCEN+MkDO4WSapIokcihKiMifvd2PiEs=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=nT4FtA47jP8m6/SxTZkBMIwSAq0nYvTYhw5A36KAhg25XTr8K6x80S7uNDHiv0EVe VrfuwkE9R4Xtw/2V8xJ7BUiPVQpBZPt4jQJ1wzjvXwEXOdZzzG1OvLIompNIRuUPxZ QPnsjxXM8f9/V8VcYyDjwdGy22qD3hV1PsnDpyKw= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Peter Zijlstra , Yao Kai , Thomas Gleixner , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.18 156/217] futex: Fix race in futex_pivot_pending() during private hash resize Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2026 16:55:24 +0200 Message-ID: <20260820145242.449783078@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260820145237.531699751@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260820145237.531699751@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Yao Kai [ Upstream commit 8e7ff730dd96519a333d1570edf1c3fabb6d3629 ] A task performing a custom private hash resize can remain blocked in uninterruptible sleep indefinitely. The hung-task detector reports: INFO: task futex-resizer:314 blocked for more than 10 seconds. task:futex-resizer state:D stack:14824 pid:314 tgid:312 ppid:311 Call Trace: __schedule+0x521/0xf30 schedule+0x22/0xa0 futex_hash_allocate+0x3db/0x490 __do_sys_prctl+0x6f5/0xbd0 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x530 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Kernel panic - not syncing: hung_task: blocked tasks futex_pivot_pending() allows the resize request to continue when either no replacement hash is pending (hash_new == NULL) or the current hash reference count has reached zero. After the final-reference wake, another futex task can complete the pivot between the two observations: T1 T2 futex_hash_allocate() wait_var_event(mm, ...) futex_pivot_pending(mm) hash_new != NULL futex_hash() futex_ref_get(old) -> false futex_pivot_hash(mm) hash_new = NULL __futex_pivot_hash(mm, new) rcu_assign_pointer(hash, new) fph = rcu_dereference(hash) /* new */ futex_ref_is_dead(fph) -> false schedule() The pivot changes the state from hash_new != NULL with a dead current hash to hash_new == NULL with a live current hash. Because futex_pivot_pending() reads hash_new and hash without serialization, the resize task can observe hash_new in the pre-pivot state and hash in the post-pivot state, causing futex_pivot_pending() to return false even though the pivot has completed. The task then goes to sleep after the wakeup has already been consumed. Serialize state reads in futex_pivot_pending() using futex_mm_phash::lock. This guarantees that futex_pivot_pending() observes hash_new and hash atomically, eliminating the race condition. Fixes: bd54df5ea7ca ("futex: Allow to resize the private local hash") Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra Signed-off-by: Yao Kai Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260804125530.3933754-1-yaokai34@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/futex/core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/kernel/futex/core.c +++ b/kernel/futex/core.c @@ -1774,12 +1774,12 @@ static bool futex_pivot_pending(struct m { struct futex_private_hash *fph; - guard(rcu)(); + guard(mutex)(&mm->futex_hash_lock); if (!mm->futex_phash_new) return true; - fph = rcu_dereference(mm->futex_phash); + fph = rcu_dereference_raw(mm->futex_phash); return futex_ref_is_dead(fph); }