Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 611D7456DE1; Sat, 12 Sep 2026 11:06:22 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1789211183; cv=none; b=UUmP71fqK68vpQvmbqzIY70Akk2ObReUDxukbj0gQAUvN+hWgx9p7h9lBYj32wVyLEzh0BivUCPx4EU5rlwTnNxkzVV/pmsm/c/XPQEHnHoqN3nO/MRTQjyMZNUaHTdSNTcrnAcq9UzoWpTKqHhe+qa+S+6CnE9i+t9ixgR4YCY= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1789211183; c=relaxed/simple; bh=RTJQNq23HuFRoqcK8j26/kvXvZCMg6FQ9jy9nIapJqQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=Xf9rFtNr/ZtO0qhX1cCWeqLEe3ocMsCMQJ4VDB4Eu2g2EuXlDf2qDbCm7yxPYl+eFVwvFs8MSU/ltgqmEUcBIU2DF+09kw8ll2gFqdfDmgNW+hTnr6ebmqfzN3hE3BZuy8/as3gtHGL4tdyjwG4DWh/O7MkiPeetbapBXqF31HE= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=PtQCJ/Oh; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="PtQCJ/Oh" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1AA881F000FF; Sat, 12 Sep 2026 11:06:21 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1789211182; bh=TM4B70Pi22Pf1L8/XWExhpp6qOYZ9p4vhyE6dg7Mu8A=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=PtQCJ/OhrdSSmH3ES6QXSQuLz+i1+qT3iqMy7InAno/IZYdz8ZgoAK99aJz3RAb5v J9eX89BHdMX6i3s6n7UmBY4pzmxrGVqMUrxiIZLhLp6CZpjvBfJZm/3VXGC8KiZIYM pVwpLe/+urVssClVqM7XghFDfxQ2jn1qoWpFIOfg= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, ZhengYuan Huang , Joseph Qi , Mark Fasheh , Joel Becker , Junxiao Bi , Changwei Ge , Jun Piao , Heming Zhao , Andrew Morton , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.18 1177/1518] ocfs2: validate orphan slot during inode read Date: Sat, 12 Sep 2026 08:55:46 +0200 Message-ID: <20260912065650.101335404@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260912065623.398859879@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260912065623.398859879@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: ZhengYuan Huang [ Upstream commit b2d31acbd3b182755b019183fb46949ba5e39b9f ] Patch series "ocfs2: validate active orphan slots during inode read". OCFS2 trusts active ordinary and append-DIO orphan slots read from dinodes. A corrupted slot can therefore index osb_orphan_wipes or the slot-local system-inode cache outside their allocations before the corruption is reported. Patch 1 validates the ordinary orphan slot used by inode wipe processing. Patch 2 validates the append-DIO orphan slot used by DIO completion and orphan recovery. Both checks reject corrupt metadata at the existing inode validation boundary. This patch (of 2): [BUG] A corrupted dinode with OCFS2_ORPHANED_FL can carry an i_orphaned_slot outside the mounted filesystem slot range. ocfs2_wipe_inode() uses it to index osb_orphan_wipes before looking up the orphan directory, causing an out-of-bounds memory access. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x780/0x820 fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c:102 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b767c00 by task kworker/u8:3/85 Call Trace: ... ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x780/0x820 fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c:102 ocfs2_wipe_inode+0x292/0xf70 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:840 ocfs2_delete_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1155 [inline] ocfs2_evict_inode+0x6c9/0x1170 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1295 evict+0x38e/0x8f0 fs/inode.c:810 iput_final fs/inode.c:1914 [inline] iput fs/inode.c:1966 [inline] iput+0x55b/0x8b0 fs/inode.c:1926 ocfs2_recover_orphans+0x610/0xe40 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:2374 ocfs2_complete_recovery+0x5af/0xd00 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:1373 ... [CAUSE] ocfs2_validate_inode_block() validates i_suballoc_slot but leaves the active ordinary orphan slot unchecked. Downstream consumers assume that the value is smaller than osb->max_slots. [FIX] Reject an active i_orphaned_slot outside the slot range during dinode validation, before the inode reaches orphan wipe processing. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260803030007.3993199-1-gality369@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260803030007.3993199-2-gality369@gmail.com Fixes: b4df6ed8db0c ("[PATCH] ocfs2: fix orphan recovery deadlock") Signed-off-by: ZhengYuan Huang Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi Cc: Mark Fasheh Cc: Joel Becker Cc: Junxiao Bi Cc: Changwei Ge Cc: Jun Piao Cc: Heming Zhao Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c index d247d69349e4a..a33de57f31618 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c @@ -1538,6 +1538,14 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb, goto bail; } + if ((le32_to_cpu(di->i_flags) & OCFS2_ORPHANED_FL) && + le16_to_cpu(di->i_orphaned_slot) >= OCFS2_SB(sb)->max_slots) { + rc = ocfs2_error(sb, "Invalid dinode %llu: orphaned slot %u\n", + (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr, + le16_to_cpu(di->i_orphaned_slot)); + goto bail; + } + /* * Reject dinodes whose i_mode does not name one of the seven * canonical POSIX file types. ocfs2_populate_inode() copies -- 2.53.0