Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 47ED4221F26; Sat, 12 Sep 2026 11:04:09 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1789211050; cv=none; b=LqWzc297Su9YdVsTuak3GbQZwF7OviD3prtvQMXdxQy4vHQmggOJolko9iNsjkAy6w8kd4qVye1yegrd3cKfSMBZzfvA7MFM8DS7zp3svUOLy1oMebHV/XgxIWxTNsiI+0VFH1eeDXtCFN9ng3SWI3+1osPClWQNqVWI+tNmpQo= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1789211050; c=relaxed/simple; bh=ivP5EVwwb5YsamLxpvc5Wh/yFGvtGc5DnmmlY8viInw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=YW89dsmsE6u0riV4ex0GJ7y0ioA8ZhhvLrtAxxG3pYVYyuzf9yteQrRmiVmfHA3Mmc3tTQVHom++vkLyVZuoKxnn7a9/HIGuu75TNaJdetI0v978CW3x2OOLAWlgc1pk0nAyu0lifXoVE1Nmd8AxzQSvoNIbPSJOWzV17/FaJNo= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=foyel10X; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="foyel10X" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id BF7621F000FF; Sat, 12 Sep 2026 11:04:07 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1789211048; bh=vpgWIOgYSrHLtRNiV46WkMFA4hFskuGFBosINaubfy4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=foyel10XR8U+LIq+Lv/15wzgW2PMEjA5MgYvxPq1CvNxn4gO2IrL6G45LolzW0zFC LZXRfcngWEr+3QxIC5DWZ31XXK9gWYbByMOzuBeSPI5bwCtTOYgJwrhdx8XIGoAJ4/ 4IHv1huGzDYOMA9Bp9zVWZvVxZkCwCgyQeV/2408= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Roberto Sassu , Coiby Xu , Ard Biesheuvel , Mimi Zohar , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.18 1108/1518] integrity: Make arch_ima_get_secureboot integrity-wide Date: Sat, 12 Sep 2026 08:54:37 +0200 Message-ID: <20260912065648.515969121@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260912065623.398859879@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260912065623.398859879@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Coiby Xu [ Upstream commit 31a6a07eefeb4c84bd6730fbe9e95fd9221712cf ] EVM and other LSMs need the ability to query the secure boot status of the system, without directly calling the IMA arch_ima_get_secureboot function. Refactor the secure boot status check into a general function named arch_get_secureboot. Reported-and-suggested-by: Mimi Zohar Suggested-by: Roberto Sassu Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Stable-dep-of: 3f7c9f9c36b4 ("s390/irqflags: Add out-of-line definitions of arch_local_irq_*() for KMSAN") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- MAINTAINERS | 1 + arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 5 -- arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c | 6 ++ arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c | 6 -- arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c | 5 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 4 +- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 2 +- include/linux/ima.h | 7 +-- include/linux/secure_boot.h | 19 +++++++ security/integrity/Makefile | 3 +- security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c | 47 +--------------- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 3 +- security/integrity/integrity.h | 1 + security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 2 +- security/integrity/secure_boot.c | 16 ++++++ 17 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/secure_boot.h create mode 100644 security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/secure_boot.c diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index 2a8ccc21183ae..022ad429aa9fa 100644 --- a/MAINTAINERS +++ b/MAINTAINERS @@ -12389,6 +12389,7 @@ R: Eric Snowberg L: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org S: Supported T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git +F: include/linux/secure_boot.h F: security/integrity/ F: security/integrity/ima/ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c index b7029beed847d..0d8892a035266 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c @@ -7,11 +7,6 @@ #include #include -bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void) -{ - return is_ppc_secureboot_enabled(); -} - /* * The "secure_rules" are enabled only on "secureboot" enabled systems. * These rules verify the file signatures against known good values. diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c index 3a28795b4ed82..28436c1599e08 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/secure_boot.c @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ */ #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -44,6 +45,11 @@ bool is_ppc_secureboot_enabled(void) return enabled; } +bool arch_get_secureboot(void) +{ + return is_ppc_secureboot_enabled(); +} + bool is_ppc_trustedboot_enabled(void) { struct device_node *node; diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c index f3c3e6e1c5d38..6ccbe34ce4087 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c @@ -1,12 +1,6 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 #include -#include - -bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void) -{ - return ipl_secure_flag; -} const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void) { diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c index dcdc7e2748486..781deb5885572 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ipl.c @@ -2504,6 +2504,11 @@ void *ipl_report_finish(struct ipl_report *report) return buf; } +bool arch_get_secureboot(void) +{ + return ipl_secure_flag; +} + int ipl_report_free(struct ipl_report *report) { struct ipl_report_component *comp, *ncomp; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h index f5932705f4b07..be58b7f5c8063 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h @@ -402,9 +402,9 @@ extern int __init efi_memmap_split_count(efi_memory_desc_t *md, extern void __init efi_memmap_insert(struct efi_memory_map *old_memmap, void *buf, struct efi_mem_range *mem); -extern enum efi_secureboot_mode __x86_ima_efi_boot_mode(void); +enum efi_secureboot_mode __x86_efi_boot_mode(void); -#define arch_ima_efi_boot_mode __x86_ima_efi_boot_mode() +#define arch_efi_boot_mode __x86_efi_boot_mode() #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_RUNTIME_MAP int efi_get_runtime_map_size(void); diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c index 791c52c8393f4..5b00b13f72d4a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c @@ -921,7 +921,7 @@ umode_t efi_attr_is_visible(struct kobject *kobj, struct attribute *attr, int n) return attr->mode; } -enum efi_secureboot_mode __x86_ima_efi_boot_mode(void) +enum efi_secureboot_mode __x86_efi_boot_mode(void) { return boot_params.secure_boot; } diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index abf8923f8fc51..8e08baf16c2fd 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include struct linux_binprm; @@ -73,14 +74,8 @@ int ima_validate_range(phys_addr_t phys, size_t size); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT -extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void); extern const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void); #else -static inline bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void) -{ - return false; -} - static inline const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void) { return NULL; diff --git a/include/linux/secure_boot.h b/include/linux/secure_boot.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..3ded3f03655c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/secure_boot.h @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2026 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Author: Coiby Xu + */ + +#ifndef _LINUX_SECURE_BOOT_H +#define _LINUX_SECURE_BOOT_H + +#include + +/* + * Returns true if the platform secure boot is enabled. + * Returns false if disabled or not supported. + */ +bool arch_get_secureboot(void); + +#endif /* _LINUX_SECURE_BOOT_H */ diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile index 92b63039c654c..548665e2b702e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/Makefile @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity.o -integrity-y := iint.o +integrity-y := iint.o secure_boot.o integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT) += integrity_audit.o integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_PPC_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \ platform_certs/load_powerpc.o \ platform_certs/keyring_handler.o +integrity-$(CONFIG_EFI) += efi_secureboot.o # The relative order of the 'ima' and 'evm' LSMs depends on the order below. obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima/ obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm/ diff --git a/security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c b/security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..bfd4260a83a33 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-1.0+ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2018 IBM Corporation + */ +#include +#include +#include + +#ifndef arch_efi_boot_mode +#define arch_efi_boot_mode efi_secureboot_mode_unset +#endif + +static enum efi_secureboot_mode get_sb_mode(void) +{ + enum efi_secureboot_mode mode; + + if (!efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE)) { + pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode unknown, no efi\n"); + return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown; + } + + mode = efi_get_secureboot_mode(efi.get_variable); + if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_disabled) + pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode disabled\n"); + else if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unknown) + pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode unknown\n"); + else + pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode enabled\n"); + return mode; +} + +/* + * Query secure boot status + * + * Note don't call this function too early e.g. in __setup hook otherwise the + * kernel may hang when calling efi_get_secureboot_mode. + * + */ +bool arch_get_secureboot(void) +{ + static enum efi_secureboot_mode sb_mode; + static bool initialized; + + if (!initialized && efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) { + sb_mode = arch_efi_boot_mode; + + if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unset) + sb_mode = get_sb_mode(); + initialized = true; + } + + if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_enabled) + return true; + else + return false; +} diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index b7fc3e7ee37eb..6a33484fcd6fe 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ core_param(ima_appraise, ima_appraise_cmdline_default, charp, 0); void __init ima_appraise_parse_cmdline(void) { const char *str = ima_appraise_cmdline_default; - bool sb_state = arch_ima_get_secureboot(); + bool sb_state = arch_get_secureboot(); int appraisal_state = ima_appraise; if (!str) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c index 138029bfcce1e..78191879dd98f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c @@ -2,52 +2,9 @@ /* * Copyright (C) 2018 IBM Corporation */ -#include #include #include -#include - -#ifndef arch_ima_efi_boot_mode -#define arch_ima_efi_boot_mode efi_secureboot_mode_unset -#endif - -static enum efi_secureboot_mode get_sb_mode(void) -{ - enum efi_secureboot_mode mode; - - if (!efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE)) { - pr_info("ima: secureboot mode unknown, no efi\n"); - return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown; - } - - mode = efi_get_secureboot_mode(efi.get_variable); - if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_disabled) - pr_info("ima: secureboot mode disabled\n"); - else if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unknown) - pr_info("ima: secureboot mode unknown\n"); - else - pr_info("ima: secureboot mode enabled\n"); - return mode; -} - -bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void) -{ - static enum efi_secureboot_mode sb_mode; - static bool initialized; - - if (!initialized && efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) { - sb_mode = arch_ima_efi_boot_mode; - - if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unset) - sb_mode = get_sb_mode(); - initialized = true; - } - - if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_enabled) - return true; - else - return false; -} +#include /* secureboot arch rules */ static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = { @@ -67,7 +24,7 @@ static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = { const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void) { - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) { + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_get_secureboot()) { if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)) set_module_sig_enforced(); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG)) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 2f58e8208997c..e51b53b7789b1 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -978,8 +978,7 @@ static int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) switch (id) { case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE: - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG) - && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) { + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG) && arch_get_secureboot()) { pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n"); return -EACCES; } diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index c2c2da6911233..17b037b3fd096 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include #include +#include #include #include #include diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c index d1fdd113450a6..c0d6948446c30 100644 --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) } /* the MOK/MOKx can not be trusted when secure boot is disabled */ - if (!arch_ima_get_secureboot()) + if (!arch_get_secureboot()) return 0; mokx = get_cert_list(L"MokListXRT", &mok_var, &mokxsize, &status); diff --git a/security/integrity/secure_boot.c b/security/integrity/secure_boot.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..fc2693c286f8b --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/secure_boot.c @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Copyright (C) 2026 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Author: Coiby Xu + */ +#include + +/* + * Default weak implementation. + * Architectures that support secure boot must override this. + */ +__weak bool arch_get_secureboot(void) +{ + return false; +} -- 2.53.0